State v. Atkins, 20A04-0505-CR-259.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A04-0505-CR-259.,20A04-0505-CR-259. |
| Citation | 834 N.E.2d 1028 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Ward ATKINS, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellant.
The State charged Ward Atkins with Unlawful Possession of Firearm by Serious Violent Felon, as a Class B felony. Atkins moved to suppress the evidence in support of the charge, alleging that it was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional investigatory stop. The trial court granted Atkins' motion. The State presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it suppressed evidence obtained after an investigatory stop.
We affirm.
On the evening of October 9, 2003, Officer Mark DeJong of the Elkhart City Police Department was dispatched to 192 North Sixth Street in Elkhart in reference to a domestic disturbance call. Officer DeJong arrived at the home alone, largely unaware of the circumstances, and knocked on the front door. He did not hear anything inside the house and no one answered the front door, but soon after he knocked, Officer DeJong heard a rear door slam. Officer DeJong then proceeded around the side of the house, which was adjacent to an alleyway.
When he reached the side of the house, Officer DeJong encountered Atkins walking in Officer DeJong's direction "on [Atkins'] property right next to the alleyway." Appellant's App. at 40. Atkins carried a jacket, which obstructed Officer DeJong's view of Atkins' hands. Officer DeJong ordered Atkins to kneel on the ground, drop the jacket, and put his hands behind his head. Atkins complied, and Officer DeJong told him that he was going to perform a pat down search for weapons. Atkins informed Officer DeJong that he had a handgun in his beltline. Officer DeJong seized the gun and asked Atkins if he had a permit for the gun, to which Atkins responded that he did not.1 Subsequently, Officer DeJong asked Atkins if he had ever been convicted of a felony. Atkins responded that he had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Officer DeJong arrested Atkins, and the State charged him with Unlawful Possession of Firearm by Serious Violent Felon.
Prior to trial, Atkins filed a motion to suppress evidence of the handgun alleging that it was found as the result of an unconstitutional investigatory stop and pat down. The trial court granted Atkins' motion. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, we do not reweigh the evidence but determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). We look to the totality of the circumstances and consider all uncontroverted evidence together with conflicting evidence that supports the trial court's decision. Id. Because the State is appealing a negative judgment, we may reverse only if the evidence is without conflict and leads to the conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. State v. Hanley, 802 N.E.2d 956, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied.
The State argues that the trial court erred when it granted Atkins' motion to suppress evidence of the handgun because Officer DeJong had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The State maintains that the investigatory stop complied with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We address each contention in turn.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the Government, and its safeguards extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. Moultry v. State, 808 N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). However, a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Id. at 170-71 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
Reasonable suspicion is a "somewhat abstract" concept, not readily reduced to "a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 171 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744). When making a reasonable suspicion determination, reviewing courts examine the "totality of the circumstances" of the case to see whether the detaining officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744). The reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Id. We review the trial court's ultimate determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo. Id. (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275, 122 S.Ct. 744; Williams v. State, 745 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)).
Initially, we note that the reasonable suspicion analysis first articulated in Terry does not apply to this case. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), the Terry stop and frisk rule applies to cases involving a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer on a public street. Here, there was not an on-street encounter. Atkins was on his own property, in a place where he had a right to be. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed evidence of the handgun because, absent probable cause, Officer DeJong had no right to encounter and stop Atkins on his own property. Indeed, here there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, much less probable cause. Nonetheless, the parties argue the investigatory stop issue as if Terry applied. Consequently, we address their arguments under the Terry standard.
The State asserts that the totality of the circumstances gave Officer DeJong reason to be concerned for his "immediate safety," thereby justifying the investigatory stop. Appellant's Brief at 7. According to the State, the investigatory stop of Atkins was "reasonable and minimally intrusive and served to protect the officer, [Atkins], and anyone else nearby." Id. We cannot agree.
The State contends that Id. at 9. Further, the State directs us to evidence that Officer DeJong heard a rear door slam and that Atkins carried a jacket over his hands as he walked towards Officer DeJong. But these facts, individually or collectively, do not provide Officer DeJong with the reasonable suspicion required to conduct a valid investigatory stop.
Indeed, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that Atkins did not attempt to flee or even turn away from Officer DeJong when he saw him. Rather, he continued to walk in Officer DeJong's direction. Officer DeJong told Atkins to drop his jacket, which he did without hesitation. After Atkins had discarded the jacket, his empty hands were visible. Officer DeJong then ordered him to kneel, and told him to put his hands behind his head. Atkins was compliant at all times. Moreover, Officer DeJong recognized that there was a "good possibility" that Atkins was the party who had complained or reported the disturbance call. Appellant's App. at 42.
The State emphasizes officer safety as grounds to support the detention of Atkins. Officer safety is always a legitimate concern, but standing alone officer safety cannot form the basis for a valid investigatory stop. See Webb v. State, 714 N.E.2d 787, 788 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (); Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (Harlan, J., concurring) ( ); United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir.2000) (). In sum, a lawful stop, based on objective facts and reasonable suspicion, is the predicate for a pat down.
Again, to stop an individual for investigatory purposes, the officer must first have reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. While we do not doubt that Officer DeJong was concerned for his safety, that concern, standing alone, does not satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement first outlined in Terry. That requirement is met where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe criminal...
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