State v. Anthony SR D.

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BEAR
• Citation: State v. Anthony D., 151 Conn.App. 109, 94 A.3d 669 (Conn. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 35553.,35553.
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. ANTHONY D., SR.

151 Conn.App. 109

94 A.3d 669

STATE of Connecticut

v.ANTHONY D., SR.^*

No. 35553.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 8, 2014.

Decided June 17, 2014.

Alan Jay Black, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Robin D. Krawczyk, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BEACH, BEAR and MINTZ, Js.^**

BEAR, J.

The defendant, Anthony D., Sr., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following the trial court's acceptance of his Alford plea,¹ of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70 (a)(1). The defendant claims that he was denied his federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law and to the adequate assistance of counsel when the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without proper inquiry or an evidentiary hearing. He requests that we reverse the judgment of the trial court and order the court to permit him to withdraw his plea or that we order the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motionto withdraw his plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was arrested and charged with several crimes related to his sexual abuse of his girlfriend's child, with whom he had lived since the child was five years old.² On December 5, 2011, the evidentiary portion of the defendant's trial commenced, and, on that day, the state presented six witnesses, including the then fifteen year old victim, who testified extensively about the defendant's sexual abuse, which began when she was six years old. On December 6, 2011, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress his confession to the police, in which he had admitted to sexually abusing the victim. Following the court's denial of that motion, the defendant entered a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to one count of sexual assault in the first degree, which the court accepted, and the state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi for each of the remaining criminal charges. The parties agreed to a sentence of ten years incarceration, with a five year mandatory minimum, followed by ten years of special parole. On the morning of sentencing, the defendant, through counsel, made an oral motion to withdraw his plea and to appoint new counsel, asserting that the defendant was not satisfied with counsel's representation. The court denied that motion and sentenced the defendant to the agreed upon term. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant specifically claims that “[t]here was error under the Due Process Clause of both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and for both clauses under Article One, Section Eight of the Connecticut State Constitution ³ and under Connecticut General Practice Book, Sections 39–26 and 27 when the judge denied the defendant's timely oral motion to withdraw his plea without any type of inquiry or evidentiary hearing as to the underlying basis of the defendant's motion.” We conclude that the inquiry conducted by the court following the defendant's oral motion to withdraw his plea was sufficient under the circumstances of this case.⁴

“Before a guilty plea is accepted a defendant may withdraw it as a matter of right. Practice Book ... § 720 [now § 39–26].⁵ After a guilty plea is accepted but before the imposition of sentence the court is obligated to permit withdrawal upon proof of one of the grounds in [Practice Book] § 721 [now § 39–27].⁶ An evidentiary hearing is not required if the record of the plea proceeding and other information in the court file conclusively establishes that the motion is without merit....

“In considering whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea the court may disregard any allegations of fact, whether contained in the motion or made in an offer of proof, which are either conclusory, vague or oblique. For the purpose of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court should ordinarily assume any specific allegations of fact to be true. If such allegations furnish a basis for withdrawal of the plea under § 721 [now § 39–27] and are not conclusively refuted by the record of the plea proceedings and other information contained in the court file, then an evidentiary hearing is required....

“An evidentiary hearing is not required if the record of the plea proceeding and other information in the court file conclusively establishes that the motion is without merit.... The burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.... To warrant consideration, the defendant must allege and provide facts which justify permitting him to withdraw his plea under [Practice Book § 39–27].” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Salas, 92 Conn.App. 541, 544–45, 885 A.2d 1258 (2005).

The following additional facts provide context for our required analysis. After the trial had commenced, the defendant pleaded guilty on December 6, 2011, to one charge of sexual assault in the first degree in exchange for an agreed upon sentence of ten years imprisonment followed by ten years of special parole. Before accepting the defendant's plea, the court, Alexander, J., conducted a canvass of the defendant in which it asked the defendant if he understood the plea agreement, if he had discussedhis plea with his attorney, if he understood the nature of an Alford plea and agreed that there was a likelihood of being found guilty if he went to trial, if he agreed that he likely would get a greater sentence if he proceeded to complete his trial, if he was pleading guilty to avoid the risk of trial, and if he understood that he was giving up his right to have the state prove the charges the against him, to confront witnesses and to testify on his own behalf. The defendant answered yes to each of these questions. Additionally, the defendant acknowledged that he was not threatened or forced to enter his plea, that no one had made any promises to him other than the plea agreement, and that he was acting of his own free will.

When the court explained the charge of first degree sexual assault to the defendant, he stated that he understood the charge but that he did not agree. The court again explained the Alford plea and again asked the defendant if he understood and still agreed that there was a likelihood that he would get a longer sentence if convicted after trial. The defendant said yes. The court then explained the sex offender registration and treatment requirements to the defendant, and he acknowledged that he understood them. The court proceeded to ask the defendant if he knew that he would be subject to random searches, polygraph examinations and electronic monitoring; the defendant offered an inaudible response, and the court asked him if he had any questions for his attorney. The defendant responded by saying that “nothing that I ask is gonna change anything.” The court then stated that it understood the defendant's point, but wanted to know if the defendant had any questions that he wanted to ask his attorney about what was occurring or about anything of a legal nature. The defendant said no. The court proceeded to accept the plea and to explain to the defendant that the agreement was binding and that the defendant could not come back and change his mind.

On December 16, 2011, the defendant returned to court for his sentencing hearing, which also was conducted by Judge Alexander. At the start of the hearing, the following colloquy took place:

“[Defense Counsel]: ... I'm sorry, before we begin, I understand that we are here for sentencing. I've met with [the defendant]. He is expressing to me concerns over the manner in which he was represented and is asking that he be permitted to withdraw his plea.

“The Court: Okay.

“[Defense Counsel]: Under those circumstances, it would be my application to the court on his behalf that new counsel be appointed to investigate his claim.

“The Court: With respect to it, the court does not believe that there is any factual basis for it. This was the court that took the plea. This was done in the middle of evidence. And, [defendant], if you want to claim at a time after that this was ineffective or somehow coerci[ve] you can have a habeas proceeding. But, Mr. [R. Bruce Lorenzen, defense counsel], as an officer of the court, do you know of any defect in that plea canvass that would allow the court to, in fact, take back the plea at this time?

“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I think that I need to be precise in my language. The canvass itself I think was quite thorough.

“The Court: Right. I mean, we went back and forth. And my recollection was that I repeatedly advised him that this was a permanent agreement and that it could not be changed....

“So, with respect to it, unless you can point out some defect, I am not inclined to have him withdraw his plea, nor am I inclined for purposes of an agreed sentencing to delay the sentencing, given the fact that the complainants are here. And with respect to it, it was only—there was even the agreement, I believe, of the waiver of the [presentence investigation report] at the time. And the court wanted some record for probation; otherwise, the sentence would have been imposed on the date of the plea.

“So, with respect to it, while there may be reasons postjudgment for a different counsel, at this time, I am not going to grant your motion to withdraw because there is no prejudice. This is an agreed sentence. So, unless the court were going to give more and Mr. Lorenzen had to persuade me to give less to maintain the agreement, there is no reason that Mr. Lorenzen is not standing next to you today for an agreed disposition. ... All right. The withdrawal—and...