State v. Arakaki

Decision Date28 August 1987
Docket NumberNo. 11600,11600
Citation7 Haw.App. 48,744 P.2d 783
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry N. ARAKAKI, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtHawaii Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. To convict a person for a violation under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 294-8(a), the State must prove that (1) the motor vehicle was being operated on a public highway, (2) the vehicle was not insured under a no-fault policy, and (3) the operator was either the owner of the vehicle or, if not the owner, had knowledge of or acted recklessly by not ascertaining that there was a valid, current no-fault card in the vehicle.

2. Where proof of elements of a crime cannot be shown or is difficult to show by direct evidence, legislatures often provide for the inference of such elements of a crime based upon the existence of other proven facts.

3. A statutory inference used in a criminal prosecution must pass constitutional muster. Since the prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the inference must not have a burden-shifting effect. Also, an inference is authorized only if there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the facts proven and the ultimate fact which the statute authorizes to be found.

4. Based on its legislative history, the No-Fault Law, HRS Chapter 294, implicitly includes a provision that the fact that the no-fault insurance identification card was not in the vehicle being operated and was not exhibited to a law enforcement officer upon demand is prima facie evidence that the vehicle was uninsured.

5. Where in a jury-waived trial of a defendant charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) in violation of HRS §§ 291-4(a)(1) and -4(a)(2), the trial court found defendant guilty of the HRS § 291-4(a)(2) count but was silent on the HRS § 291-4(a)(1) count, defendant was placed in jeopardy for the HRS § 291-4(a)(1) count and cannot be retried for that offense.

6. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal Constitution precludes a second trial if the reviewing court finds that the evidence was legally insufficient. Under such circumstances, the reviewing court must direct a judgment of acquittal. However, if a conviction is reversed solely due to trial error, retrial is constitutionally permissible.

7. Trial court errors on evidentiary points involving matters of first impression constitute trial error and not insufficiency of evidence at trial.

8. Where in a DUI case the trial court admitted the intoxilyzer test result into evidence without an adequate foundation being laid and where definitive local appellate rulings regarding adequate foundation for admission of intoxilyzer test results were nonexistent at the time of the trial, the admission of the test result was trial error and the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a retrial of the DUI offense.

Carol Kunishima, Deputy Public Defender (Deborah L. Kim, Richard W. Pollack, and Susan Barr, Deputy Public Defenders, on the briefs), Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Arthur E. Ross, Deputy Pros. Atty. (Candace Kay Andersen, Deputy Pros. Atty., on the brief), Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and TANAKA, JJ.

TANAKA, Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant Larry N. Arakaki (Defendant) of his convictions for operating a motor vehicle not insured under a no-fault policy (insurance violation) contrary to the provisions of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 294-8(a)(1) (1985), 1 and for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) in violation of HRS § 291-4(a)(2) (1985). 2 Defendant contends that (1) the State failed to prove the insurance violation beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) since there was inadequate foundation for the admission of the intoxilyzer test result into evidence, this court should reverse the DUI conviction and direct the entry of a judgment of acquittal upon remand. We affirm the insurance violation conviction, vacate the judgment of conviction for DUI, and remand for retrial.

I. FACTS

After stopping Defendant for an alleged traffic violation, police officer Jason Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) arrested Defendant for DUI. Dela Cruz then asked Defendant for his driver's license, no-fault insurance card, and vehicle registration. Defendant produced his driver's license, but could not locate the other two items. Believing the inability to locate the insurance card and registration was due to Defendant's intoxicated condition, Dela Cruz told Defendant he would help Defendant look "for his insurance card and registration, if [it] was okay." Transcript at 35. Dela Cruz was able to find the vehicle registration, but not the insurance card. Thereupon, Dela Cruz arrested Defendant for the insurance violation.

At the police station, Defendant consented to a breath test. The intoxilyzer test result indicated 0.13 percent alcohol in Defendant's blood.

After a bench trial, the district court found him guilty of both the insurance violation and the DUI offense, 3 and Defendant appealed.

II. INSURANCE VIOLATION

Regarding the insurance violation, Defendant and the State agree that to convict a person for a violation under HRS § 294-8(a), the State must prove that (1) the motor vehicle was being operated on a public highway, (2) the vehicle was not insured under a no-fault policy, and (3) the operator was either the owner or, if not the owner, had knowledge of or acted recklessly by not "ascertaining that there was a valid, current no-fault card in the vehicle[.]" State v. Lesher, 66 Haw. 534, 537, 669 P.2d 146, 148 (1983). Defendant concedes that there was proof that he was the owner 4 of the automobile involved which was being operated on a public highway. He asserts, however, that the State "failed to meet its burden of proving that the car was not covered by insurance at the time of the citation." We disagree.

