State v. Arguelles, No. 970364

• Decision Date: 14 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 970366., No. 970364
• Citation: 2003 UT 1,63 P.3d 731
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roberto V. ARGUELLES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

63 P.3d 731

2003 UT 1

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Roberto V. ARGUELLES, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. 970364, 970366.

Supreme Court of Utah.

January 14, 2003.

Rehearing Denied January 16, 2003.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Thomas Brunker, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, attorney for the court.

AMENDED OPINION

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶ 1 This case presents the unusual situation wherein a capital defendant seeks the death penalty for his crimes. The defendant, Roberto V. Arguelles ("Arguelles"), pled guilty to four counts of aggravated murder. During the penalty phase, Arguelles waived his right to counsel, acknowledged that he felt the death penalty was the appropriate punishment for him, and presented limited mitigating evidence. The court sentenced defendant to death. Now before us on mandatory statutory appeal, the court assistant¹ claims on Arguelles's behalf that the death sentence should be overturned.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On April 26, 1996, Arguelles confessed to kidnapping and killing Margo Bond, Stephanie Blundell, Lisa Martinez, and Tuesday Roberts. Three days later, Arguelles was charged with four counts of aggravated murder. Two attorneys from the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association ("LDA") were appointed to represent Arguelles. On September 25, 1996, the LDA was disqualified by the magistrate because of potential and actual conflicts of interest.

¶ 3 In January 1997, the magistrate appointed Edward Brass ("Brass"), Patrick Anderson ("Anderson"), and Clark Donaldson ("Donaldson") to represent Arguelles. Three months later, in a hearing before the magistrate, Arguelles waived his right to counsel and accepted Brass, Anderson, and Donaldson as standby counsel. In the same hearing, Arguelles waived his right to a preliminary hearing and attempted to plead guilty. The magistrate entered not-guilty pleas on Arguelles's behalf, then bound him over to the district court.

¶ 4 Arguelles reaffirmed his desire to represent himself in a hearing before the district court, then pled guilty to each count of aggravated murder. Arguelles also explicitly waived his right to a jury trial for the sentencing phase. During the three-day penalty proceeding which followed, the State presented evidence of Arguelles's prior offenses, details of the charged murders, and the testimony of the victims' family members. As mitigating evidence, Arguelles presented the testimony of Jenny Glover, a corrections investigator and peace officer, who testified regarding Arguelles's confession and his help in locating the victims' bodies. Arguelles also presented evidence of examinations and reports describing his history of blackouts, memory loss, and associative disorders. After weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence, the trial court sentenced Arguelles to death.

¶ 5 In August 1998, pending automatic appeal to this court, Arguelles attempted suicide while in prison. The State moved to have the case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Arguelles's mental competency to proceed. Conflict counsel Jim Bradshaw and Ken Brown were appointed for the hearing. The district court found Arguelles competent to proceed. After Arguelles indicated that he did not wish to appeal his sentence, Brass was appointed as a court assistant to handle the statutorily required appeal. We discuss in greater detail below the facts surrounding each of the issues raised by the court assistant in this appeal.

I. BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE

¶ 6 Early in the proceedings, the magistrate appointed the LDA to represent Arguelles. In June 1996, the State moved to have the magistrate inquire into the LDA's potential conflicts of interest. The State argued that two LDA employees, Robert Steele ("Steele") and Virgil Johnson ("Johnson"), would be necessary witnesses to the trial, creating a conflict of interest. Steele, an LDA attorney, had represented Arguelles and been present when Arguelles confessed to the four crimes charged. Johnson, an LDA investigator, was previously employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and had investigated an earlier case in which Arguelles was convicted of attempted murder and aggravated assault. At the hearing, the LDA attorneys argued that there was no conflict and that the State was using the motion as a "ruse." Arguelles testified that he would waive any conflict. At the end of the hearing, Arguelles told the magistrate, "I just want you to know that I will not be accepting other counsel and going through all this again with new counsel. I'll represent myself if it comes to that."

