State v. Anthony
| Decision Date | 26 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | AN-88-8987,KN-88-970,AN-88-10971,KN-88-816,PA-88-1009,AN-88-8986,PA-88-601,AN-88-8966,AN-88-9165,Nos. S-3650,S-3765,KN-88-966,s. S-3650 |
| Citation | 810 P.2d 155 |
| Parties | STATE of Alaska, Appellant, v. Dennis Ray ANTHONY, James Richard Flake, David Matthew Logue, Richard R. Ecklund, Victor E. Chambers, on behalf of themselves and all other persons who are now or will be similarly situated, CASE NO. 3CI, Leroy K. Smith, Roger M. Pike, Patrick Plentnikoff, Richard D. Nitz, Michael A. Bateman, and Robert D. Lozzio, Robert D. Thrall, CASE NO. 3CI, Reginald L. Silvernail, CASE NO. 3CI, Anthony L. Brown, CASE NO. 3CI, Edward P. Lowry, CASE NO. 3CI, John C. Aspell, CASE NO. 3CI, Richard H. Krantz, CASE NO. 3CI, Sidney R. Hertz, Peter W. Thorsen, CASE NO. 3CI, Terry F. Newell, CASE NO. 3CI, Robert G. Klink, CASE NO. 3CI, Appellees. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant, v. Richard Carl SNYDER, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Marilyn May, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, and Jeffrey W. Bush, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Douglas B. Baily, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellant.
Pete Ehrhardt, Robinson, Beiswenger & Ehrhardt, Soldotna, for appellees Anthony, Silvernail, Newell and Klink.
Edward P. Lowry, Sidney R. Hertz, Anthony L. Brown, appellees pro se.
Leroy K. Smith, appellee pro se.
Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and BURKE, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.
The issue in this appeal is whether AS 43.23.005(d), 1 which prohibits certain felons from collecting permanent fund dividends, violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and/or the Alaska Constitution. 2 The superior court held the statute violative of "equal protection." We reverse.
AS 43.23.005(d) provides that persons convicted of a felony, who are incarcerated during any period of a fiscal year as a result of the conviction, are ineligible for a permanent fund dividend (dividend) for that year.
Dennis Ray Anthony filed suit pro se in May 1988, challenging the constitutionality of AS 43.23.005(d). Other incarcerated felons later filed similar suits. In January 1989, all pending cases were consolidated. Some plaintiffs retained counsel to represent them. Other plaintiffs continued their pro se representation. Richard Carl Snyder filed suit in May 1989, also challenging the constitutionality of AS 43.23.005(d). Since cross-motions for summary judgment were pending in the consolidated Anthony cases at the time, the Snyder case continued separately to judgment.
In both cases, the inmates alleged that AS 43.23.005(d) violates the equal protection clause, the due process clause, and the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment in the Alaska and United States Constitutions. In both cases, the inmates prevailed on only the equal protection challenge. The state appealed. This court consolidated Snyder with Anthony. Since none of the inmates cross-appealed, 3 the sole issue before the court is whether the superior court erred in holding that AS 43.23.005(d) violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and/or the Alaska Constitution.
Constitutional questions are questions of law to which we apply our independent judgment. Sonneman v. Knight, 790 P.2d 702, 704 (Alaska 1990). We adopt "the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy." Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).
Our analysis focuses on the Alaska Constitution. Alaska's equal protection clause is more protective of individual rights than the federal equal protection clause. Sonneman, 790 P.2d at 706. In analyzing equal protection issues under the Alaska Constitution, we have rejected the traditional two-tiered federal approach in favor of a more flexible "sliding scale" test. State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Alaska 1978). We apply a three-step analysis:
First, it must be determined ... what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review....
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.
Third, an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertaken.... At the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the fit between the means and ends must be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.
Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984). See also Sonneman, 790 P.2d at 704.
Appellees argue that a person's interest in a permanent fund dividend is entitled to enhanced protection under state equal protection analysis because the source of the dividend is property belonging to state residents. They argue that since the Alaska Constitution provides specifically for the permanent fund, an individual's interest in a dividend is a constitutional right entitled to enhanced scrutiny. They rely on the following three sections of the Alaska Constitution:
The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.
At least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received by the State shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principal of which shall be used only for those income-producing investments specifically designated by law as eligible for permanent fund investments. All income from the permanent fund shall be deposited in the general fund unless otherwise provided by law.
Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation.
Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 17. The essence of the appellees' argument is that a dividend is more than the right to receive a check each year. According to the inmates, the dividend represents a constitutionally protected interest in the natural resources of the state.
The state counters that an inmate's interest in a dividend is less important than other interests which the court has held deserve only minimal scrutiny. It cites Sonneman, 790 P.2d 702, in which we held that the right to receive unemployment compensation benefits was entitled to review at the low end of the sliding scale. The state also cites State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983) (), and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 705 P.2d 418, 437 (Alaska 1985) ().
Previously we indicated that we will apply only minimum scrutiny to a statute affecting an individual's right to a permanent fund dividend. See Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448, 459 (Alaska 1980) (), rev'd on other grounds, Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982). We concluded that the right to a dividend is not analogous to any situation in which the federal courts have applied strict scrutiny. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d at 457. We held that a dividend is not a "basic necessity," id. at 455, nor is the right to receive it a "fundamental right," id. at 457. The United States Supreme Court declined to decide whether enhanced scrutiny was required in analyzing the rights at issue in Zobel, since it held that the preference given to those who had resided in Alaska longer than others was not rationally related to the goals of the statute. 457 U.S. at 60-63, 102 S.Ct. at 2313-2314.
A dividend is merely an economic interest and therefore is entitled only to minimum protection under our equal protection analysis. See Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (Alaska 1983). A dividend is not, generally, a source of income that individuals depend on to supply the basic necessities of life. Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d at 455. It is an annual lump sum payment and the recipients cannot know with certainty how much it will be in any given year.
It is useful to compare a dividend to other interests that this court has found are not entitled to "compelling interest" scrutiny. In Sonneman, we rejected the argument that the right to receive unemployment compensation benefits is an inherent, fundamental right. 790 P.2d at 704-05. We have also held that an individual's interest in employment is not a fundamental right and therefore is not entitled to "compelling interest" scrutiny. Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 40 (Alaska 1980). But cf., State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 632 (Alaska 1989) (). We view an individual's interest in a permanent fund dividend as no more important than one's interest in employment or unemployment compensation benefits.
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