State v. Arceneaux

• Decision Date: 03 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1047.,12–1047.
• Citation: 111 So.3d 1177
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest Joseph ARCENEAUX.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

111 So.3d 1177

STATE of Louisiana

v.Ernest Joseph ARCENEAUX.

No. 12–1047.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 3, 2013.

Michael Harson, District Attorney, Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Allan P. Haney, Assistant District Attorney, Lafayette, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.

Edward K. Bauman, Louisiana Appellate Project, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Ernest Joseph Arceneaux.

Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, BILLY HOWARD EZELL, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.

GREMILLION, Judge.

[3 Cir. 1]Defendant, Ernest Joseph Arceneaux, was convicted of the aggravated burglary of Rachel Nederveld's apartment and the simple burglary of a car she was using. Defendant was charged with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.2; aggravated burglary, a violation of La.R.S. 14:60; and simple burglary of an automobile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:62.

The State moved to sever the charge of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling and proceeded to trial on the remaining charges of aggravated burglary and simple burglary of an automobile. Defendant was subsequently found guilty on both counts. He was sentenced to thirty years at hard labor for aggravated burglary and to five years at hard labor for simple burglary of an automobile. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.

Defendant is before this court asserting two assignments of error. He contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of simple burglary of an automobile, and that the trial court erred in imposing excessive and consecutive sentences.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of simple burglary of an automobile.¹

The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged.” State v. Leger, 05–11, p. 91 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 170,cert. denied,549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); [3 Cir. 2]State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 La.1984)). The Jackson standard of review is now legislatively embodied in La.Code Crim.P. art. 821. It does not allow the appellate court “to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05–477, p. 6 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521 (citing State v. Robertson, 96–1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165). The appellate court's function is not to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94–3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442.

The factfinder's role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ryan, 07–504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07), 969 So.2d 1268. Thus, other than insuring the sufficiency evaluation standard of Jackson, “the appellate court should not second-guess the credibility determination of the trier of fact,” but rather, it should defer to the rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of the jury. Id. at 1270 (quoting State v. Lambert, 97–64, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/30/98), 720 So.2d 724, 726–27).

State v. McKithern, 11–1402, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/12), 93 So.3d 684, 691.

The Defendant was convicted of simple burglary of an automobile.

In order to obtain a conviction for simple burglary, the elements of the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime at issue, simple burglary, are contained in La.R.S. 14:62:

Simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein....

Like most felonies, burglary consists of an act element and an intent element. La.R.S. 14:7, 14:8. The act element, or actus reus, is the unauthorized entry of a dwelling or vehicle. The intent element, or mens rea, is the specific intent to commit a theft (or other felony) in the dwelling or vehicle. State v. Maxie, 614 So.2d 1318 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993). Theft is defined by La.R.S. 14:67(A) as follows:

Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential.

State v. Kennerson, 96–1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371–72.

[3 Cir. 3]Nederveld testified that on December 3, 2010, she returned to her apartment around midnight and saw a man standing in her bedroom. The man grabbed Nederveld and started hitting her in the head and the back. Nederveld screamed and kicked, and the man ran away. Nederveld testified that the man she saw was Defendant.

The same night, Nederveld saw that the window of her mother's car, which she had been using, was broken. Nederveld indicated that the window had duct tape on it, and she did not know how the tape got there. Nederveld testified that nothing was missing from the car. However, she did not inspect the inside of the car to determine if anything had been tampered with. Nederveld also testified that she did not give Defendant permission to enter the car.

Detective Larry Theriot determined that Defendant worked at the apartment complex where Nederveld lived. A few days after the incidents, Detective Theriot spoke with Defendant. During the interview, Defendant admitted that he entered Nederveld's apartment and was looking for cash, jewelry, and other items. Defendant was then questioned about Nederveld's car as follows:

Q Um, and then also that night, the young girl's car was broken into. Did you do that? Did you break into her car that night?

....

A Yes, yes.

Q That was parked in the front.

A I'm the one that bust [sic] the window. Yes.

Q Okay. Which window did you bust?

A The back and the right.

Q Okay. The back passenger side?

[3 Cir. 4]A Yeah.

Q All the way in the back. Did you get anything out of the car?

A No, sir.

Q Okay. Why didn't you get anything out the car?

A It was nothing in it.

Q Nothing in it?

A No.

Defendant was subsequently asked why he chose Nederveld's apartment, and he responded:

I don't know, man. Uh, I don't know. I just—I just happened to see her, you know what I'm saying? Uh, you know, going by her car and gotten [sic] cash, you know what I'm saying? So I figure, you know what I'm saying? So I figure, you know what I'm saying?

....

Easy score. Uh, uh, uh, money, you know what I'm saying?

Defendant further stated: “Yeah, you know what I'm saying. I say, well, I—I say, well, that [sic] all intention on my mind right now. I say [sic], this is where I might have to find cash that is here.”

Detective Theriot testified that during the interview, Defendant stated that he placed duct tape on the car window and used a brick to hit it. As a result of his striking the window, the car's alarm went off. Defendant then ran into the bushes. Because of the alarm, people went outside to look around, and, when they returned to their apartments, Defendant got inside the car and hid. The car's alarm went off again, so he ran. Detective Theriot then asked what Defendant “went there for,” and he stated: “He said he wanted cash or something of value. He did not find anything of value to take from the car.”

[3 Cir. 5]Defendant contends that the State did not prove he entered Nederveld's car with the specific intent to commit a felony or theft therein. Defendant recites Detective Theriot's testimony regarding the statement he made to police. He then asserts that the police report did not indicate that he stated he went inside the vehicle. Additionally, the investigative report stated “ ‘it appears the subject may have attempted to burglarize the vehicle.’ ”

Defendant notes that Nederveld did not see him enter the car, and she testified that nothing had been removed from the car. Defendant asserts that the only evidence of a crime was the broken window and his admission that he broke it. Defendant alleges it was not necessary for him to stick his head or body inside the car to ascertain if there was anything of value in the car. Defendant avers the evidence was not legally sufficient to prove he had the specific intent to commit a felony or theft inside the car.

In support of his argument, Defendant cites State in Interest of S.P., 11–1598 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/2/12), 90 So.3d 528. In S.P. the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for simple burglary of an automobile. He appealed, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his adjudication. Evidence adduced at the adjudication hearing indicated that the window of an automobile was broken, and a female yelled at the perpetrator to stop. Duncan Pace testified that the juvenile ran through the neighborhood and was pursued by two dogs and a female. Pace conceded he did not see the juvenile reach into the vehicle or throw anything at the vehicle. Police testified that they were flagged down and given a description of the perpetrator. Police then canvassed the neighborhood in search of the perpetrator. When the juvenile saw the officers, he ran toward a house where people were gathered on a porch. Police stopped their vehicle and asked the juvenile to [3 Cir. 6]approach. In response, the juvenile jumped a fence and fled. He was subsequently apprehended under a nearby house.

The fourth circuit found:

Even viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, although the window was smashed there is no evidence of entry into the vehicle. Further, although smashing a window constitutes evidence of the intent to damage the vehicle ... it does not necessarily constitute evidence of an intent to enter the vehicle as,...