State v. Arenas

Decision Date08 May 2023
Docket NumberA-1-CA-39413
PartiesSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAIME ARENAS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY Daniel A. Bryant District Court Judge.

Raul Torrez, Attorney General Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Allison H. Jaramillo Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, JUDGE.

{¶1} Defendant Jaime Daniel Arenas appeals his conviction of one count of battery upon a peace officer, a fourth degree felony, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 3022-24 (1971); and one count of resisting, evading or obstructing an officer, a misdemeanor, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1(D) (1981). Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) the State engaged in improper questioning designed to elicit impermissible character evidence and that the subject of the questions exceeded the scope of direct examination in violation of Rule 11-611(B) NMRA; (2) the district court erred in admitting a video recording of Defendant's encounter with the police from a pending misdemeanor case for resisting an officer, arguing that the video was inadmissible under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA, Rule 11-403 NMRA, and Rule 11-608(B)(1) NMRA; (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence of battery upon a peace officer; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking an officer-witness to explain why Defendant was charged with battery upon a peace officer; and (5) Defendant's convictions for battery upon a peace officer and resisting arrest violate double jeopardy. We hold that the admission of the video from Defendant's pending criminal case was an abuse of discretion and sufficient evidence supports Defendant's conviction. Because we hold that the admission of the video was error and requires reversal and remand for a new trial, we do not address Defendant's remaining issues on appeal.[1]

DISCUSSION

{¶2} We begin by addressing Defendant's argument that the admission of a video from Defendant's pending case was inadmissible under Rule 11-404(B), holding that admission of the evidence was an abuse of discretion, and that the error was not harmless and requires reversal. Because Defendant is entitled to a new trial, we next address whether Defendant's conviction for battery upon a peace officer is supported by sufficient evidence in order to determine if retrial implicates Defendant's double jeopardy rights. We hold that sufficient evidence supports Defendant's battery upon a peace officer conviction.

I. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Video From Defendant's Pending Case

{¶3} Defendant contends the video consisted of bad act evidence[2] and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 11-404(B). Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence did not involve a similar kick, had no relevance as to whether Defendant intended to kick the officer in the present case, and was instead prohibited character evidence, used to show Defendant's "character to resist and argue with police and that he acted in conformity with that character." We agree that the evidence was prohibited character evidence, and thus, inadmissible under Rule 11-404(B).

{¶4} "We review the district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 36, 278 P.3d 1031. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by its ruling unless we can characterize [the ruling] as clearly untenable or not justified by reason." State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶5} Under Rule 11-404(B)(1), "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." "In other words, evidence of other misconduct may not be admitted into evidence to demonstrate that because the defendant committed those acts . . ., he is more likely to have committed them at the time of the charged offense." State v. Bailey, 2015-NMCA-102, ¶ 12, 357 P.3d 423 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act may be admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Rule 11-404(B)(2). "This list is not exhaustive and evidence of other wrongs may be admissible on alternative relevant bases so long as it is not admitted to prove conformity with character." State v. Otto, 2007-NMSC-012, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 443, 157 P.3d 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Before admitting evidence of other crimes or wrongs, ""the [district] court must find that the evidence is relevant to a material issue other than the defendant's character or propensity to commit a crime, and must determine that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice, pursuant to Rule 11-403." Otto, 2007-NMS C-012, ¶ 10. "[E]vidence of how a person acted on a particular occasion is not legally relevant when it solely shows propensity and should be automatically excluded under Rule 11-404(B) because it is unfairly prejudicial as a matter of law." State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 21, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828.

{¶6} Prior to admitting evidence under Rule 11-404(B), a court should therefore consider that (1) "the rule prohibits the use of otherwise relevant evidence when its sole purpose or effect is to prove criminal propensity"; (2) "other-acts evidence may be admissible if it is relevant to an issue besides the inference that the defendant acted in conformity with his or her character"; (3) "the proponent of the evidence is required to identify and articulate the consequential fact to which the evidence is directed before it is admitted"; and (4) "even if other-acts evidence is relevant to something besides propensity, such evidence will not be admitted if the probative value related to its permissible purpose is substantially outweighed by the factors enumerated in Rule 11-403." Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 22.

{¶7} We first determine if the video is relevant to a material issue other than Defendant's character or propensity to commit a crime besides the inference that he acted in conformity with his character. Id.; Otto, 2007-NMSC-012, ¶ 10. The State argues that the video from Defendant's pending case was relevant to show intent, arguing that Defendant "placed his intent squarely at issue." More specifically, the State argues on appeal that the video goes to Defendant's "intent to verbally abuse and disobey orders of officers," even though it does not go to "the specific question of Defendant's intent to kick Corporal Freeman." Defendant contends that the video evidence does not bear on the question of whether Defendant accidentally or intentionally kicked Corporal Freeman, and rather, the evidence was used to show that Defendant acted in conformity with his character to resist and argue with the police.

{¶8} In deciding whether the video evidence from Defendant's pending case was used to infer that Defendant acted in conformity with his character, or to prove intent as the State contends, we look at the State's "rationale for admitting the evidence to prove something other than propensity," and "more is required to sustain a ruling admitting other-acts evidence than the incantation of the illustrative exceptions contained in the Rule." Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 25 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In the proceedings below the State argued that the video was admissible for impeachment and to prove Defendant's "intent, motive, purpose, plan, all of that" as authorized under Rule 11-404(B). With regard to intent the State stated, "[I]f we can show [Defendant's] behavior, we know his intent when it comes around officers, he's going to be disrespectful to them and lash out at them, either verbally or physically." The State further asserted that "[t]his exact same situation happened, where [Defendant] is very unruly and cussing at officers."

{¶9} Our Supreme Court provided guidance recently in evaluating the admissibility of evidence when that evidence is a prior conviction of the same crime for which a defendant is on trial. State v. Fernandez,__-NMSC-__, ¶ 17,__P.3d__(S SC-39129, Mar. 6, 2023). In Fernandez our Supreme Court held that admission of a defendant's prior conviction for battery upon a peace officer was an abuse of discretion and it was inadmissible under Rule 11-609(A)(1)(b) NMRA and Rule 11404 when the defendant was on trial for the same crime. Fernandez, -NMSC-__, ¶¶ 23, 26. In concluding that the conviction was inadmissible under Rule 11404, the Court stated that the prior conviction would "more likely lead the jury to conclude that [the d]efendant had a propensity to commit the crime rather than helping the jury conclude whether [the d]efendant had the requisite intent in this case." Fernandez, __-NMSC-__, ¶ 26. The state in Fernandez similarly argued that the defendant's prior conviction was "relevant to show an absence of mistake or lack of accident." Id. ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the Court found that "the chain of inferences that flows from the...

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