State v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 20 November 1894
• Citation: 140 Ind. 628,38 N.E. 820
• Parties: STATE v. ARNOLD et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

140 Ind. 628

38 N.E. 820

STATE

v.ARNOLD et al.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 20, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Whitley county; J. M. Van Fleet, Special Judge.

James Arnold and others were indicted for receiving, as partners doing a banking business, a certain deposit of money when they were insolvent. From an order sustaining a motion to quash the indictment, the state appeals. Reversed.

A. G. Smith, L. D. Fleming, and Marshall, McNagny & Clugston, for the State. L. W. Royse, H. S. Biggs, and A. A. Adams, for appellees.

DAILEY, J.

The appellees were indicted at the February term, 1894, of the Whitley circuit court, the charge being that they were partners doing a banking business at said county, and as such received a deposit of $25 from one William Heagy at a time when they were insolvent, and knew of their insolvent condition. The appellees appeared, and filed a motion to quash the indictment upon the ground that the act of March 9, 1891, of the general assembly of this state, in so far as it relates to private bankers, is unconstitutional and void. This motion was sustained by the court, and the state takes this appeal.

Inasmuch as the appellees are described in the indictment as private bankers, doing a partnership business, they contend that the act which purports to include them in its application is in contravention of section 19, art. 4, of the constitution of Indiana, which is as follows: “Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.” The title to the act of March 9, 1891, upon which the indictment in this case is predicated, is “An act concerning bank officers, brokers, etc., receiving deposits after insolvency, repealing all laws in conflict therewith.” The appellees contend that the title of the act in its present form does not differ essentially from what it would if the “etc.” were omitted therefrom, and it read, “An act concerning bank officers and brokers receiving deposits after insolvency,” and that it is not broad enough to warrant legislation touching an entirely different class of men. The letters “etc.” are an abbreviation of “et cetera.” In 1 Bouv. Law Dict. p. 610, two translations of these words are given: “And others,” and “other things.” In 1 Rap. & L. Law Dict. p. 466, these identical definitions are given. In Agate v. Lowenbein, 4 Daly, 62, it was held that “et cetera” is synonymous with “and so forth.” The expression “and so forth” is sometimes used in pleadings, simply to avoid repetition, but the law writers say it is not used in solemn instruments.Com. v. Ross, 6 Serg. & R. 427. In 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 240, it is said: “The words ‘and for other purposes,’ frequently suffixed to the title of a statute, imply purposes not named in the title. * * * ‘Etc.’ has also been held to have no meaning as a part of the title of an act.” State v. Hackett, 5 La. Ann. 93. It is said in Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) p. 176: “The words ‘and for other purposes' must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with the constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them could be brought in by their aid.” Applying this test, what subject would one look for in the body of the act under the head of “etc.” in the index? What would be suggested to the mind by the phrase “and others” or “and so forth,” discovered in the index? In such case, it seems clear that the court could not enlarge the scope of the title so as to embrace matters not enumerated therein. State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 195. They have no dispensing power, as the constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent as to what shall have operation. Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269;Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill & B. Plank-Road Co., 22 Barb. 642. In Suth. St. Const. § 211, the author says the title of an act is now so associated with it in the process of legislation that when, in performing its constitutional functions, it affords means of determining the legislative intent, in cases of doubt its help cannot be rejected for being extrinsic and extralegislative. We are fully persuaded from an examination of the authorities that the title to the act in question is not a model of skillful legislation, but think it is comprehensive enough, omitting the “etc.,” to express the subject of the act, and that in the use of the words “bank officers” in the title there was sufficient indication of the legislative intent to embrace in its provisions not only officers of incorporated banks, but all persons officiating in a banking establishment or place doing a banking business. This court must judicially know as a matter of common history that there is a system of banking business in this state, into which private individuals and partnerships enter, not governed by any articles of incorporation; and in this arrangement the...