State v. Ardoin

• Decision Date: 13 February 1911
• Docket Number: 18,584
• Citation: 54 So. 407,128 La. 14
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. ARDOIN

54 So. 407

128 La. 14

STATE v. ARDOIN

No. 18,584

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 13, 1911

Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B H. Pavy, Judge.

Jules Ardoin was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

E. B Dubuisson, for appellant.

Walter Guion, Atty. Gen., and R. Lee Garland, Dist. Atty., R. G Pleasant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

BREAUX C.J.

Defendant was charged with murder, and found guilty as charged without capital punishment.

The following gave rise to one of the points at issue: The trial judge charged the jury that self-defense, pleaded by the defendant, admits the killing. To quote literally from the charge: Self-defense admits the killing.

That a defendant, in a case of homicide, in order to maintain self-defense, must show that his life was in imminent danger, or that he was exposed to bodily harm.

The exception of the defense was that the court erred in instructing the jury that self-defense admits the killing; and that the charge was also erroneous because the court instructed the jury that it was incumbent upon the defendant to show that he was justified in taking the life of the decedent. That, under the plea of not guilty, it was not incumbent upon the defense to show anything; it was the duty of the state to show beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty either of murder or manslaughter.

To the first part of defendant's objection, we will state, without discussing the subject much further, that the ruling of the district court in regard to defendant's acknowledgment of the killing is correct.

An accused can expressly admit the killing.

In State v. Yokum, 11 S.D. 544, 79 N.W. 835, Supreme Court of South Dakota, the killing was referred to as having been admitted by defendant.

The defendant testified in his own behalf and stated that he killed the deceased in self-defense, as shown by the narrative of the judge, made part of the bill of exceptions.

This is a direct statement made by the defendant and limited to the killing.

Having admitted the homicide under oath, the defendant is not in a position to deny the binding effects of his admission, nor can he be heard to urge that the charge is erroneous because the trial judge in his charge mentioned that he had thus testified.

The instruction did not go further than the admission of the defendant. He was not prejudiced.

Volenti non fit injuria.

This brings us to a consideration of the second objection urged by the defendant, that it was not incumbent upon him to show that he was justified in taking the life of the deceased, and that it was the state's duty to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

A defendant may attempt to disprove the guilt charged if he chooses. Not guilty is the presumption until the contrary appears.

It is incumbent upon the state to prove his guilt.

It is error to instruct the jury that, to "justify the taking of human life on the ground of self-defense, the defendant must show that he, at the time of the killing, was in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, and that the danger which threatened him could not have been avoided or prevented by other means than by killing the assailant." Copying from the charge.

By the foregoing instruction, the onus of proof is made to shift from the state to defendant.

The best thoughts upon the subject are not in favor of the view above expressed.

In State v. Shea, 104 Iowa 724, 74 N.W. 687, the court held that, in a prosecution for an assault with intent to do great bodily harm, the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault was not committed in self-defense.

This headnote of the decision clearly indicates the principle laid down.

A number of decisions are cited, rendering it evident that this is the view held by the courts of that state.

In Alabama, there is some inconsistency upon the subject. It remains that, in a number of decisions, it is decided that the onus of proof is with the state.

In Dent v. State, 105 Ala. 14, 17 So. 95, the judge charged that the jury must be satisfied that the defendant shot and killed under an immediate and impending sense of great danger to life or limb, either real or apparent, and that there was no other probable means of escape, and the defendant must not have been the aggressor.

The court held that this charge is fatally defective in that the burden of proof is changed, requiring the defendant to make out a case for the state, citing quite a number of decisions of the Supreme Court of that state in support of the correctness of the view expressed.

The point was thoroughly considered in Gravely v. State, 38 Neb. 871, 57 N.W. 751.

The burden of proof remains with the state in all criminal prosecutions, the court said.

The rule applies to any substantive defense which may be interposed to justify the act.

The court cited 1 Greenleaf on Evidence (15th Ed.) 81, notes; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, 29, and note; People v. Riordan, 117 N.Y. 71, 22 N.E. 455; People v. Downs, 123 N.Y. 558, 25 N.E. 988; Tiffany v. Com., 121 Pa. 165, 15 A. 462, 6 Am. St. Rep. 775; Rudy v. Com., 128 Pa. 500, 18 A. 344; Com. v. McKie, 1 Gray (Mass.) 61, 61 Am. Dec. 410; People v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704, 32 N.W. 905; Lilienthal v. U.S. 97 U.S. 237, 24 L.Ed. 901; Howard v. State, 50 Ind. 190; 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure, 669, 673.

The court adds that, even in those jurisdictions (in other states than in Louisiana) in which the burden of proving a distinct defense rests upon the prisoner, the rule is generally held not applicable, where...