State v. Ates

• Decision Date: 21 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-KA-2698,81-KA-2698
• Citation: 418 So.2d 1326
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Roy Edward ATES.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 1326

418 So.2d 1326

STATE of Louisiana v. Roy Edward ATES.

No. 81-KA-2698.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 21, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1982. ^*

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Lavalle Salomon, Bruce G. Whittaker, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Randolph Smith, Gilmer P. Hingle, Smith & Hingle, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.

PHILIP C. CIACCIO, Justice Pro Tem. ^**

The defendant, Roy Edward Ates, was charged and convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of second degree murder. R.S. 14:30.1. He has appealed relying upon 17 assignments of error.

On the night of September 29, 1980, the defendant, Roy Ates, and his wife, Katherine, were at home with their three year old son. As the defendant was handling a shotgun, it discharged, hitting his wife in the face and killing her instantly. The defendant at first professed that the incident was an accident that occurred because his gun malfunctioned as he was cleaning it. He later admitted that the day before this incident he took the victim's grandfather with him to use the gun and thereby established an alibi that the gun malfunctioned in operation. He further stated that on the day of the shooting he and his wife had visited the grave of one of their children who had died. He said that his wife had blamed him for the child's death, although the child died of natural causes. When they returned to their house that afternoon, the defendant wanted to watch television but his wife kept insisting that he go to another room and get their daughter. The wife left the room and returned. The defendant was cleaning his gun. He admitted thinking a lot about killing her, but he contends that on this day he only meant to scare her by shooting the gun. He pulled the trigger and the gun discharged hitting his wife in the face. The defendant grabbed his son, who was playing in the room, and ran to a neighbor's house.

The defendant's former girlfriend, Mary Deland, testified that she had started dating the defendant in June, 1979 when he was separated from his wife. She became engaged to marry him on Christmas of 1979. In June, 1980 she moved with him to Oklahoma and lived with him until July, 1980 when he returned to his wife. She saw him on September 20, 1980 to return his clothes. She stated that they had met several times after this and the defendant advised her that he wanted to marry her but he could not go through with a divorce or separation and that the only way out of his marriage was to kill his wife. She saw on the news that the defendant had killed his wife. She stated that the defendant told her about the alibi incident with the victim's grandfather and that on the night of the shooting debated with himself about killing his wife. He admitted to this witness that the gun went off as he was contemplating the act and that he shot his wife.

The defendant was arrested on January 19, 1981 and subsequently charged, by a bill of indictment, with the murder of his wife, Katherine Ates. Assignment of Error Nos. 6 and 17.

The defendant excepted and assigned error to the refusal of the trial court judge to order the State to produce prior statements made by the defendant's girlfriend, Mary Deland. The defendant filed a motion to produce any such statements made to investigatory bodies or law enforcement personnel. The defendant filed a subpoena duces tecum directing the prosecuting District Attorney to produce in open court the trial transcription of all such statements and he also requested portions of the materials relating to Grand Jury testimony for inspection during the trial. The State filed a motion to quash the subpoena. In the alternative, the defendant asked that an in camera inspection of the statements be conducted by the Court.

Rulings on these motions were deferred for disposition at trial by the trial judge. The defendant objected to the court's ruling. During the trial testimony of witness Deland, defendant moved again for the transcripts of prior statements which could be used to impeach her credibility or alternatively for an in camera inspection.

The defendant contends that because the testimony of Ms. Deland was virtually indispensible to the State's case in proving motive and premeditation, it was vital to his defense wherein he alleged and sought to prove that the killing was accidental.

Under the United States Supreme Court decision of Brady v. Maryland, the State, upon request, must produce evidence that is favorable to the accused where it is material to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). This rule has been expanded to include evidence which impeaches the testimony of a witness where the reliability or credibility of that witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Where a specific request is made for such information and the subject matter of such a request is material, or if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the information to the trial judge. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

Under the laws of the State of Louisiana, as a general rule, the prosecution is not required to furnish statements by witnesses made to the District Attorney or an investigative body. C. Cr. P. Art. 723. The exceptions to such discovery are specifically prescribed by statute. C. Cr. P. Arts. 716, 718, 721-723. The defendant may not be denied exculpatory statements made by a witness other than the defendant provided the statement is material and relevant to the issue of guilt or punishment. State v. Landry, 381 So.2d 462 (La., 1980). The defendant's request for such materials must be specific and relevant. State v. Davenport, 399 So.2d 201 (La., 1981). There is, however, no duty to provide defense counsel with unlimited discovery. U.S. v. Agurs, supra.

In this case the defendant filed numerous discovery motions. He filed a motion for production, wherein, he requested a transcript of the statements made by Mary Deland to officers of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff's Office. In the motion he requested, in the alternative, that an in camera inspection be conducted by the court to determine if inconsistent statements had been given by Ms. Deland. He also filed a subpoena duces tecum for these materials. The court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion. The court noted that although the law provided for the defendant to be given exculpatory statements, it does not provide for a transcript of the witness' testimony. After making this remark the judge advised counsel that he reserved the defendant's right, at trial, to move for production of the witness' inconsistent statements, if he felt at that time that there were any such statements. The defendant objected to the ruling.

During the interrogation of Ms. Deland, defense counsel moved for "production of prior statements of Mary Beth Deland for purposes of impeachment" and he asked for "an in camera inspection." The request was denied. This ruling was in error.

The defendant's request was specific, i.e., "prior statements of Mary Beth Deland, for purposes of impeachment." Although not phrased in as precise a manner as would be desirable, it was apparent that the request was for inconsistent and exculpatory statements. Since Ms. Deland was the chief prosecution witness and her testimony went directly to the issue of guilt of the defendant, and since the...