State v. Araiza

• Citation: 856 P.2d 872,124 Idaho 82
• Decision Date: 08 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 18398,18398
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rodney ARAIZA, Defendant-Appellant. Boise December 1992 Term
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 872

856 P.2d 872

124 Idaho 82

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Rodney ARAIZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18398.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise December 1992 Term.

July 8, 1993.

Allen Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, and August H. Cahill, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant. August H. Cahill argued.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., and Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. Lynn E. Thomas argued.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a criminal case in which Rodney Araiza was convicted of first-degree murder and riot.

We hold:

1. The trial court's denial of Araiza's motion to strike the jury panel based on a claim that the state used its peremptory challenges to exclude racial minorities from the jury panel was not clearly erroneous.

2. The trial court's denial of motions by Araiza's attorney to withdraw from the case based on a conflict of interest did not violate Araiza's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and was not an abuse of discretion.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion under I.R.E. 608(b) or violate Araiza's constitutional right of confrontation by refusing to allow cross-examination of a state's witness concerning the witness' prior alleged perjury. Under I.R.E. 608(b), the trial court correctly excluded testimony from a defense witness concerning specific instances of untruthfulness of the state's witness.

4. The state's late disclosure or non-disclosure of evidence did not violate Araiza's constitutional right to a fair trial.

5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Araiza's motions for mistrial.

6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Araiza's motion for a new trial.

7. The trial court did not impose unreasonable sentences on Araiza nor abuse its discretion in denying Araiza's motion to reduce the sentences.

I.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

Richard Holmes, an inmate in the state penitentiary who had been scheduled to be a witness for the state in Maxwell Hoffman's trial for murder, was killed during a prison riot in September 1988. During the riot several inmates took over the penitentiary's close custody unit. When the authorities regained control of the unit several hours later, they found Holmes dead in his cell. There was a large hole punched through Holmes' cell wall, and someone had stabbed Holmes a number of times with a sharp object.

Araiza was an inmate in the close custody unit. The state charged Araiza with riot and first degree murder. Although the investigation indicated that several inmates were probably connected with the murder, Araiza was the only inmate charged. About twenty inmates were charged with riot.

In Araiza's trial, the state called a number of correctional officers and inmates who testified concerning Araiza's participation in the riot and placed Araiza in Holmes's cell during the time of the murder. The state also played an audio tape recording of Holmes's murder in which Holmes pleaded with an inmate named "Shorty." The state presented evidence that Araiza was the only inmate in the close custody unit known as "Shorty." In response, Araiza called a number of inmates who testified that Araiza was not near Holmes's cell during the murder, but arrived at the cell after Holmes was dead. Araiza testified in his own behalf that he had entered Holmes's cell after the murder to see if Holmes was alright. Araiza presented evidence that other inmates also go by the nickname "Shorty." The jury found Araiza guilty of first degree murder and riot.

Araiza requested a new trial, asserting that a new trial was required by newly discovered evidence and in the interest of justice. In support of the request, three inmates, all of whom had testified in Araiza's trial, testified that three other inmates murdered Holmes. At trial, each of these inmate witnesses had testified that they knew the identity of the murderers and that Araiza was not one of the murderers. They also stated they would not reveal who the murderers were, because they did not want to earn a reputation as "snitches." In their testimony in support of the request for new trial, the three inmate witnesses identified inmates LeMere, Sjogren, and Clarke as Holmes's murderers. Another inmate, who did not testify at trial, also testified in support of the request for a new trial. This inmate stated that Sjogren admitted to him that he, Clarke, and another inmate had stabbed an inmate during the riot.

As part of the sentencing hearing, which was combined with the hearing on the post-trial motions, Araiza called Miyauchi, a student volunteer at the prison, to present mitigating evidence. Miyauchi testified that she had received information from another volunteer that inmate LeMere admitted killing Holmes and that Araiza did not commit the murder. Araiza also called as a witness the volunteer chaplin, Bull, who had spoken with LeMere. Bull testified that LeMere admitted to him that he was responsible for the murder along with inmates Clarke and Sjogren.

Araiza also asked the trial court to consider the motion for new trial in light of five letters written to the trial court by jurors. The letters, which are not part of the record on appeal but which are referred to by the trial court in its ruling on the motion for new trial, seem to have indicated that five of the jurors either had reservations about Araiza's level of guilt or requested leniency by the trial court in sentencing Araiza.

The trial court rejected Araiza's motion for a new trial holding that the allegedly new evidence was either already presented at trial or was unreliable because of lack of credibility and lack of first-hand knowledge. The trial court also rejected Araiza's reliance on the jurors' letters, finding that the letters might warrant mitigation of Araiza's sentence, but did not undermine the basis for Araiza's conviction.

Although the state argued in favor of the death penalty in sentencing, the trial court found that mitigating circumstances existed that outweighed any statutory aggravating circumstance. The trial court sentenced Araiza to life in prison with a fixed term of thirty-five years for the first degree murder conviction and to a concurrent fixed term of twenty years for the riot conviction. Araiza moved for a reduction of sentence claiming that his youth and other circumstances of prison life warranted a lesser sentence. The trial court denied this motion.

Araiza appealed, raising numerous issues concerning his trial, the denial of his post-trial motions, and his sentences.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STATE'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES WERE NOT USED TO EXCLUDE RACIAL MINORITIES FROM THE JURY PANEL WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

Araiza asserts that his constitutional rights were violated by the state's use of peremptory challenges to exclude two jurors who were members of racial minorities. Araiza contends the trial court should not have accepted the state's explanation for use of its peremptory challenges of these jurors. We conclude that the trial court's acceptance of the state's explanations was not clearly erroneous.

At the conclusion of voir dire, Araiza objected to the composition of the jury panel. Citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), Araiza claimed the state improperly used its peremptory challenges to exclude two members of racial minorities from the jury. Specifically, Araiza challenged the state's motives for excluding prospective juror Mose and prospective juror Martinez. Mose and Martinez were the only two potential jurors who were members of recognizable racial minorities.

The trial court found that based on appearance, Mose was black, and that based on appearance and questioning, Martinez was Hispanic. The trial court held that Araiza established a prima facie showing of racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges and requested the state to explain on the record its reasons for peremptorily challenging Mose and Martinez. The state explained that it challenged Mose because she did not have enough "significant community contacts" to have a stake in the outcome of the trial. The state justified its challenge of Martinez by claiming she lacked sufficient "life experiences" and that this could hamper her in making necessary credibility determinations. Araiza objected to these explanations, arguing they were a pretext for impermissible racial discrimination. The trial court found that the reasons offered by the state were valid, nonracial reasons for exercising peremptory challenges and overruled Araiza's objection to the jury panel.

This is the first case to reach this Court alleging racially impermissive use of peremptory challenges. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's racially motivated use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors of the same race as the defendant violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's racially motivated use of peremptory challenges violates the excluded juror's right to equal protection of the laws and that a criminal defendant, regardless of racial background, has standing to assert the equal protection claim of an excluded juror.

The framework for asserting impermissible racial motivation in the use of peremptory challenges is set out in Batson. Once a criminal defendant makes out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the state must come forward with a racially-neutral explanation for challenging the prospective juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. This explanation must be racially neutral and may not be based on an assumption that a juror will be partial to the defendant based on the juror's race or on any racial stereotype. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S....