State v. Antrim
| Decision Date | 29 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 104,620.,104,620. |
| Citation | 279 P.3d 110,294 Kan. 632 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. William ANTRIM, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
The State can breach a plea agreement by effectively arguing against a negotiated sentencing recommendation. However, if the State reserves the right to oppose a defense departure motion and twice makes the concurrent sentencing recommendation that it promised to make, the prosecutor's further comments and cross-examination questions designed to support the agreed recommended sentence and defeat the departure motion do not breach the plea agreement.
Rachel L. Pickering, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
After pleading no contest to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, William M. Antrim appeals his sentence, arguing the State breached the plea agreement by arguing against the recommended sentence in the agreement. Further, he contends the district court erred in determining the minimum prison term he must serve before becoming eligible for parole and in including lifetime electronic monitoring in the journal entry of judgment. Because the district court had no authority to impose lifetime electronic monitoring, we remand this case to the district court for entry of a nunc pro tunc order deleting the reference to electronic monitoring in the journal entry, but we affirm the remainder of his sentence.
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Antrim agreed to plead no contest to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child in return for the State's agreement to dismiss three counts of rape and recommend a sentence of life with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. The agreement specifically recognized that although Antrim was “free to seek any alternative sentence allowed by law,” the State would oppose any such effort.
At sentencing, Antrim moved for a departure from the mandatory minimum sentence of Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21–4643(a)(1)(C), and introduced the testimony of Dr. Gerard Steffan, a clinical psychologist, in support of the motion. Dr. Steffan testified that Antrim's scores on various psychological tests placed him in the lowest category of risk for reoffending with another sexual offense. According to Dr. Steffan, research shows that child molesters who molest children within the family recidivate at lower rates than rapists and child molesters who molest children outside of the family. On cross-examination, Steffan admitted he was aware that intrafamily victims report less frequently than victims of incidents with strangers.
Following Steffan's testimony, the court proceeded directly to sentencing. The court expressly requested that the State incorporate its argument against the motion for departure into its recommendation for disposition. The defendant did not object to this procedure, and the prosecutor stated:
....
“I'm asking the Court to follow this plea agreement, Judge.”
Ultimately, the court declined to follow the plea agreement's recommendation of concurrent sentences, finding “this is one of the most deplorable and despicable things that could be perpetrated on a young girl.” Instead, the court sentenced Antrim to consecutive life sentences with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years on each count. Further, the court denied Antrim's motion to depart.
In this direct appeal, Antrim first argues the State violated his due process rights by failing “to abide by the terms of the plea agreement and effectively arguing against concurrent sentencing.” Antrim focuses on the prosecutor's cross-examination of Steffan and the prosecutor's subsequent comment that Antrim “perpetuated through his own daughter exactly what Dr. Steffan has diagnosed the defendant with, which is she's going to have difficulty in her future.”
Whether the State breached the plea agreement presents a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. See State v. Woodward, 288 Kan. 297, 299, 202 P.3d 15 (2009).
288 Kan. 297, Syl. ¶ 3, 202 P.3d 15.
In support of his claim that the State breached the plea agreement, Antrim relies almost exclusively on State v. Foster, 39 Kan.App.2d 380, 180 P.3d 1074,rev. denied 286 Kan. 1182 (2008). There, the court considered whether the prosecutor breached the provision of the plea agreement requiring him to recommend probation when the prosecutor specifically recommended probation but failed to argue that probation would serve community safety interests by promoting offender reformation-a finding necessary for the court to grant probation. 39 Kan.App.2d at 384, 180 P.3d 1074. The court found that although the prosecutor made the minimum recommendation required by the plea agreement, she paid lip service to that recommendation by providing only negative information about Foster at sentencing. 39 Kan.App.2d at 387, 180 P.3d 1074.
But Antrim ignores decisive distinctions between this case and Foster. In Foster, the court could not grant the sentence recommended in the plea agreement without making an additional factual finding. In contrast, the court here could have sentenced Antrim to consecutive sentences based solely upon the parties' recommendations. See K.S.A. 21–4720(b). Further, unlike in Foster, the parties in this case specifically agreed that while the defendant was “free to seek any alternative sentence allowed by law,” the State would oppose that effort.
And that is precisely what the State did after Antrim moved to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence required by Jessica's Law and supported his request with expert testimony. Consistent with the...
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State of Kan. v. Beaman
...K.S.A. 22–3504(2) correcting the sentencing journal entry error so it reflects the actual sentence pronounced. See State v. Antrim, 294 Kan. 632, 279 P.3d 110 (2012).Submitting Aggravating Factors to the Jury Beaman's final issue is familiar to this court. It concerns the district court's d......
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State v. Brown
...district court to vacate the references to lifetime electronic monitoring and lifetime postrelease supervision. See State v. Antrim, 294 Kan. 632, 636–37, 279 P.3d 110 (2012). Convictions affirmed, sentences affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with ...
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State v. Urista
...the State breached the plea agreement presents a question of law over which we exercise unlimited review. See State v. Antrim, 294 Kan. 632, 634, 279 P.3d 110 (2012).Applicable Law “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be ......
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State v. Peterson
...the State breached a plea agreement presents a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. State v. Antrim, 294 Kan. 632, 634, 279 P.3d 110 (2012). A plea agreement is a contract between the State and the accused, and the exchanged promises must be fulfilled by both pa......