State v. Atkinson

Decision Date20 February 1933
CourtFlorida Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE et rel. PORTER et al. v. ATKINSON, Circuit Judge, et al.

En Banc.

Original proceeding by the State on the relation of E. M. Porter and another, against H. F. Atkinson, as Circuit Judge, and others, for writ of prohibition.

Demurrer overruled, and peremptory writ of prohibition ordered issued.

COUNSEL James M. Carson, E. B. Kurtz, and Kurtz & Reed all of Miami, for relators.

Burdine Terry & Fleming and Richard H. Hunt, all of Miami, for respondents.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

This case is one of original jurisdiction in which this court issued a rule nisi in prohibition to Honorable H. F Atkinson, judge of the circuit court of the Eleventh judicial circuit of Florida, Lora L. Lasseter, joined by her husband Platt A. Lasseter, in a case then pending in the circuit court of Dade county wherein it was alleged that the circuit judge, on petition of other defendants, the Lasseters, was assuming jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to take charge of and wind up the affairs of a building and loan corporation known as Dade County Security Company.

The only practical difference between the case presented here and that which was presented in State ex rel. Dade County Security Company et al. v. Barns et al., 99 Fla. 1258 128 So. 860, 861, is that in the Barns Case the record showed that Dade County Security Company was at the time in the hands of a liquidator under appointment of the state comptroller and that it was sought to supersede the power and authority of the comptroller to conduct the liquidation, while in the instant case the record shows that the comptroller had made an order, the effect of which was to turn the affairs of the company back into the hands of the shareholders and directors thereof and to discharge the liquidator. The complainants in the court below contended that the comptroller had abandoned the liquidation of the company when the affairs of that company were in such condition as to require a continuation of liquidation and when such affairs did not warrant the return of the management of the company to shareholders and directors.

We find no conflict in decisions from other jurisdictions with what was said by this court in State ex rel. Dade County Security Company et al. v. Barns et al., supra, in the following language:

'In the exercise of the sovereign power of the state, statutes provide administrative regulations for the supervision of banks and of building and loan associations by the state through the state comptroller and also provide that under stated conditions relating to insolvency or to illegality of management, the comptroller may take possession of the property and business of such banks and associations and if necessary or advisable to do so, the comptroller is by statute authorized to appoint as his agents liquidators through whom the comptroller shall administer on such assets and business; the legislative purpose being to facilitate the liquidation and settlement of the affairs of such insolvent banks and associations in the most economical and expeditious manner. Should the comptroller or his agents violate the law in such administration, the courts may adjudicate controversies or afford appropriate relief as to particular matters that may be involved in such statutory administration. See Lake Worth Inlet Dist. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 97 Fla. 174, 120 So. 316; Reddick v. State, 96 Fla. 140, 117 So. 510; Amos v. Baird, 96 Fla. 181, 117 So. 789; Glidden, Adm'x, v. Gutelius, 96 Fla. 834, 119 So. 140, 120 So. 1; Atlantic Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Pratt, Receiver, 95 Fla. 822, 116 So. 635; Bryan v. Bullock, 84 Fla. 179, 93 So. 182.'

Our statute (Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, § 6052 et seq.) was adopted from the federal statute known as the National Banking Act (see 12 USCA § 21 et seq.). In fact, it differs from that act only in that the federal act places certain power in the comptroller of the currency of the United States whereas the Florida statutes vest the power in the comptroller of the state. It is a well settled rule of construction that, when a statute is adopted from another state or country and such statute has been previously construed by the courts of such state or country, the statute is deemed, as a general rule, to have been adopted with the construction so given to it. See Kidd v. City of Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 297, 120 So. 556, and cases there cited.

In Boyd v. Schneider, 131 F. 223, 227, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit said:

'The national banking act provides a system for the collection of the assets of an insolvent bank, and their distribution among creditors. The legal machinery for this is a receiver appointed by the comptroller of the currency, and removable by him, in whom is vested all rights of receivership, to the exclusion of all other receivers or assignees; assessments leviable by the comptroller against the stockholders; and procedure for the allowance of claims, the payment of dividends, and the distribution of money thus collected.'

In Hulse v. Argetsinger (D. C.) 12 F. (2d) 933, 935, the court said:

'The statute confers upon the Comptroller of the Currency, when satisfied of the insolvency of a banking association, the right to appoint a receiver and enforce existing liabilities of directors and shareholders and administer the assets and convey the same on order of the court. Section 5234, R. S. (Comp. St. § 9821 [12 USCA § 192]). This provision, it seems to me, plainly gives the Comptroller entire control of the insolvent bank, with the evident purpose of speedily winding up its affairs regardless of the wishes of the stockholders. The receiver is not the officer of the court, but is the agent of the United States, charged with the duty of investigating and redressing maladministration, waste and dissipation by directors and stockholders in the same manner as a creditor or the shareholders on behalf of the bank might do.'

Other states have adopted statutes like ours, all of which appear to have been taken from the National Banking Act and it appears that in such states it has been...

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6 cases
  • State v. Aiuppa
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • May 1, 1974
    ...have been adopted with the construction given to them by the courts of the state from which they were adopted. State ex rel. Porter v. Atkinson, 108 Fla. 325, 146 So. 581 (1933). A statute adopted from another state is governed by the construction placed upon it, at the time of its enactmen......
  • Akey v. Murphy
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1970
    ...has been many times followed by this court. See Gray v. Standard Dredging Co., 109 Fla. 87, 149 So. 733 (1933); State ex rel. Porter v. Atkinson, 108 Fla. 325, 146 So. 581 (1933); and, most recently, Blank v. Yoo Hoo of Florida Corp., Fla.1969, 222 So.2d 420. It seems that the statutes of C......
  • Flammer v. Patton
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1971
    ... ... We have long held that when our Legislature adopts a statute from another state, we should adopt that state's judicial construction of the statute. See Blank v. Yoo Hoo of Florida Corp., 222 So.2d 420 (Fla.1969); State ex rel. orter v. Atkinson, 108 Fla. 325, 146 So. 581 ... (1933); Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894) ...         Recently, in Akey v. Murphy, 238 So.2d 94 ... ...
  • Hewitt v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1933
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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