State v. Arviso
Decision Date | 23 December 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 981524-CA.,981524-CA. |
Citation | 993 P.2d 894,1999 Utah Ct. App. 381 |
Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Cesar R. ARVISO, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Maurice Richards, Public Defender Ass'n, Ogden, for Appellant.
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., and Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.
¶ 1 Cesar R. Arviso challenges the trial court's order reinstating his previously suspended sentence. We reverse.
¶ 2 As the result of a plea bargain, on April 14, 1998, Arviso pleaded guilty to the charge that he distributed a controlled substance, violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp.1999). Arviso was sentenced as follows:
¶ 3 Arviso was later deported, but returned to Utah after a short time. Consequently, on July 2, 1998, the trial court lifted the sentence suspension and reimposed the prison term of one to fifteen years. Arviso protested, asking for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied his request, replying that Arviso's 1
¶ 4 Arviso appeals, arguing the trial court lacked authority to suspend his sentence without ordering probation. He further contends that, even if the trial court had that authority, it illegally sentenced him in ordering him not to return to the United States after deportation.2 Because we dispose of this case based on our analysis of the latter, we leave for another day the question of whether trial courts have the authority to suspend sentences without probation.
¶ 5 Arviso asserts that the United States Congress has delegated authority to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to determine whether aliens may enter the United States, thus designating this area of the law for federal control and preempting state participation. Consequently, Arviso argues, the condition that he not return to the United States after deportation is unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine, arising from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.3 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. We agree.4
¶ 6 "The Supreme Court `has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission of aliens.'" State v. Pando, 122 N.M. 167, 921 P.2d 1285, 1287 (App.1996) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 1478, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977) (citation omitted)); see also State v. Camargo, 112 Ariz. 50, 537 P.2d 920, 922 (1975) (); Hernandez v. State, 613 S.W.2d 287, 289-90 (Tex.Crim. App.1980) . Congress, in turn, has assigned the United States Attorney General the sole power to exclude aliens, "thus leaving no role for the ... judiciary in such matters in conjunction with sentencing criminal defendants." David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety, in Criminal Case, of Federal District Court Order Restricting Defendant's Right to Re-enter or Stay in United States, 94 A.L.R. Fed. § 3, at 619 (1998); see also United States v. Hernandez, 588 F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir.1978) ( ); Hernandez, 613 S.W.2d at 290 (). Thus, a court exceeds its discretion when sentencing "a criminal defendant in such a manner as to assume the power to control the ... exclusion of aliens." Rigney, supra, 94 A.L.R. Fed. § 3, at 619.
¶ 7 Here, the trial court suspended Arviso's prison term "on condition [he] not return to the United States." By imposing this condition, the trial court trespassed into forbidden INS territory, violating the Supremacy Clause. See Hernandez, 588 F.2d at 351; see also Camargo, 537 P.2d at 922 (); Pando, 921 P.2d at 1288 ().5 We therefore conclude the trial court incorrectly conditioned Arviso's suspended sentence on the unconstitutional provision that he stay out of the United States.
¶ 8 Having concluded Arviso's first point was correct, we now must disagree with the result he urges flows from our conclusion. He argues that, because his sentence was illegal, the trial court lost jurisdiction over him and thus may not commit him to prison. He argues that he should therefore be completely released from custody. However, according to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) this "illegal sentence" may be corrected "at any time." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). After all, an unlawful sentence is "void," creating no rights and neither impairing nor affecting any rights. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991); accord 12A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 823 (1998). And, the trial court's jurisdiction continues "over the case and the prisoner until a valid sentence [is] imposed." State v. Lim, 79 Utah 68, 71-72, 7 P.2d 825, 826 (1932); accord State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah Ct.App.1991).6
¶ 9 Even so, this case involves a plea bargain.
Where the defendant has entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain contemplating a particular sentence, the general rule is that the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea if it is subsequently determined that the sentence is illegal or unauthorized. The withdrawal of a guilty plea returns the parties to their initial positions, and the original charges under the indictment or information may be reinstated.
Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Guilty Plea as Affected by Fact that Sentence Contemplated by Plea Bargain is Subsequently Determined to be Illegal or Unauthorized, 87 A.L.R. 4th § 2, at 388 (1991); see also People v. Jackson, 121 Cal.App.3d 862, 176 Cal.Rptr. 166, 170 (1981) () ; Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481, 487 (Colo.1989) (); Forbert v. State, 437 So.2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983) () ; State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J.Super. 324, 519 A.2d 367, 368 (1986) (). The policy underlying this rule is that "it may be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement the material terms of which have been vacated." Rojas v. State, 52 Md. App. 440, 450 A.2d 490, 494 (1982) ( ).
¶ 10 Arviso pleaded guilty "rel[ying] on the expectation that he would avoid imprisonment." Id. The State bargained with Arviso for a conviction expecting that it could forgo the expense and vagaries of a trial, while relying on the fact that Arviso would be removed as a threat to the public safety. See id. Sentencing Arviso to his original prison sentence or letting stand the suspended sentence without the illegal condition "would frustrate both parties' expectations." Id. Thus, Id.
¶ 11 In the face of these well-settled propositions, we must allow Arviso to "withdraw his plea and plead anew" in the trial court. Chae, 780 P.2d at 486 ( ). Arviso "may choose to stand trial or negotiate some other plea bargain." Rojas, 450 A.2d at 494.
¶ 12 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order ending its suspension of Arviso's sentence and remand to the trial court to allow Arviso to withdraw his guilty plea and to hold further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. When Arviso had asked for an evidentiary hearing, he had referred to himself as being on probation. The trial court replied that Arviso "wasn't on probation" before revoking the suspension of his sentence. Then, a minute entry about the July 2 hearing, signed by the trial court o...
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