State v. Arguello
| Decision Date | 30 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 27351.,27351. |
| Citation | 873 N.W.2d 490 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joseph ARGUELLO, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, John M. Strohman, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
Robert Van Norman, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1.] Joseph Arguello was convicted of three counts of sexual contact and rape involving three minors. Arguello appeals his conviction on the ground that the trial judge left the courtroom during the presentation of evidence. Arguello also appeals on the ground that the judge failed to give the jury a statutorily required admonishment before recesses and adjournments. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] Joseph Arguello had a twenty-year, on-again, off-again relationship with R.D. During one period of separation, R.D. married another man and they had three children. R.D. divorced in 2007, and she reunited with Arguello in 2008. She and the children began living with Arguello. In 2012, one of the children accused Arguello of inappropriate sexual activity. Arguello was subsequently charged with numerous counts of rape and sexual contact involving all three children.
[¶ 3.] Circuit Court Judge Jeff Davis presided at trial. Immediately after the jury was empaneled on the first day of trial, Judge Davis gave the following admonition to the jury:
It's important that you honor your oaths as jurors. There's a statutory admonition I'm required to give you, which essentially says: You are to form or express no opinions about the case, discuss it among yourselves or allow anyone to discuss it with you until it's finally submitted to you for your determination. It's important that the testimony and the evidence come only from the witness stand and has been properly admitted for you folks to consider. Rather than say that at every recess, I'll say "Remember the admonition," and that's what I'm talking about.
The judge did not give the full admonition again during the three-day trial. At each recess or adjournment, he told the jury to "remember the recess admonition" (on one occasion he told the jury to "remember the recess admonition that I've given you in the past"). The judge also failed to give any admonition before one lunch recess.
[¶ 4.] Near the end of the second day of trial, the attorneys and the judge agreed that the jury would view videos of two of the victims' forensic interviews in which they gave their accounts of what had occurred. The judge then told the jury that he had "a little mission about 4 o'clock that involve [d] the state's attorney's office on entirely unrelated matters" and that he would leave the courtroom while the jury watched the videos. The judge also told the jury that if necessary, "they'll change [the videos] and offer them separate." The judge told the bailiff the jury could take a break "in between" and he would be "back around...." The transcript does not reflect the time the judge actually left the courtroom and the time he returned. However, there is no dispute that the judge left the courtroom while the videos were presented to the jury and he returned to discharge the jury for the day. It appears from the transcript that both attorneys agreed to have the videos played without the judge's presence.1
[¶ 5.] Arguello appeals raising two issues. He first argues that Judge Davis caused structural error, invalidating the convictions, because he left the courtroom during the presentation of evidence.2 Structural error requires reversal without a showing of prejudice. Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16, 804 N.W.2d 400, 406 (). Structural errors so greatly affect the framework of the trial that they merit automatic reversal. Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ). However, structural errors occur only "in a very limited class of cases." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).
[¶ 6.] This Court, following Neder, has only recognized six types of structural error:
(1) a deprivation of the right to counsel; (2) a biased judge; (3) an unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant's race; (4) a deprivation of the right of self-representation at trial; (5) a deprivation of the right to a public trial; and (6) an erroneous reasonable doubt standard.
Guthmiller, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16, 804 N.W.2d at 406 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833 ); State v. Hayes, 2014 S.D. 72, ¶ 17, 855 N.W.2d 668, 674–75. We have also followed the Supreme Court in rejecting any sort of "functional equivalent[s]." Guthmiller, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16, 804 N.W.2d at 406 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. at 1833 ). Therefore, we have declined to find an error structural unless it fits within one of the six categories. See id. at ¶ 17 ().
[¶ 7.] This case is like Guthmiller. The judge erred in leaving the courtroom during the presentation of evidence, but the error is not one of the six recognized structural errors. See Guthmiller, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶¶ 17–18, 804 N.W.2d at 406–7. Arguello recognizes the Guthmiller categorical framework. Therefore, he argues that the judge's absence from the courtroom violated some of the constitutional rights recognized in the six categories; i.e. the rights to counsel, due process, and a public trial. But there is no evidence suggesting that the judge's absence violated any one of those constitutional rights. There is certainly no evidence suggesting a constitutional violation so egregious as to "necessarily render[ ] [the] trial fundamentally unfair." See id. at ¶ 16. Because the error in this case does not fit the categorical framework, we conclude that no structural error occurred.
[¶ 8.] This conclusion is supported by our pre-Neder cases disapproving judges leaving the courtroom during trials. Although we have consistently disapproved of this conduct, we have not reversed without a showing of prejudice. In O'Connor v. Bonney, 57 S.D. 134, 231 N.W. 521, 524 (1930), the judge and court reporter left the courtroom during closing arguments. We "emphatically disapproved" the judge's departure but we affirmed the judgment, indicating that the judge's absence alone was insufficient to reverse. O'Connor, 231 N.W. at 524 (). In Poe v. Arch, 26 S.D. 291, 128 N.W. 166, 168 (1910), a trial judge briefly left the courtroom when a party fainted and was carried to an adjoining room, but defense counsel continued with his argument. We again upheld the jury verdict because there was no prejudice to the defendant. Id. Many other state and federal cases support the conclusion that a trial judge's absence is improper, but it is not structural error.3
[¶ 9.] Because there was no structural error, Arguello must establish prejudice. Arguello argues that he was prejudiced because the judge's absence prevented a fair consideration of his motion for judgment of acquittal. Arguello contends that because the judge was not present to observe the victims' accounts of the alleged sexual misconduct, the judge could not have properly considered Arguello's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
[¶ 10.] The record is unclear whether the judge ever watched the videos. At an earlier motion hearing, the parties indicated that the judge should watch the videos at his convenience because they were the subject of a pretrial motion. The judge indicated at the end of that hearing that he would "get the videos watched." But there is no indication in the record—from a decision of the court or otherwise—whether the judge actually viewed the videos. We need not, however, determine whether the judge watched the videos in this case. Even if we assume he did not, Arguello cannot establish prejudice. Arguello failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the State's case stands unchallenged. Because Arguello has not established prejudice, we reject his challenge to his conviction on this ground.
[¶ 11.] We do, however, reiterate that it is improper to leave the courtroom during a trial. "The presiding judge is an integral part of the trial court, and ought not to be absent for any period while the trial is proceeding." O'Connor, 231 N.W. at 524. "It will thus be seen that the judge is an essential constituent of a court, and that there can be no court in the absence of the judge or judges." State v. Jackson, 21 S.D. 494, 113 N.W. 880, 881 (1907). Moreover, a judge's absence can have a significant effect on the jury. Jurors are mindful of a judge's behavior during trial— every word the judge says and every action the judge takes is received with deference. People v. Vargas, 174 Ill.2d 355, 220 Ill.Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037, 1042 (1996). Therefore, a "judge's absence from the bench during the course of the trial may create a negative impression in the minds of the jury to the detriment of the defendant." Id. We also note that a judge's absence may cause the jury to believe the matters in court are not important enough to merit attention. We adopt the Massachusetts Supreme Court's view that:
The very act of a judge's presiding over the trial has a profound and sobering influence on all those who are present in the courtroom. ‘[T]he core of our constitutional system is that individual liberty must never be taken away by shortcuts....'
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