State v. Arvizu
| Decision Date | 26 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 43182,2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 551 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VICTOR RENE ARVIZU, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.
Order revoking probation, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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Victor Rene Arvizu appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation. Specifically, Arvizu contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because his probation violation was not willful. He further contends that even if his probation violation was willful, it did not warrant revocation. Additionally, Arvizu argues the district court violated his due process and equal protection guarantees when it revoked his probation. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district court's order.
Arvizu pled guilty to two felony counts of battery on certain personnel. The district court placed Arvizu on probation for five years with an underlying unified sentence of five years, with one year determinate. According to the terms and conditions of probation, Arvizu was ordered to "complete any training or counseling program established by the probation officer" and to "take all medications as prescribed."1 The State alleged Arvizu violated these terms when he failed to complete a mental health evaluation as instructed by his supervising officer and failed to stay on prescribed medications.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing for the alleged probation violation. Arvizu's supervising probation officer testified that he instructed Arvizu to obtain a mental health assessment from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). The officer further testified that when he asked Arvizu if he understood it was lawful for the officer to instruct Arvizu to obtain the mental health evaluation, Arvizu stated that he understood. The officer then testified that Arvizu did not obtain a mental health evaluation. According to the officer's testimony, Arvizu visited the VA for the evaluation but when Arvizu told the VA that his probation officer made him go, the VA refused to administer the evaluation. Arvizu, in response, contested the legality of the officer's instruction to obtain a mental health evaluation. Specifically, Arvizu argued that because his probation officer had a recent mental health evaluation from Arvizu, there was no need for an additional evaluation.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that the recent nature of the former evaluation did not make the probation officer's instruction to obtain an additional evaluation inappropriate or unlawful. Thus, the district court found that based on substantial evidence, Arvizu violated his probation conditions by failing to complete a mental health evaluation as lawfully instructed by his probation officer.2 Arvizu denied having a mental health condition during the disposition hearing. The district court found that because Arvizu did not believe he had any mental health conditions, and because Arvizu "effectively blocked" a mental health evaluation "by going there and telling the VA that [he was] there against [his] will," it could not conclude that Arvizu did not "present a risk to the community present." The district court therefore revoked Arvizu's probation and imposed a sentence of five years, with one year determinate. In its order revoking probation, the district court indicated, "[t]he Courtfinds that the defendant willfully and knowingly violated the terms of his probation." Arvizu timely appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation.
Arvizu contends the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. He specifically argues his probation violation was not willful, and therefore the district court lacked authority to revoke his probation. Moreover, he maintains that even if his violation were willful, it did not warrant revocation.
Idaho Code § 20-222(2) provides that Further, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) provides:
The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.
It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222(2); State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988).
If a court has determined that the defendant violated his probation, it must then determine whether to revoke or continue probation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho 558, 758 P.2d at 717. A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within theboundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
Before probation can be revoked, a probationer must be given a due process hearing. State v. Greenawald, 127 Idaho 555, 556, 903 P.2d 144, 145 (Ct. App. 1995). Throughout probation revocation proceedings, the probationer is entitled to due process. State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988). The probationer is entitled to be present at the hearing and may be entitled to counsel. Greenawald, 127 Idaho at 556, 903 P.2d at 145. The probationer must be afforded the opportunity to present and rebut evidence and to call and cross-examine witnesses. Id. Prior to the hearing, the probationer must be given adequate notice of the grounds for revocation. Id. During probation revocation proceedings, two threshold questions are presented--whether the probationer violated the terms of probation and, if so, whether probation should be revoked. State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 637, 84 P.3d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 2003). The State bears the burden of proving satisfactory proof of a violation or "any other cause," though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Kelsey, 115 Idaho at 314, 766 P.2d at 784 (quoting I.C. § 19-2602).
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.
Here, Arvizu argues his probation violation was not willful because he was not responsible or at fault for being denied a mental health evaluation. During the disposition hearing, however, the district court noted that Arvizu prevented the mental health evaluation from occurring by telling the VA he was there against his will and he was being instructed, by his probation officer, to participate in the evaluation. The probation officer testified that when he asked Arvizu if he understood it was lawful for the officer to instruct Arvizu to obtain the mental health evaluation, Arvizu stated that he understood, but he still failed to obtain a mental health evaluation by his willful decision to inform the VA that he was only there under his probation officer's instruction. While the VA's refusal to perform a mental health evaluation was beyond Arvizu's control, it was Arvizu's willful conduct and statements to the VA that prevented themental health evaluation in the first place. Arvizu's statements and conduct toward the VA were certainly within his own control. Based on the testimony and evidence, the district court found that Arvizu "didn't want to do [the mental health evaluation], and so it didn't happen." The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Arvizu's probation violation was willful.
Arvizu next contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking...
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