State v. Archer

Decision Date08 April 1953
Docket NumberNo. 47962,47962
Citation244 Iowa 1045,58 N.W.2d 44
PartiesSTATE v. ARCHER.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Emmett P. Delaney and John L. Delaney, of Clinton, for apellant.

Robert L. Larson, Atty. Gen., Raphael R. R. Dvorak, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kermit G. Kruse, Clinton County Attorney and Walter W. Eggers, Special Prosecutor for Clinton County, Clinton, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The body of Mrs. Lillian Chapman was found in an alley in Clinton on the morning of May 30, 1950. Some of her ribs on the right side were broken, her body had several bruises, and a scarf was drawn tightly about her neck. The medical testimony was that death was caused by strangulation. Her clothing was disarranged, her nether undergarments being entirely removed. Apparently from this it was suspected she had been the victim of rape, but the medical testimony failed to substantiate that fact. Mrs. Chapman's age is variously given as having been from sixty to seventy-two years. That her death was felonious and had occurred during the night of May 29-30 admits of no doubt. She lived nearby and there is no explanation of how she happened to be out on the streets on the night in question. She lived with her sister who did not know she had gone out until the morning of May 30th. Apparently no one saw her out of her home that night, except the slayer.

The Clinton police force and the county attorney's office of course interested themselves in the case and began a search for the killer. This was unsuccessful for many months, as will presently be shown in more detail.

The defendant herein, an itinerant laborer, had been in and out of Clinton for a year or so before the date of the crime, and for a few months prior thereto had been employed by one Charles Smith on his farm across the Mississippi river in Illinois. Charles Smith had a brother, Lafayette Smith, living in Clinton. The defendant, then known as Jack O'Day, had worked for Lafayette Smith at times, and it was through this connection he met the brother Charles and entered his employ. He was about forty-six years of age at the time. On occasion he would come to Clinton with Charles Smith and visit for a few hours at the house of Lafayette Smith, often eating his evening meal there. This occurred on May 29, 1950. On that date Charles Smith advanced him $6 for the purpose, ostensible or real, of purchasing some clothing. But, after visiting with the Lafayette Smith family and eating his supper there, he left their home and that night disappeared from Clinton. He had told Mrs. Charles Smith he expected to go west to 'make the harvest,' and had said to another woman who lived in their home that he liked to ride freight trains and might go any time; that he expected to leave about June 1.

Although the Clinton authorities knew within a few weeks that he had left Clinton on the night of the murder, they apparently did not give it great significance until they had no success in locating a more likely suspect. That the defendant was not a criminal fleeing from the scene of his crime is shown by the fact that on many occasions during the next eight months or more he communicated by letters or post cards with friends in Clinton, each time giving his present location. Mrs. Lafayette Smith says she heard from him about every week or ten days. On two occasions he sent clothing for the Smiths to keep for him, and once at least asked them to forward it to Sheridan, Wyoming where he wrote he had a job and expected to be for some time. She learned from a post card sent about the middle of February, 1951, that he was in Casper where he was employed.

About this time the Clinton police, having failed to solve the mystery of the slaying, and having no likelier prospect, wrote to the police at Casper, Wyoming, where the defendant was readily located through his communications with friends in Clinton, asking them to question him. No charge was then filed against him, either in Iowa or Wyoming. The chief of police at Casper thought so little of the gravity of the matter that, instead of taking defendant into custody forthwith, he left word with the landlady at his rooming house that he wanted to see him. This was on February 20, 1951. The defendant, upon returning from work, was given this message. Although thus duly warned he reported at the police station the same evening. This, again, was not the act of a man with a conscience scarred by murder. But as soon as he appeared at the Casper police station he was thrown into a cell and held without charge or warrant. This was almost nine months after the commission of the crime.

Here it is material to point out that, except for the confessions obtained from defendant, there is no syllable of evidence to connect him with the crime unless it be that he had been in Clinton and had departed from there on the night it was committed. Theodore E. Long, Clinton police captain, and Edward Clancy, identification officer, who were most active in the investigation, concede this; and the record would thoroughly demonstrate it if they did not. We have held, following the majority rule, that if the commission of a crime by someone is shown, a confession alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction, although there is no other evidence connecting the confessor with the crime. State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 44 N.W.2d 24; State v. Webb, 239 Iowa 693, 703, 31 N.W.2d 337. But when the confession is the sole link connecting the defendant with the offense committed, the reason for making sure such confession is fairly obtained, without threats, duress, coercion, promises, or undue pressure--that is, that it is entirely voluntary in every way--most clearly appears. It is always improper to admit involuntary confessions; but far greater and graver injustice is done when there is no other evidence pointing to the accused than when his guilt is shown, to some extent at least, by other proof.

