State v. Atchison

• Decision Date: 27 July 1915
• Docket Number: No. 1756.,1756.
• Citation: 151 P. 305,20 N.M. 562
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Parties: STATEv.ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO.

20 N.M. 562

151 P. 305

STATE

v.ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO.

No. 1756.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 27, 1915.

Syllabus by the Court.

A “general law” is one that relates to a subject of a general nature, or that affects all the people of the state, or all of a particular class.

A “special law” is one made for individual cases, or for less than a class of persons, or subjects, requiring laws appropriate to peculiar conditions or circumstances.

Statutory or constitutional provisions against special legislation on a subject do not prevent the Legislature from dividing legislation into classes and applying different rules as to each.

Classification, however, must be based upon substantial distinctions, and not be arbitrary in its nature, and must apply to every member of the class or every subject under similar conditions, embracing all and excluding none whose condition and circumstances render legislation necessary or appropriate to them as a class.

Held, that chapter 60 of the Laws of 1897, classifying counties numerically, without giving a basis for such classification or making provisions for the future admission or exclusion of other counties, is special legislation, in contravention of the Springer Act (Act July 30, 1886, c. 818, 24 Stat. 170), and to the extent of its attempted classification is invalid.

Held, further, that chapter 8 of the Laws of 1905, so far as it attempts to base an authorization for a tax levy upon the so-called classification of the act of 1897 (chapter 60), is likewise to that extent invalid, as in contravention of the Springer Act, and that the attempted levy by Bernalillo county in the tax year of 1913 of one mill for boarding prisoners under said chapter 8 of the Laws of 1905 is therefore invalid.

Appeal from District Court, Bernalillo County; H. F. Raynolds, Judge.

Action by the State of New Mexico against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company. From a judgment of dismissal, entered on sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, the State appeals. Affirmed.

Laws 1905, c. 8, so far as it attempts to base an authorization for a tax levy upon Laws 1897, c. 60, invalid because making an improper classification of counties, is likewise to that extent invalid, as in contravention of the Springer Act.

This is an action brought by the state against the railway company to collect a sum of money alleged to be due as delinquent taxes. The complaint alleged that the railway company refused to pay the sum of $518.28, one-half of which was then due and payable, which was a one-mill county levy, in Bernalillo county, in the tax year of 1913, for boarding prisoners. To this complaint a demurrer was interposed raising the following questions:

“(a) Because the act of 1905, under which the tax in question is levied, is unconstitutional and void; the same being in contravention of the act of Congress approved July 30, 1886. (b) Because in the year 1913 there was no law in the state of New Mexico authorizing a levy of one mill for boarding prisoners. (c) Because the said act of 1905, if valid at the time of its passage, was repealed and made inoperative by section 1, article 10, of the Constitution of the state of New Mexico.”

The demurrer was sustained, and the complaint dismissed, from which judgment of the trial court this appeal was taken.

F. W. Clancy, Atty. Gen., and Ira L. Grimshaw, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

W. C. Reid and E. W. Dobson, both of Albuquerque, for appellee.

HANNA, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The first point raised by the demurrer and argued before this court is that chapter 8, Laws 1905 (section 1346, Code 1915), is invalid as a special law, in contravention of the act of Congress of July 30, 1886, commonly known as the “Springer Act.” This congressional act prohibited the Legislatures of the several territories from passing local or special laws in certain enumerated cases; the one with which we are immediately concerned being: “For the assessment and collection of taxes for territorial, county, township or road purposes.” That portion of the act of 1905 with which this inquiry is concerned, as the same appears in the Code of 1915, is as follows:

“Sec. 1346. That the board of county commissioners in counties of the first class may cause to be levied and collected annually a special tax, of not exceeding three mills on the dollar, for the purpose of providing funds to defray the expenses of boarding county prisoners in county jails.”

For the purpose of arriving at the intention of the Legislature in its designation of “counties of the first class,” it is conceded we must refer to a prior statute, chapter 60, Laws 1897 (section 1, p. 303, C. L. 1897), the only classification of the counties of the territory then in effect, which provided that the counties of New Mexico should thereafter be divided into counties of the first, second, third, and fourth classes; Bernalillo and San Miguel to be counties of the first class. It is argued by appellee that this classification was arbitrary, and based upon no substantial distinction with reference to the subject-matter of legislation; that the act was both local and special, and therefore violative of the terms of the “Springer Act,” for which reason it could have no validity as the basis of classification for the purposes of the act of 1905. Other contentions are made which we do not consider it necessary to notice.

It is therefore clear that, when the two acts are read together, they authorize the levy and collection of the special tax in question in the two counties of Bernalillo and San Miguel and in none other. It is equally plain that the classification of the counties by the act of 1897 made no provision whereby other counties might enter into the privileges of any class, or be relieved from the responsibilities thereof, by reason of changed conditions developing in the future. In other words, there was no basis for the classification, such as the assessed valuation of the counties, which was adopted as the basis of all subsequent classification statutes. We have in the act of 1897 a legislative declaration that certain counties, therein named, shall be “counties of the first class” until such time as the Legislature shall elect to make other and different classification of the counties. Should a shifting population, or numerous other conditions, make the classification either unfair or burdensome, there could be no relief until the Legislature revoked the law and made different provisions.

[1][2][3][4] With this condition in mind, we turn to the inquiry of whether these acts, so far as they are an attempted classification of counties, are special, and to be denounced as violative of the terms of the “Springer Act.” We can perhaps gain a better understanding of the matter by first inquiring as to what “general laws” are, as distinguished from special and local laws. In the sense in which the term is used in constitutional or statutory provisions inhibiting special legislation:

“Laws of a general nature are such as relate to a subject of a general nature, and a subject of a general nature is one that exists or may exist throughout the state, or which affects the people of the state generally, or in which the people generally have an interest.” 1 Lewis' Sutherland, Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) § 197.

The territorial Supreme Court in an early case defined a general law as one that affects all the people, or all of a particular class. Terr. v. Cutinola, 4 N. M. (Johns.) 305, 309, 14 Pac. 809.

Mr. Sutherland thus deals with the subject of special laws:

“Special laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its peculiar condition and circumstances.”

Upon first impression it would seem that the problem of determining whether a law was general in its nature, or for less than a class, would prove a simple one; but an examination of the numerous adjudicated cases will disclose that the question has proven a complex and uncertain one to such an extent that, as stated...