¶ 7 The magistrate determined that the State did not establish a compelling need for Steele's testimony about the voluntariness of Arguelles's videotaped confessions because there were other witnesses present at the confession, and that Steele's evidence would be cumulative and not necessary to preserve the cause of action. The trial court also determined that Johnson was not a necessary party to establishing Arguelles's prior conviction, but that Johnson's knowledge of aggravating factors to be brought out during the sentencing phase of the trial created a conflict of interest that Arguelles could not waive.

¶ 8 In determining that a conflict of interest existed as to Johnson, the trial court found that his potential testimony would be both compelling and necessary. The testimony was compelling because "Mr. Johnson's numerous conversations with the defendant directly impact on the issue of aggravating circumstances and the presentation of those circumstances to the jury. The defense has conceded that Mr. Johnson has information that could address the aggravating circumstances." The court found that the testimony was necessary because it was: (1) adverse to the defendant; (2) admissible; and, (3) "the defense has not presented any alternative sources to defeat the State's claim that Mr. Johnson is the only source available for this information." The trial court further relied upon Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 145, which states, "the law firm must avoid representing a defendant in a case in which its investigator substantially participated while employed by the State," and which cites Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct precluding a "law firm from representing a defendant so long as the possibility exists that the investigator will testify." Because the State claimed that it planned to call Johnson as a witness, the trial court found that a conflict did exist. Finally, the trial court concluded that Arguelles could not waive the conflict because it was based upon an issue of divided loyalty, which "demonstrates a denial of the right to have effective assistance of counsel."²

¶ 9 Two months after the LDA was disqualified, Arguelles filed his own pro se motion to disqualify the prosecutors, which was denied. Soon thereafter, the magistrate appointed attorneys Brass, Donaldson, and Anderson to represent Arguelles. A month later, Arguelles filed a pro se motion to dismiss his court-appointed counsel and to represent himself.

¶ 10 In an April 23, 1997, hearing, the magistrate conducted a waiver of counsel colloquy with Arguelles, questioning him to determine whether he understood what was happening at the hearing and whether he fully understood the consequences of electing to represent himself and of waiving counsel. During this colloquy, the magistrate informed Arguelles of his right to be represented by an attorney and informed Arguelles of the charges he was facing and the possible sentences accompanying the charges. The magistrate told Arguelles about the court rules he must follow and that he could not "simply take the stand and proceed by telling a story." The magistrate also advised Arguelles that it was "unwise" for Arguelles to represent himself.

¶ 11 Arguelles answered the numerous questions clearly and affirmed that he believed himself to be "of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the consequences of [the waiver] and [his] pleas, and free of any mental disease or defect or impairment ...." The court assistant was present at the hearing in the capacity of standby counsel and did not raise any concerns about Arguelles's mental competence. Nevertheless, the magistrate asked standby counsel, "Has the defendant manifested to you any—any actions that would lead you to believe that he is not knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently waiving his right to counsel at this time?" Standby counsel responded, "No." After this colloquy, the court found that Arguelles had waived counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The magistrate appointed Brass, Donaldson, and Anderson to remain in the case as standby counsel to Arguelles.

¶ 12 During the same hearing, Arguelles waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the magistrate again asked Arguelles if he believed himself "free from any mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent [him] from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering into this waiver?" Arguelles responded, "I do." The State then asked whether standby counsel had discussed the waiver with Arguelles and whether, in standby counsel's opinion, Arguelles understood the waiver. Standby counsel answered, "I've discussed that subject with him many times. I've not discussed this form with him. It's not my desire to participate in the waiver of the preliminary hearing. You can see that he's a bright—I was going to say young male. I guess that's relative. He's capable of understanding that form, in my opinion." The magistrate pressed standby counsel further, asking, "We'll accept your representation that you do not believe that it's appropriate to participate in this waiver but that you have discussed with the defendant his desires and explained to him what he'll be giving up by entering into this waiver; is that correct?" "That's true," responded standby counsel. The...