State v. Armitage

• Decision Date: 22 October 2021
• Docket Number: NO. CAAP-19-0000814,CAAP-19-0000814
• Parties: STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Myisha Lee ARMITAGE, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

150 Hawai‘i 154

497 P.3d 1102 (Table)

STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Myisha Lee ARMITAGE, Defendant-Appellant

NO. CAAP-19-0000814

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i.

October 22, 2021

On the briefs:

Andrew T. Park for Defendant-Appellant.

Chad M. Kumagai, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City & County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Hiraoka and Wadsworth, JJ.)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Myisha Lee Armitage (Armitage ) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, entered on November 1, 2019, in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court ).¹ Following a jury trial, Armitage was convicted of Accidents Involving Death or Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS ) § 291C-12 (Supp. 2015)² (Count 1 ), and Negligent Homicide in the First Degree, in violation of HRS §§ 707-702.5(1)(a) and/or 707-702.5(1)(b) (2014)³ (Count 2 ).

On appeal, Armitage contends that: (1) the indictment as to Count 1 was insufficient because it failed to specify that Armitage did not stop as close as possible to the accident scene and "forthwith return" to the scene "without obstructing traffic more than is necessary," HRS § 291C-12 ; (2) the jury instructions for Count 1 were prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, and misleading because they did not contain all of the elements of the charged offense; (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction as to Count 1; (4) the indictment as to Count 2 was insufficient because it did not include the definition of "under the influence" and thus failed to state an offense; and (5) the Circuit Court erred in not suppressing the result of Armitage's blood alcohol test where the police failed to obtain a warrant to draw Armitage's blood.

After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve Armitage's contentions as follows:

(1) Armitage argues that the Hawai‘i Supreme Court's decision in State v. Baker, 146 Hawai‘i 299, 463 P.3d 956 (2020), is dispositive of her contention that the indictment was insufficient as to Count 1.

In Baker, the supreme court considered the sufficiency of a charge brought against a driver for failure to stop at the scene of an accident involving vehicle damage, in violation of HRS § 291C-13. At that time, HRS § 291C-13 (Supp. 2008) stated, in relevant part:

Accidents involving damage to vehicle or property. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property that is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall forthwith return to, and in every event shall remain at, the scene of the accident until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of section 291C-14. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. ...

See Baker, 146 Hawai‘i at 302 n.1, 463 P.3d 959 n.1.

The supreme court construed this language to mean that "[a] driver .... does not violate the statute by not stopping at the scene, by not stopping as close as 'possible' to the scene, or not returning to the scene of the accident, if doing so would prevent a traffic hazard that would otherwise result." Id. at 307, 463 P.3d at 964. Therefore, the court concluded:

The requirement that the stop was made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary is thus a requisite aspect of proof of the offense when the driver stops at, or forthwith returns to, a location that the State contends is not as close as "possible" to the accident scene.

Accordingly, when a defendant stops in close proximity of the accident scene and provides the requisite information, the State, in order to show a violation of the statute, is required to prove the following: (1) the defendant failed to stop at a location that was as close to the scene of the accident as possible, or to forthwith return thereto, and (2) the failure did not result from the defendant avoiding an unnecessary obstruction of traffic.

Id.

In Baker, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the failure-to-stop charge for the first time on appeal. Id. at 308, 463 P.3d at 965. The supreme court thus applied the liberal construction standard in reviewing the charge. Id. (citing State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 90, 657 P.2d 1019, 1019-20 (1983) ; State v. Wells, 78 Hawai‘i 373, 381, 894 P.2d 70, 78 (1995) ). The court nevertheless ruled:

The State in this case did not specify in the complaint that [the defendant] did not stop either at the accident scene or stop at the location closest to the accident scene and forthwith return thereto without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. The State's omission of this statutory qualification did not provide [the defendant] with fair notice of the elements of the offense charged. In fact, the charge did not include any reference to the language "without obstructing traffic more than is necessary" or include language similar to it. The failure to include the statutory language resulted in this element of the charge having a common meaning that differed from the express statutory requirements, and thus neither the complaint nor the oral charge can be reasonably construed to charge an offense. Accordingly, the deficient charge deprived Baker of the right to due process. As a result, the State failed to state an offense, and the conviction based upon it cannot be sustained.

