State v. Armenta
| Decision Date | 24 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 64611-2,64611-2 |
| Citation | 134 Wn.2d 1,948 P.2d 1280 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Huberto Rojo ARMENTA and David Yepez Cruz, Petitioners. |
Stephanie Croll, Seattle, for Respondent.
Petitioners Huberto Armenta and David Cruz obtained review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed the superior court's dismissal of informations charging each of them with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The issues before us are whether, under the facts found by the trial court at a suppression hearing, petitioners were detained in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and, if so, whether that illegal detention vitiated the consent they gave to search their vehicle. We conclude that because petitioners' conduct did not present a reasonable and articulable suspicion that they were engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal activity, they were detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We further conclude that their consent to search was a product of this illegal detention. Consequently, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the trial court dismissing the charges against petitioners.
On October 9, 1994, at approximately 11:00 a.m., petitioners Huberto Armenta and David Cruz approached Prosser Police Officer G.J. Randles at a truck stop in Prosser and On the way to the vehicle, Officer Randles asked Armenta and Cruz for identification "to tell dispatch where [he was]." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (RP) at 11; see Clerk's Papers (CP) at 14. 1 According to Randles, "This was standard operating procedure ... intended for officer safety." CP at 14. Armenta gave Randles an Arizona driver's license bearing his true name. Cruz told Randles that his name was "Luis Perez," indicating that he had lost his wallet in Idaho and did not currently have any identification on his person.
asked him if he knew of an auto mechanic that could repair their car. Randles was in uniform. Although Spanish is their native language, Armenta and Cruz spoke to Officer Randles in English. Randles told Armenta and Cruz that he was not aware of any mechanics who would be available on Sunday, but offered to look at their car himself. Armenta and Cruz accepted his offer and Randles followed them to their car. They mentioned at some point that they were traveling from Idaho to Seattle.
Officer Randles noticed a bulge in one of Cruz's pockets and, consequently, asked him if it was a wallet. Consistent with his prior statement, Cruz said "no" and took out "[a] wad of money with a $20 bill on top, wrapped with a rubber band." RP at 14. Randles then asked Cruz how much money he had. Cruz said he had $1,000. When Randles asked Cruz where he got the money, he said that he had just cashed a paycheck that he received for working on "a ranch in Seattle." CP at 14-15. Cruz was not, however, able to produce a pay stub and he could not recall the name of the ranch at which he allegedly had been employed. Armenta then voluntarily produced three more bundles of money, each with a $20 bill on top and wrapped with a rubber band, saying that he had three bundles of $1,000 each. When Randles asked Armenta where he got the money, Armenta said that he had just sold a car. Armenta did not, however, have a receipt or a copy of the bill of sale, and he At that point, Officer Randles "called in" for a "driver's check" of the names Armenta and Cruz had given him. 2 CP at 15. The dispatcher notified Randles that the car was registered to Armenta, that Armenta's Arizona driver's license had been suspended, and that Armenta had only an identification card in Washington. The dispatcher told Randles that there was no record of a "Luis Perez." Randles then "called dispatch for back-up" and placed the bundles of money in his patrol car "for safe keeping." RP at 15; CP at 16. He asked Armenta if any drugs or weapons were in the vehicle. Armenta said "no." CP at 16. Randles then asked Armenta if he could search the vehicle, saying " CP at 16. Armenta said "something to the effect of 'No, go ahead, I don't mind.' " CP at 16. Officer Randles did not read Armenta his Miranda 3 rights before asking to search the vehicle.
had in his possession the title to the car he claimed to have sold.
Randles found a pack of cigarette rolling papers in the vehicle's passenger compartment. As he continued to search, he noticed Cruz standing on the other side of the car holding an open pocket knife with a two-and-a-half- to three-inch-long blade. Officer Randles "asked" Cruz for the knife and conducted a weapons pat down of Armenta and Cruz. CP at 16. Randles then said " CP at 17. Armenta said "something to the effect of 'No, go ahead, I don't mind.' " CP at 17.