The defendant having been laid by the heels by the Casper police in the informal manner above described was questioned to some extent on the evening of February 20th. The next day there was further questioning by the chief of police and by other officers. It was on this day he was first advised he was being held on suspicion of murder, or perhaps for questioning in connection with a murder. He readily signed a waiver of extradition at this time, although there was no charge pending against him anywhere upon which an extradition could be based. But, as will be later shown, defendant is not a man well versed in the law, or having any adequate understanding of his legal rights. Nor was he advised at any time, by anyone, of his right to counsel and to have a charge filed and a prompt arraignment.

The foregoing facts, and those which are referred to later, are not in dispute. Most of them have been taken from the testimony of the various police officers called by the state. We recognize the rule that the defendant's right to hve purported confessions excluded must rest upon matters not challenged in the record, and that if there is contradiction, or if the minds of reasonable men might differ upon undisputed facts, the question of voluntariness is for the jury. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 145, 96 L.Ed. 86, and many other cases enunciate this doctrine. But the essential facts here are not disputed and we think clearly show the error in the admission of the confessions hereinafter referred to.

After the defendant was summarily thrown into jail on the evening of February 20th he was again questioned on February 21st and February 22nd by the Casper police. These gentlemen had been furnished with the known facts concerning the murder of Mrs. Chapman and the Clinton police theory as to how it was committed. On February 23rd the county attorney of Clinton county and police captain Long arrived. The questioning on this date started shortly after seven o'clock in the evening and continued with relays of officers taking part until 11:30 or twelve o'clock, when the defendant finally agreed to tell them the story they wanted. Captain Long and Casper officers made up the first 'team'; then Mr. Eggers, the Clinton county attorney, took over; then Long, with officers Tony Wroblewski and C. J. Carter of the Casper department came in again. During the approximately four days of questioning by various officers the defendant maintained his innocence. But, at least on the night of February 23rd as to which we have more detail, when his story did not accord with the wishes of the officers, he was told he wasn't telling the truth, or that he was lying and it was repeatedly demanded that he admit the murder. It must have been apparent to him, a it is to a reader of the record in the case, that no other answer would satisfy the inquisitioners. At length, about 11:30 p. m., the defendant, after being repeatedly accused of falsification when he denied any knowledge of the crime, said:

'If I tell you I did this, will you let me get some sleep?'

Officers Long, Wroblewski, and Carter all testify to this.

The defendant then told a story which did not fit the officers' theory of the case and they told him it was not satisfactory. The Casper officers had been advised by letter of the known facts in the case, and during all the questioning they and the Clinton authorities repeatedly challenged defendant with them. The confession which he finally signed, State's Exhibit 15, was written by Mr. Eggers; and the second one, Exhibit 16, which at the demand of the officers defendant wrote himself with Exhibit 15 lying on the table beside him, is quite evidently a resume of the first.

Still with no formal charge filed against him anywhere the defendant was taken upon the train and returned to Clinton where the party arrived on the night of February 25th. Here a special state agent appeared upon the scene. At 11:30 that night the defendant was taken by the assorted...

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  • State v. Crawford
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 18 d5 Março d5 2022
    ...following divergent paths the wise jurist will re-examine his authorities and his reasoning with the utmost care." State v. Archer , 244 Iowa 1045, 58 N.W.2d 44, 51 (1953). We have reexamined our authorities in this area and conclude that requiring a defendant to file a motion for judgment ......
  • State v. Crawford
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 18 d5 Março d5 2022
    ...to be following divergent paths the wise jurist will re-examine his authorities and his reasoning with the utmost care." State v. Archer, 58 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Iowa 1953). have reexamined our authorities in this area and conclude that requiring a defendant to file a motion for judgment of acqui......
  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 6 d2 Fevereiro d2 1962
    ...28 N.W.2d 475; and State v. Case, 247 Iowa 1019, 75 N.W.2d 233. The test is whether or not the confession is voluntary. State v. Archer, 244 Iowa 1045, 58 N.W.2d 44; and State v. Case, supra. The confession, like any admission, is presumed to be voluntary. The burden rests on the defendant ......
  • State v. Holland
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 16 d2 Novembro d2 1965
    ...persuasive showing of the voluntary nature of admissions and confessions of an accused. The present case is a far cry from State v. Archer, 244 Iowa 1045, 58 N.W.2d 44, only Iowa decision cited, Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (also cited in Archer), and other su......
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