State v. Arsenault
| Decision Date | 25 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005-208.,2005-208. |
| Citation | 153 N.H. 413,897 A.2d 988 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Christopher W. ARSENAULT. |
Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Gregory J. Ahlgren, of Manchester, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Christopher W. Arsenault, appeals an order of the Merrimack District Court (Michael, J.) denying his motion to vacate a prior conviction. We reverse.
The parties do not dispute the material facts in this case. In March 2001, Arsenault was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of RSA 265:82. The complaint alleged that Arsenault drove a motor vehicle upon a way while having an alcohol concentration of .02 or more. Arsenault was under twenty-one years of age at that time. In July 2001, he appeared in court without a lawyer, spoke with someone at the courthouse, and indicated his intention to plead guilty. The person provided Arsenault with an acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, which he signed.
After he signed the acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, Arsenault presented it to the court and the court engaged him in a plea colloquy. The record shows that the colloquy contained no discussion of either the elements or the nature of the offense charged. The trial court sentenced Arsenault to a 120-day loss of license and a fine of three hundred and fifty dollars.
In 2004, Arsenault was arrested for a subsequent DWI offense. In January 2005, he moved to vacate his 2001 DWI conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made because the elements of the offense were never explained to him. After a hearing in the trial court, the motion was denied.
On appeal, Arsenault argues that the State had the burden of proving that his plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. He asserts that, since the record is devoid of evidence that he was advised of the elements of the charge against him, the trial court could not have found his plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
The State responds that, though the trial court did not advise Arsenault of the elements of DWI, the court could have properly assumed that he was aware of them because he received the complaint and signed the waiver form. Additionally, the State argues that it is the defendant who had the burden of proving that a plea was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary. The State concludes that, even if Arsenault lacked understanding of the elements, the court's error was harmless.
Arsenault's argument that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made implicates the due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). We review constitutional questions of law de novo. In the Matter of Berg & Berg, 152 N.H. 658, 661, 886 A.2d 980 (2005). Because Arsenault did not unambiguously and specifically invoke a provision of the New Hampshire Constitution, we address only his federal claim. See Appeal of Morgan, 144 N.H. 44, 46-47, 742 A.2d 101 (1999). We note that the State does not challenge the applicability of due process rights in the context of a violation, as opposed to a crime. Accordingly, we do not address that distinction.
It is well established that a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to be valid. E.g., State v. Thornton, 140 N.H. 532, 536, 669 A.2d 791 (1995). A guilty plea does not qualify as intelligent unless the defendant first receives "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (quotations omitted). For a plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant must understand the essential elements of the crime to which he pleads guilty. Thornton, 140 N.H. at 537, 669 A.2d 791.
Which party bears the burden of proof when a defendant challenges the knowledge or volition of his plea depends upon the procedural posture of the appeal.
Id. (citations omitted).
Because Arsenault's motion to vacate was a collateral attack, he bore the initial burden to "describe the specific manner in which the waiver was in fact involuntary or without understanding" and to "at least go forward with evidence sufficient to indicate that his specific claim present[ed] a genuine issue for adjudication." Zankowski, 140 N.H. at 296, 665 A.2d 1081. In his motion to vacate, Arsenault argued that he did not understand the elements of the offense charged against him, stating that his information regarding the plea came only from the prosecutor and that Arsenault did not, at any time, have any of the elements of the offense described to him by anyone. He further stated that, at the time he entered his plea, he was twenty years of age, had minimum schooling, and had consulted with no legal representative prior to appearing in court that day. Thus, Arsenault described the manner in which his waiver lacked understanding.
At the 2005 hearing on Arsenault's motion to vacate, the trial court allowed Arsenault to further comment on his motion if he wished. Both Arsenault and the State made legal arguments at the hearing. From a review of the transcript, it is clear that the parties and the court treated the facts alleged in Arsenault's pleading as "evidence" for purposes of satisfying the requirement that the defendant "at least go forward with evidence sufficient to indicate that his specific claim present[ed] a genuine issue for adjudication." Id. Neither in the trial court nor in this court has the State objected to that treatment. We note that, for a defendant to satisfy his initial burden of going forward, he need not persuade the trial court of his argument. His burden is to "describe the specific manner in which the waiver was in fact involuntary or without understanding" and to "at least go forward with evidence sufficient to indicate that his specific claim present [ed] a genuine issue for adjudication." Id. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Arsenault satisfied his initial burden.
The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the record complies with Boykin. The State concedes that the trial court did not advise Arsenault of the essential elements of the charged offense. Further, our review of the record reveals no indication that the trial court affirmatively inquired into the knowledge and volition of the defendant's plea. In the colloquy, the trial court told Arsenault that he was entitled to withdraw his plea and have a trial, that the division of motor vehicles could impose additional administrative penalties, and what penalties would accompany a subsequent DWI violation. The trial court, however, did not discuss the elements of the charged offense or the nature of that charge. Accordingly, the burden rests on the State to demonstrate to a clear and convincing degree that the plea was voluntary or knowing in the respect specifically challenged. Richard, 129 N.H. at 408, 529 A.2d 898.
Before addressing whether the State demonstrated that the plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, we take this opportunity to remind the trial courts that a colloquy is constitutionally required when a defendant pleads guilty because the defendant forfeits not only the right to trial, but also the right to confront accusers as well as the right...
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