Beneath a spare tire, Randles found a binocular case. Inside it were 50 to 70 clear plastic baggies containing a white powder that he suspected was cocaine. Randles then placed Armenta and Cruz under arrest and transported them to jail. Laboratory tests later determined that the Officer Randles later obtained a warrant to search Armenta's vehicle. He found a piece of plastic containing "a black tar substance believed to be heroin." CP at 18. Another officer who assisted in the search "discovered a marijuana cigarette on the vehicle's console." 4 CP at 18.
binocular case contained approximately 260 grams of cocaine.
Detective Suarez of the Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force went to the Benton County jail later that day to interview Armenta and Cruz. Suarez read Armenta and Cruz their "constitutional rights" in Spanish. CP at 18. They each waived their rights and agreed to speak with Suarez.
Cruz told Suarez that he had traveled with Armenta to Parma, Idaho, where Armenta's vehicle had been loaded with cocaine. Cruz said that he and Armenta were being paid $4,000 to drive the cocaine from Parma to Seattle.
Armenta also told Detective Suarez that he and Cruz were receiving $4,000 to drive the cocaine to Seattle. Armenta said that he had gone to Parma with the intent of picking up cocaine and driving it to Seattle, and that he knew the "drugs" were in the vehicle. CP at 19. Armenta acknowledged that he gave Officer Randles permission to search his vehicle.
Armenta and Cruz were charged separately with "possession of a controlled substance ... with intent to deliver...." 5 CP at 9; Cruz CP at 6. Before trial, they each moved to suppress the cocaine found in the binocular case and the statements they made to Detective Suarez. At a suppression hearing, Armenta testified that he did not understand he could refuse to consent to the search of his vehicle, and that he thought he would not get his money back if he did not consent. He also testified that he had received only a sixth-grade education, in Mexico, and that Following the suppression hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. 6 Among other things, the trial court concluded:
he did not have a bank account. Cruz did not testify at the hearing.
2. ARMENTA's consent to search his vehicle was freely and voluntarily given under the guidelines set forth in State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975) and subsequent cases interpreting Shoemaker.
....
4. Before a police officer can ask for consent to search a person's car, the police officer must have "articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity". State v. Cantrell, 70 Wash.App. 340, 344, 853 P.2d 479 (1993).
5. Officer Randles did not have enough articulable facts to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he asked ARMENTA for permission to search his vehicle. Thus, the officer did not have the right to ask for consent to search ARMENTA's vehicle.
6. Because the request to search ARMENTA's vehicle was improper, the search itself was illegal. Thus, any evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be suppressed.
7. Because the initial search of ARMENTA's vehicle was illegal, the subsequent arrest of ARMENTA and CRUZ was improper. Thus, any statements ARMENTA and CRUZ made after their arrest must be suppressed.
8. Because the initial search of ARMENTA's vehicle was illegal, the subsequent issuance of a search warrant based, in part, on the evidence seized in the illegal search, and the subsequent search of ARMENTA's vehicle incident to the
search warrant were improper. Thus, the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant must be suppressed.
CP 20-21.
The State concluded that it was unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence, including the statements of Armenta and Cruz, and thus moved to dismiss the charges against them. The trial court granted its motions and the State appealed to Division Three of the Court of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals pursuant to RAP 3.3. That court reversed the trial court, concluding that although Officer Randles "seized" Armenta and Cruz when he placed their money in his patrol car, he had a "well-founded suspicion" that they were engaged in criminal activity which justified "an investigative stop or seizure." State v. Armenta, 83 Wash.App. 118, 122, 920 P.2d 257 (1996), review granted, 131 Wash.2d 1005, 932 P.2d 644 (1997). We thereafter granted Armenta and Cruz's petition for review.
Whether a person has been seized under the Fourth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Thorn, 129 Wash.2d 347, 351, 917 P.2d 108 (1996). "The resolution by a trial court of differing accounts of the circumstances surrounding the encounter are factual findings entitled to great deference," but "the ultimate determination of whether those facts constitute a...
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