Baker, 146 Hawai‘i at 308, 463 P.3d at 965 (citations omitted).

Here, Armitage was charged in Count 1 with failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving death or serious bodily injury, in violation of HRS § 291C-12. The operative provisions of HRS § 291C-13 substantially mirror those of HRS § 291C-12. In particular, both statutes require a driver who is involved in an accident that causes a specified harm to immediately stop at the scene of the accident or stop "as close thereto as possible" and "forthwith return" to the scene. HRS § 291C-12 ; HRS § 291C-13 ; see Baker, 146 Hawai‘i at 306, 463 P.3d at 963. Both statutes also require that "[e]very such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary." HRS § 291C-12 ; HRS § 291C-13. However, the charge against Armitage, like its counterpart in Baker, failed to specify that Armitage did not stop at the accident scene or stop at the location closest to the accident scene and forthwith return thereto without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. Under Baker, the failure to include the statutory language "without obstructing traffic more than is necessary," or similar language, rendered Count 1 deficient and deprived Armitage of the right to due process. See Baker, 146 Hawai‘i at 308, 463 P.3d at 965.

The State contends that because Baker was decided after Armitage's trial, the Baker ruling "should be given purely prospective effect" and should not be applied in this case. However, the supreme court in Baker did not indicate that its ruling on the sufficiency of the charge should be given strictly prospective effect; rather, the court applied its ruling to the case before it, concluding that the State failed to state an offense and vacating the defendant's conviction under HRS § 291C-13.⁴ See id. at 308, 310, 463 P.3d at 965, 967. The disposition of Baker thus indicates that the court's ruling on the sufficiency of the charge was not intended to apply "purely prospectively." Cf. State v. Jones, 148 Hawai‘i 152, 174-76, 468 P.3d 166, 188-90 (2020) (applying a holding prospectively and not to the case at bar) ; State v. Torres, 144 Hawai‘i 282, 292-95, 439 P.3d 234, 244-47 (2019) (same); State v. Jess, 117 Hawai‘i 381, 404, 184 P.3d 133, 156 (same). At least as to the present case, which is on direct appellate review, we conclude that the Baker ruling – i.e. , that the failure-to-stop charge was deficient for omitting the statutory language "without obstructing traffic more than is necessary," or similar language – applies. For the reasons discussed above, the Judgment as to Count 1 must be vacated.

(2) Given that we vacate as to Count 1 based on Armitage's first point of error, we do not reach her second point of error.

(3) In her third point of error, Armitage contends there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction as to Count 1.

Sufficient evidence to support a conviction "requires substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged." State v. Grace, 107 Hawai‘i 133, 139, 111 P.3d 28, 34 (App. 2005) (quoting State v. Ferrer, 95 Hawai‘i 409, 422, 23 P.3d 744, 757 (App. 2001) ). Substantial evidence is "credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Ferrer, 95 Hawai‘i at 422, 23 P.3d at 757 ). The evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact," who must "determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact." Id. (quoting Ferrer, 95 Hawai‘i at 422, 23 P.3d at 757 ).

In order to convict Armitage for a violation of HRS § 291C-12, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Armitage was driving a vehicle that was involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of another person; and (2) Armitage did not (a) immediately stop at the scene or stop as close thereto as possible and forthwith return to the scene without obstructing traffic more than is necessary; or (b) give the information required by HRS § 291C-14⁵ to any person injured in the accident and any police officer at the scene, and render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance. See HRS § 291C-12 ; HRS § 291C-14 ; see also Baker, 146 Hawai‘i at 309, 463 P.3d at 966 (stating the elements to prove a violation of HRS §...