State v. Arthur H., 18100.

Citation953 A.2d 630,288 Conn. 582
Decision Date26 August 2008
Docket NumberNo. 18100.,18100.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. ARTHUR H.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state's attorney, and Elizabeth C. Leaming, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

KATZ, J.

The defendant, Arthur H., appeals from the trial court's judgment ordering that, for a period of ten years following his release from incarceration for his conviction of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1),2 he register in the state's sex offender registry pursuant to General Statutes § 54-254,3 a provision in the statutory scheme commonly known as "Megan's Law." He claims that the order constituted an abuse of discretion and requests that the order be vacated. In the alternative, the defendant claims that the trial court's failure to hold an adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to making its determination that the defendant should be required to register violated his right to due process, and therefore, he requests that the case be remanded for such a hearing. We conclude that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in ordering sex offender registration following the defendant's guilty plea to the charge of risk of injury to a child, and that the defendant cannot prevail on his claim of a due process violation because the procedure afforded to the defendant clearly was not constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts. The trial court conducted a plea canvas on September 27, 2006, at which the state recited, in relevant part, the following facts in support of the charge of risk of injury to a child. On August 25, 2005, six days after the victim turned sixteen years old, the victim's mother brought a complaint for suspected sexual assault against the defendant as a result of events that had occurred and been reported to her earlier that day. The victim's mother informed police that the defendant had been her boyfriend for the past five years and that he resided with her and her daughter at their home. The police interviewed the victim, who relayed the following account to them. After the defendant returned home from work on August 25, he offered to give the victim a back massage. She agreed and they went to the bedroom that the defendant shared with the victim's mother. The victim lay face down on the bed and watched television while the defendant sat on top of her, straddling her buttocks and legs, and gave her a back massage. In so doing, he also rubbed her sides near her breasts, but did not touch her anywhere else. She believed that the defendant had masturbated while giving her the massage because there was vibrating motion that seemed unrelated to the massage, and afterward the defendant wiped her back with a towel that was on the bed. Following the massage, the defendant quickly left the room, gave the victim $100 and told her that the massage was "their secret." Later that day, when the victim's mother telephoned home, the victim told her mother what had happened and stated that she needed to take a shower because she felt violated. The victim further reported to the police that, over the previous two years, the defendant had given her numerous massages and, on one of these occasions, had given her $50. During these massages, the victim and the defendant usually were wearing only their underwear. On August 25 and in the past, the defendant rubbed his penis against the victim's buttocks but she did not believe that his penis was erect.

In a subsequent interview with the police, the defendant provided the following account. The defendant admitted that on August 25, 2005, he had given the victim a massage while wearing only a pair of boxer shorts, that he had removed the boxer shorts the victim had worn over her underwear to give her the massage, and that he had become sexually aroused and had ejaculated into a towel. He further admitted that, approximately three times in the preceding six months, during the course of giving the victim a massage, his penis had come out of his boxer shorts "on its own" because he became sexually aroused. The defendant stated that the victim had not done anything to him during these occasions and that he never had touched her in an inappropriate manner. He admitted that he had given her money because he felt bad that he had "made the mistakes" and had asked her to keep it a secret. The defendant admitted all of these facts but denied that there had been masturbation involved when the victim was fifteen years old.

The trial court accepted the defendant's guilty plea, after informing the defendant that the plea could expose him to the possibility of having to register as a sex offender if the court found that the felony had been committed for a sexual purpose. Prior to the plea canvas, the court had informed the parties that it would rely on "the entire picture," not just argument of counsel, to make its sentencing decision, including whether there should be sexual offender registration. On January 3, 2007, after conducting a hearing and making certain findings, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of five years, suspended after ten months, followed by five years of probation. In addition to the standard conditions of probation, special conditions were imposed, including that the defendant: be evaluated for a sexual offender treatment program and, if required to participate, successfully complete such a program; be prohibited from having any contact with the victim or any members of her immediate family; be prohibited from having any unsupervised contact with any child under the age of sixteen years, unless such contact has been preapproved by both the department of adult probation and the sex offender treatment provider; and be prohibited from residing in any residence in which a child under the age of sixteen is living without prior approval of the department of adult probation and the sex offender treatment provider. The court further ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years, to commence upon his release from incarceration. The defendant appealed from the judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Additional facts will be set forth as needed to address the defendant's claims.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to register as a sex offender. The defendant's challenge is based on the premise that, because the recognized purpose of the sex offender registry is to protect the public's safety, the decision to require registration necessarily must be predicated on a conclusion that the defendant poses a danger of reoffending.4 The defendant claims that, in the present case, such a conclusion is improper because he presented evidence to the court, from his treating physician and other witnesses, that he poses little to no risk of reoffending, that he has no prior criminal record, that he has accepted responsibility for the wrongfulness of his actions and that he has a supportive family and a long, successful work history in the area. In response, the state maintains that this claim is without merit because the challenged order was a reasonable exercise of the trial court's broad discretion. Specifically, the state contends, first, that the language of § 54-254(a) and our case law do not support the defendant's assertion that an order to register as a sex offender must be based on a finding that the defendant poses a risk for reoffending or a danger to public safety. Rather, the state contends, "a finding by the court that a crime was committed for a sexual purpose alone justifies an order of registration because such a finding triggers the legislative presumption embodied in § 54-254(a) that such an offender poses a risk of reoffending and a potential danger to the public." (Emphasis added.) Second, the state contends that, even if the risk of reoffending is an appropriate consideration, "the information of record ... amply supported the court's order of registration and did not compel the conclusion that the defendant posed no risk of reoffending and no potential danger to public safety."

To resolve this claim, we must answer two questions: whether a finding of a felony committed for a sexual purpose alone is enough to order registration under the mandates of § 54-254(a); and whether, if some other consideration is required, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering registration in light of the evidence before it. We conclude that the statute mandates consideration of other factors, and that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in imposing registration on this defendant.

In construing § 54-254(a), General Statutes § 1-2z "directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn. 5, 16, 912 A.2d 992 (2007). As with any question of statutory construction, our review of this threshold question as to the requirements of the statute is plenary. See id.

Because we are not writing on a blank slate when construing this law, however, we begin with some general background on Megan's Law, found in chapter 969 of the General Statutes, §§ 54-250 through 54-261. We previously...

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35 cases
  • Hogan v. Dept. of Children and Families
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 10 Marzo 2009
    ...sex offender registry not punishment under functional or motivational test for purposes of ex post facto claim); State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582, 590, 953 A.2d 630 (2008) ("[Connecticut's] requirement to register as a sex offender is regulatory, rather than punitive, in nature"). Accordin......
  • State v. Fernando A.
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    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 3 Noviembre 2009
    ...an adversarial evidentiary hearing before a trial court may order a defendant to register as a sex offender; State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582, 609, 953 A.2d 630 (2008); that it is not a violation of due process for a trial court to rely on an unsworn statement in an arrest warrant to deter......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Developments in Connecticut Criminal Law: 2008
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 83, December 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...its discretion in ordering ten years registration after accepting his guilty plea to risk of injury to a child. State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582 (2008). The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court had exercised its statutory discretion solely based on its finding that ......

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