State v. Arroyo

• Decision Date: 09 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 28044.,28044.
• Citation: 931 A.2d 975,104 Conn.App. 167
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Reynaldo ARROYO.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

931 A.2d 975

104 Conn.App. 167

STATE of Connecticut v. Reynaldo ARROYO.

No. 28044.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 19, 2007.

Decided October 9, 2007.

Andrew S. Liskov, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Bruce R. Lockwood, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Timothy J. Liston, state's attorney, and Maureen Platt, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

SCHALLER, DiPENTIMA and GRUENDEL, Js.

SCHALLER, J.

The defendant, Reynaldo Arroyo, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) and 53a-48, and larceny in the fifth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-125a (a) and 53a-119. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied (1) his request for a special credibility instruction to the jury concerning the testimony of two jailhouse informants, (2) his requested jury instruction on DNA evidence and (3) his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the afternoon of March 28, 2001, the defendant asked his neighbor if he could borrow money, stating that he would pay the money back after he went on "a mission." Later that evening, the defendant and Richmond Perry drove to Mike's Package Store in Middlefield. At the counter, an argument ensued between the defendant and the owner of the store, Edmund Caruso, over the amount of change the defendant received from his purchase. The argument escalated, and the defendant pulled out a handgun and jumped over the counter. The defendant pushed Caruso, who then sprayed Mace at both the defendant and Perry. During the altercation, Caruso was shot several times and subsequently died as a result of his injuries. Following the shooting, the defendant and Perry fled from the scene with the cash register. The defendant was arrested several weeks later.

The defendant was charged with felony murder, murder, robbery in the first degree, larceny in the fifth degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The jury found him guilty of felony murder, larceny in the fifth degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and not guilty of the other charges. The court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth where necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his request for a special credibility instruction concerning the testimony of two jailhouse informants. He further maintains that the impropriety was harmful and deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. The defendant argues that because the jailhouse informants had hoped for and anticipated some benefit and were motivated by self-interest, the rule articulated by our Supreme Court in State v. Patterson, 276 Conn. 452, 886 A.2d 777 (2005), applies. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary for our resolution of this issue. At trial, the state presented the testimony of Thomas Moran and Ronald Avery. While awaiting their trials, Moran and Avery shared a courthouse lockup cell with the defendant. Both Moran and Avery testified that while in the lockup, on different occasions, the defendant confessed to them that he and Perry had robbed the package store and had shot Caruso.

Prior to his conversations with the defendant in the lockup, Moran had known the defendant and had lived with him for a short period of time earlier that year. Moran testified that although he had an extensive criminal record, he did not "believe in violence" and was testifying because "it was the right thing to do." The jury heard evidence that Moran had attempted to use the information three different times in an effort to negotiate an agreement with the state, even though from the beginning, he was told, "you'll get nothing." Moran's attempts to obtain benefits in exchange for his cooperation were futile.

Avery met the defendant for the first time while in the lockup at the Norwich courthouse. Avery testified that he did not believe the defendant initially, but decided to come forth with the information after seeing the incident reported on the news. Avery testified that he thought there would be a monetary reward for the information, and, furthermore, he had hoped to use the information to "get some play" on his case.

Prior to the conclusion of the trial, the defendant requested that the judge instruct the jury that it should weigh, examine and view Moran's and Avery's testimony with great caution, care and scrutiny to determine whether the testimony had been affected by bias or prejudice against the defendant, and to consider whether Moran and Avery testified to serve their own self-interest because they believed or hoped that they would benefit by falsely implicating the defendant.

The court denied the defendant's request but instructed the jury to consider the motives of any witness and the credibility of his or her testimony, taking into account all the evidence as well as any inconsistencies in the witness' testimony and whether the witness had an interest in the outcome of the trial or any bias or prejudice toward any party or any matter in the case.

Our standard of review for claims of instructional impropriety is well established. "The principal function of a jury charge is to assist the jury in applying the law correctly to the facts which [it] might find to be established . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 179, 920 A.2d 236 (2007). "[I]ndividual jury instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. . . . The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in its entirety fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rule of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 289 Conn. 779, 822, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

"Generally, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction singling out any of the state's witnesses and highlighting his or her possible motive for testifying falsely." State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 561, 747 A.2d 487 (2000). Prior to the Patterson case, our jurisprudence recognized two exceptions to this general rule: the complaining witness exception; State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 211-12, 438 A.2d 418 (1980);¹ and the accomplice witness exception. State v. Shindell, 195 Conn. 128, 142, 486 A.2d 637 (1985).² In Patterson, on which the defendant relies, our Supreme Court set forth a third exception for the testimony of jailhouse informants. State v. Patterson, supra, at 276 Conn. at 469-71, 886 A.2d 777. "We agree with the defendant that an informant who has been promised a benefit by the state in return for his or her testimony has a powerful incentive, fueled by self-interest, to implicate falsely the accused. Consequently, the testimony of such an informant, like that of an accomplice, is inevitably suspect. . . . Because the testimony of an informant who expects to receive a benefit from the state in exchange for his or her cooperation is no less suspect than the testimony of an accomplice who expects leniency from the state, we conclude that the defendant was entitled to an instruction substantially in accord with the one that he had sought." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at 469-70, 886 A.2d 777.

We conclude that Patterson does not apply in this case. In Patterson, police officers contacted the jail-house informant two days before the defendant's trial to inquire whether the defendant had made any incriminating statements to him while he and the defendant were cellmates. Id., at 465, 886 A.2d 777. The informant sought and was promised a two year reduction in his sentence, a favorable recommendation in his pending charges, assistance in obtaining early parole, transfer to another prison and restoration of his visitation privileges for his cooperation. Id. Following Patterson, we agreed with the state's concession in State v. Slater, 98 Conn.App. 288, 309 & n. 13, 908 A.2d 1097, cert. granted, 280 Conn. 950, 912 A.2d 484 (2006),³ that the court should have given the Patterson instruction requested by the defendant. In Slater, a prosecutor told the informant that during sentencing on the charges pending against the informant, the prosecutor would call to the court's attention the fact that the informant had testified for the state. Id., at 310, 908 A.2d 1097. In the present case, perhaps Moran and Avery had hoped that they would receive some benefit when they volunteered information to the state, but our review of the record reveals no evidence that either received or had been promised any benefit or consideration. This fact distinguishes the present case from Patterson and Slater.⁴ The special credibility instruction required by Patterson is necessary only when the jailhouse informant's incentive to lie is made greater by a promise of some benefit for testifying against the defendant. State v. Patterson, supra 276 Conn. at 469-70, 886 A.2d 777. Indeed, requiring that trial courts give a special credibility instruction every time a jailhouse informant testifies that he or she merely hoped to receive any benefit or consideration would be an overbroad application of Patterson's narrow exception to the general rule that a defendant generally is not entitled to jury instructions that highlight any witness' possible motive for testifying falsely. We conclude that the court properly instructed the jury with respect to the testimony of Moran and Avery.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly denied...