We hold that from the proven fact that Defendant failed to exhibit a no-fault insurance identification card upon demand of police officer Dela Cruz and that such card could not be found in Defendant's automobile, the trier of fact was permitted to draw an inference of the elemental fact that the automobile was uninsured.

"Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding." Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 791 (1979). Where proof of elements of a crime cannot be shown or is difficult to show by direct evidence, "legislatures often provide for the inference of such elements of a crime based upon the existence of other proven facts." State v. Brighter, 61 Haw. 99, 103, 595 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1979). 5 Such statutory inferences, however, must pass constitutional muster. See State v. Bumanglag, 63 Haw. 596, 634 P.2d 80 (1981); State v. Pimentel, 61 Haw. 308, 603 P.2d 141 (1979); State v. Brighter, supra; State v. Dwyer, 57 Haw. 526, 560 P.2d 110 (1977); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971). Since the prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the inference must not have the "impermissible burden-shifting effect." Bumanglag, 63 Haw. at 618, 634 P.2d at 94. Also, an inference is authorized "only if there is a natural and rational evidentiary relation between the facts proven and ultimate fact which the statute authorizes to be found." Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 529, 560 P.2d at 112.

The Hawaii No-Fault Law, HRS Chapter 294 (1985 and Supp.1986), purports "to create a system of reparations for accidental harm and loss arising from motor vehicle accidents, to compensate these damages without regard to fault, and to limit tort liability for these accidents." HRS § 294-1(a) (1985). It declares that the system "can only be truly effective, ... if all drivers participate at least to the extent required by law." HRS § 294-1(b) (1985). It states that the law "treats uninsured drivers more severely than those who obtain the legally required no-fault insurance coverage[,]" because of "the specific legislative intent of encouraging participation by all drivers in the no-fault insurance system[.]" Id. Yet, the No-Fault Law contains no explicit statutory inference to aid in the enforcement of HRS § 294-8 which requires all vehicles (except federally owned vehicles) operated on public highways to be insured.

In 1978, five years after the enactment of the No-Fault Law, the legislature was concerned about the uninsured motorist population. In enacting Act 91, 1978 Haw.Sess.Laws 116, the legislature indicated its purpose was

to place law enforcement officers and the courts of the State in an effective statutory position to enforce the compulsory insurance requirements of the Hawaii No-Fault Law in order to protect the public as intended under the law.

Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 584-78, in 1978 Senate Journal at 1012.

Act 91, inter alia, added new HRS § 294-8.5 to the No-Fault Law and amended HRS § 286-116. HRS § 294-8.5 requires every insurer to "issue to its insureds a no-fault insurance identification card" for each insured motor vehicle and provides that "[t]he identification card shall be in the insured motor vehicle at all times and shall be exhibited to a law enforcement officer upon demand." 6 HRS § 286-116 was amended to require every licensed driver to have "a valid no-fault insurance identification card applicable to the motor vehicle operated as required under section 294-8.5, when operating a motor vehicle" and to "display the same upon demand of a police officer." 7

The legislative history indicates that Act 91 was to provide "the necessary teeth to the no-fault enforcement provisions, and ... [to] reduce the uninsured motorist population." Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 584-78, in 1978 Senate Journal at 1013. Therefore, based on the reading of HRS §§ 294-8, 294-8.5, and 286-116 in pari materia in light of their legislative history, we conclude that, since Act 91's enactme...

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8 cases
  • 80 Hawai'i 126, State v. Malufau
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • October 18, 1995
    ...evidence in support of one element of the offense were improperly admitted intoxilyzer test results); but see State v. Arakaki, 7 Haw.App. 48, 58-59, 744 P.2d 783, 789 (1987) (vacating DUI conviction and remanding for new trial where intoxilyzer test results were improperly In the instant c......
  • 86 Hawai'i 331, State v. Shamp
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 1997
    ...of or acted recklessly by not 'ascertaining that there was a valid, current no-fault card in the vehicle.' " State v. Arakaki, 7 Haw.App. 48, 51, 744 P.2d 783, 785 (1987) 6 (quoting State v. Lesher, 66 Haw. 534, 537, 669 P.2d 146, 148 (1983)), overruled on other grounds, State v. Dow, 72 Ha......
  • State v. Ofa, 14917
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • March 25, 1992
    ...it remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal for the defendant. In State v. Arakaki, 7 Haw.App. 48, 744 P.2d 783 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Dow, 72 Haw. 56, 61, 806 P.2d 402, 405 (1991), the prosecution conceded on appeal tha......
  • State v. Wetzel
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • November 27, 1989
    ...The legislature has created this statutory inference. The use of such an inference is not unconstitutional. In State v. Arakaki, 7 Haw.App. 48, 744 P.2d 783 (1987), we Where proof of elements of a crime cannot be shown or is difficult to show by direct evidence, "legislatures often provide ......
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