State v. Arriaga-Luna

Decision Date27 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. 20110718.,20110718.
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Delfino ARRIAGA–LUNA, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John E. Swallow, Att'y. Gen., Ryan D. Tenney, Asst. Att'y. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Joan C. Watt, Brenda M. Viera, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

Justice DURHAM, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 The State appeals the district court's grant of defendant Delfino Arriaga–Luna's motion to suppress his confession to murder. The district court held that this confession was coerced because of the interrogating officers' “invocation of Mr. Arriaga–Luna's children as a method to get a confession.” We reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On April 5, 2010, a female victim was found deceased in her apartment. She had two gunshot wounds to the head. As officers were investigating, Mr. Arriaga–Luna's wife arrived at the scene with the victim's boyfriend and told police that she and her two young daughters had been kidnapped by the victim's boyfriend because of a drug debt owed by her husband. The victim's boyfriend then told police he believed that Mr. Arriaga–Luna had killed his girlfriend. Police located and apprehended Mr. Arriaga–Luna and brought him to the police station for questioning.

¶ 3 Mr. Arriaga–Luna was interrogated on April 6, 2010, from about one a.m. to about three a.m. The interview was conducted primarily in English, but a Spanish interpreter was present so that Mr. Arriaga–Luna could elect to hear the questions and give responses in his native language. During the interview, Detective Arenaz tried to convince Mr. Arriaga–Luna to tell him that Mr. Arriaga–Luna's brother had shot the victim, or that the killing was an accident, so that Mr. Arriaga–Luna would not go to prison for a crime he did not commit. As a persuasive technique, Detective Arenaz appealed to Mr. Arriaga–Luna's love for his children. He initiated the following exchange:

Detective: You have a wife and kids.

Arriaga–Luna: Yeah. (Unintell).

Detective: Do you wanna ever ...

Arriaga–Luna: (Unintell).

Detective: ... see them again?

Arriaga–Luna: My babies?

Detective: Yeah.

Arriaga–Luna: I wanna see them.

Detective: You're not gonna see them. You're ... you're gonna be locked in prison for the rest of your life.

Mr. Arriaga–Luna did not confess during this interview.

¶ 4 Two days later, Mr. Arriaga–Luna was interrogated by Detective Hamideh. Detective Hamideh appears to have employed the so-called false-friend technique. He spoke to Mr. Arriaga–Luna in Spanish, made small talk with Mr. Arriaga–Luna in the car ride before the interview about the challenges facing Latinos in the United States, and told Mr. Arriaga–Luna that he wanted to help him and his family.

¶ 5 During this second interview, Mr. Arriaga–Luna repeatedly expressed concern for his daughters. Detective Hamideh appealed to this concern and to Mr. Arriaga–Luna's desire for his daughters' respect and in persuading him to confess. For example, he said, “give [your daughters] hope that yes, I did what I did.... And I am going to take the time, until—until that point.... And after that point—‘Girls. We are going to be together.’ But free.” Detective Hamideh also told Mr. Arriaga–Luna, “I think that their daddy—their daddy can say, ‘Yes. I did make a mistake. But I have my dignity because I told the truth.’ When Mr. Arriaga–Luna asked Detective Hamideh what would happen to his daughters, Detective Hamideh responded, [Y]es, I can bring resources there so that [your daughters] can be educated and break the cycle here.” Less than one hour after the interview began, Mr. Arriaga–Luna confessed to shooting the victim.

¶ 6 Mr. Arriaga–Luna moved the district court to suppress his confession on the grounds that it was coerced. In ruling on this motion, the court focused its analysis on three aspects of Mr. Arriaga–Luna's interrogation: (1) the threat of a possible life sentence; (2) the use of the false-friend technique, and (3) references to Mr. Arriaga–Luna's children. The district court rejected the defense arguments regarding the possible life sentence and the false-friend technique. However, the district court granted the motion to suppress Mr. Arriaga–Luna's confession based on [t]he detectives' invocation of Mr. Arriaga–Luna's children as a method to get a confession.” The State appealed this ruling, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 A district court's determination of whether a confession was voluntary or unconstitutionally coerced involves a mixed question of law and fact. Our review of mixed questions is “sometimes deferential and sometimes not.” Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶ 42, 308 P.3d 382. In determining how much deference to afford to the district court's decision on a mixed question, we apply a three-part balancing test that considers

(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts.

State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 8 Here, the district court's conclusion that Mr. Arriaga–Luna's confession was coerced was based entirely on its review of the interrogation transcripts and the court's interpretation of the law. Because we are in as good a position as the district court to examine the transcripts and determine what the law is, we owe the district court no deference. See Swallow v. Jessop (In re United Effort Plan Trust), 2013 UT 5, ¶ 22, 296 P.3d 742;In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382, 2012 WL 4486225. When a district court relies on live testimony in an evidentiary hearing where the defendant, interrogators, or other relevant individuals testify regarding the circumstances of the confession and the defendant's characteristics and state of mind at the time of the confession, some deference may be appropriate. See Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 26, 144 P.3d 1096. However, even in such cases, deference may be limited in the interest of developing a uniform body of appellate law to govern police interrogation practices. See In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ¶ 44.

ANALYSIS
I. A CONFESSION IS INVOLUNTARY IF THE WILL OF THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN OVERCOME

¶ 9 The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution protect individuals from being compelled to incriminate themselves. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). The ultimate goal of analyzing whether a confession was coerced is to determine “whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.” United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977).

¶ 10 The totality of the circumstances includes “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 14, 984 P.2d 1009 (internal quotation marks omitted). Details of the interrogation include external factors, such as “the duration of the interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery, absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to the defendant by the officers.” Id. The subjective characteristics of the accused that may affect susceptibility to “more subtle forms of psychological persuasion” include “the defendant's mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education, age, and familiarity with the judicial system.” Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, for a confession to be involuntary there must be a causal connection between the coercion and the confession. State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 1993).

¶ 11 As the U.S. Supreme Court has long held, “certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique character of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned,” and confessions resulting from them are inadmissible. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). Threats or promises render a confession involuntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, they overcome a defendant's free will. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (rejecting a per se rule that any confession following a threat or promise is involuntary and analyzing the voluntariness of a confessionbased on the totality of the circumstances). For example, we have held that “an interrogation can be impermissibly coercive because [it] carried a threat of greater punishment or a promise for lesser punishment depending on whether [a defendant] confessed.” Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 29, 984 P.2d 1009 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Police may, however, give a suspect realistic estimates about probable sentences. State v. Montero, 2008 UT App 285, ¶ 14, 191 P.3d 828.

¶ 12 In Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) and United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.1981), the defendants' confessions were held to have been coerced because the interrogating officers made threats regarding the defendants' children. The police officers in Lynumn encircled a single mother and told her that she would not see her children again unless she admitted to being a drug dealer. 372 U.S. at 531–32, 83 S.Ct. 917. The officers also told Lynumn that her children's government assistance would be withdrawn unless she confessed. Id. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917. The ...

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