State v. Armendariz
| Decision Date | 03 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 28,320.,28,320. |
| Citation | 2006 NMSC 036,141 P.3d 526 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael ARMENDARIZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
Patricia Madrid, Attorney General, Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
{1} This is a direct appeal taken from the imposition of a life sentence plus thirteen years for Defendant's convictions of first degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Those convictions stem from the shooting death of New Mexico State police officer Damacio Montaño and the non-fatal shooting of Eric Montaño outside the Two Minute Warning bar in Los Lunas, New Mexico. Defendant presents two issues for this Court's review. First, Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to present specific conduct evidence to support his contention that the decedent was the first aggressor. Second, Defendant asserts that his convictions for aggravated battery and attempted murder violate double jeopardy protections. Finding no merit in Defendant's claims, we affirm.
{2} Although several conflicting stories detailing the events surrounding the shooting were presented at trial, it is clear that there was a series of altercations throughout the evening at the Two Minute Warning bar. These events culminated in the forcible removal of many individuals from the bar and with the bar owner locking the entrance to the establishment when violence erupted. Defendant was at the bar that night with his friend, Nestor Chavez, and several female companions. Brothers Damacio and Eric Montaño, two off-duty police officers, along with Damacio's wife, Lina Montaño, were also at the bar that night. When fighting broke out inside the establishment between various individuals, Damacio and Eric, along with the bar's bouncers, began removing people from the bar. At some point, Defendant, Nestor Chavez, and their companions either left or were escorted out of the bar.
{3} Once outside, Defendant, Nestor Chavez, and two of the women who were with them that night gathered inside Defendant's car. Shortly thereafter, Damacio approached the car. Again, there was conflicting testimony regarding why Damacio approached the car and what prompted his interaction with Defendant and Nestor. Eric Montaño testified that he and his brother were approaching yet another fight in the parking lot when they were intercepted by Nestor Chavez, who began punching them. The defense witnesses presented a very different picture, testifying that it was only after Damacio charged toward Defendant's car that Nestor got out of the car and began struggling with Damacio. While Eric Montaño and others testified that Damacio was merely trying to restrain Nestor in a typical law enforcement fashion, the defense presented witness testimony that Damacio, a large man, was actually beating up Nestor, and that Eric walked up and also began beating Nestor.
{4} In any event, after some period of chaotic altercation between the Montaño brothers, Nestor Chavez, Defendant, and their female companions, Defendant retreated briefly and returned with a gun. Again, there was conflicting testimony regarding whether the Montaño brothers at that point identified themselves as police officers and whether Damacio made any sudden movements toward Defendant. What is clear is that Defendant opened fire, shooting Eric Montaño once and Damacio seven times. While Eric Montaño survived the shooting, Damacio's wounds were fatal.
{5} Defendant was charged with ten crimes: first degree murder, two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, two counts of tampering with evidence, two counts of conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Two essentially different stories were presented to the jury at Defendant's trial regarding the interaction between Damacio and Defendant. Defendant maintained that it was Damacio, with the help of his brother Eric, who initiated the altercation and that Defendant armed himself and ultimately shot both men in defense of Defendant's friend, Nestor Chavez. The State presented testimony that it was Defendant and Nestor Chavez who instigated the altercation and that police officers Damacio and Eric Montaño were merely trying to restrain Defendant and Nestor when the violence escalated to the point of the shooting. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm by a felon.
{6} Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded testimony from Damacio's widow, Lina Montaño. In general, we review a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Woodward, 121 N.M. 1, 4, 908 P.2d 231, 234 (1995). An abuse of discretion arises when the evidentiary ruling is clearly contrary to logic and the facts and circumstances of the case. Id.
{7} Shortly before trial commenced, the State moved to exclude "any evidence of or reference to alleged domestic violence between decedent Damacio Montaño and his widow, Lina Montaño." That motion was filed in response to co-defendant Nestor Chavez's request for any documentation filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court related to possible incidences of domestic violence between Damacio Montaño and his wife. In the motion, the State argued that any such evidence was irrelevant under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence and that the prejudicial effect of any such information or its tendency to confuse the issues or mislead the jury would outweigh its possible probative value.
{8} The trial court heard argument from counsel on the issue during a pretrial conference. Defense counsel argued in support of the admission of alleged incidences of domestic violence, stating, The State again argued relevancy and prejudice and questioned the accuracy of Defendant's assertions. Prior to ruling on the motion, the trial court agreed to conduct a suppression hearing in chambers to accurately determine the substance of Lina Montaño's possible testimony.
{9} At the suppression hearing, Lina Montaño testified that there were two incidents of domestic violence between her and Damacio, one of which occurred while she was pregnant with her first child, or shortly thereafter, and one of which resulted in the termination of Damacio's employment with the Artesia Police Department. She described the incidents as involving pushing and slapping. After the second incident, Lina obtained a temporary restraining order against her husband. Lina consistently maintained that Damacio did not have any problems with alcohol and was not intoxicated during either domestic dispute, and that she had never seen her husband fight anyone. She also indicated that she and Damacio had received counseling and had not had any additional domestic disputes since the second incident.
{10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court judge announced that he did not believe that "there [was] a sufficient showing to [the] court of a pertinent trait of the victim in [the] matter, and [he couldn't] see how it would come up" in accordance with Rule 11-404(A)(2) NMRA. He stated that under Rule 11-403 NMRA balancing, the proposed testimony would not be more prejudicial than probative, but that the admission was nonetheless precluded by Rule 11-404 NMRA.
{11} The New Mexico Rules of Evidence allow for the admission of "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor." Rule 11-404(A)(2) NMRA. Under Rule 11-405(B) NMRA, "[i]n cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct," in addition to proof in the form of reputation or opinion testimony. Rule 11-405 NMRA, therefore, creates an exception to the general rule that only reputation or opinion testimony is permitted on direct examination to prove a character trait. Finally, the Rules of Evidence allow for the exclusion of evidence, even if relevant, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Rule 11-403 NMRA.
{12} Defendant argues primarily that he should have been allowed to demonstrate that the victim, Damacio, had a propensity for violence and aggression, through the introduction of specific instances of violent conduct between Damacio and his wife. Defendant argues that such evidence was certainly relevant to his defense, that is, to his contention that Damacio was the first aggressor in the altercation preceding the shooting. In contrast, the State argues that any specific evidence of Damacio's prior domestic disputes was neither relevant nor probative as to whether Damacio was the first aggressor. The State also argues that, under existing caselaw, no defendant is entitled to offer instances of specific conduct to prove that the victim was...
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