State v. Atkinson

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MERRIMON
• Citation: State v. Atkinson, 93 N.C. 519 (N.C. 1885)
• Decision Date: 31 October 1885
• Parties: STATE v. GEORGE ATKINSON and WILLIAM WHITFIELD.

93 N.C. 519

STATE

v.GEORGE ATKINSON and WILLIAM WHITFIELD.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October Term, 1885.

This was an indictment for LARCENY, tried at Spring Term, 1885, of the Superior Court for JOHNSTON county, before MacRae, Judge, and a jury.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty against the defendants, and the Court gave judgment, from which they appealed.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

Attorney General and D. G. Fowle, for the State .

Messrs. Reade, Busbee & Busbee, for defendants .

MERRIMON, J.

What is evidence, and whether or not there is any evidence to go to the jury in respect to an issue submitted to them, are questions exclusively for the decision of the Court. But if there is evidence--any evidence--to go to the jury, it is their province to determine its weight and effect, and whether or not it is sufficient to warrant them in rendering a verdict of guilty in a criminal action. Of course, this does not imply that the Court would not have the power in a proper case, where there is a conflict of testimony, to set a verdict of guilty aside, as being manifestly against the weight of evidence. If the evidence produced is so slight and inconclusive, as that in no view of it, could the jury reasonably render a verdict of guilty, then there is no evidence that ought to be submitted to them. State v. White, 89 N. C., 462, and the cases there cited.

The question presented by the record is, was there evidence that ought to have been submitted to the jury? If this question must be decided in the affirmative, then it was the province of the jury to determine its weight and sufficiency. The ingenious argument of the counsel for the defendants, failed to satisfy us that there was no evidence. We are of opinion, that taking all the facts and circumstances in evidence together, their natural bearing upon each other, the legitimate inferences that might reasonably be drawn from them, some of them in detail and from them as a whole, the verdict was not an unreasonable one, if the jury believed the evidence, and it must be taken that they did. There was strong evidence going to show that the prosecutor's cotton was stolen by some person. Two or three witnesses testified that it was at the place designated by them, and that it disappeared in a clandestine way, without the knowledge or sanction of the owner. It was suggested on the argument, that it might have been shipped with other cotton by mistake. There was not the slightest evidence to warrant such a supposition or inference. While it was in the range of possibility that it might have been, this was extremely improbable, especially in view of the total absence of evidence tending to show such mistake. The suggestion rests upon the merest conjecture.

The defendants had knowledge of the cotton, particularly the defendant Whitfield, he weighed, marked, and worked more or less with it, and both worked about it shortly before it was missed, and before they were discharged from such service by their employer, because “they did not attend to his business.” The larceny was committed in November. Very shortly after the defendants were so discharged, at night, perhaps as late as nine o'clock at night, the defendant Atkinson, in the immediate neighborhood of the cotton, asked the witness Holland, who had a horse and cart, if he wanted to make some money. On receiving an affirmative reply, he said he wanted some cotton moved. The witness, knowing that he had not made any, asked where? The reply was “up here,” pointing up the way towards Hyman's platform, where the cotton of the prosecutor was, and he further said, he had two bales--half the number missed. The manner and circumstances of this conversation, manifestly impressed the witness with the strong belief that this defendant had not come honestly by the two bales of cotton he desired to have removed; for he said he could not remove it--that he could not afford to get himself into trouble, &c. This defendant did not, so far as appears, resent at all the implied imputation that he had stolen, or was about to steal the cotton, nor did he offer any explanation in respect to it, to satisfy the witness that he would encounter no danger if he would remove it for him. The first impulse of an innocent man, would have been to deny and...