State v. Aubert
Decision Date | 17 September 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 80-005,80-005 |
Citation | 421 A.2d 124,120 N.H. 634 |
Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Jean M. AUBERT. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gregory H. Smith, Acting Atty. Gen. (Brian T. Tucker, Concord, orally), for the State.
Fisher, Parsons & Moran, Dover (Robert E. Fisher, Dover, orally), for defendant.
The principal issue in this case is whether the trial court's jury instruction and failure to grant an instruction constituted reversible error. We hold that it did.
On the evening of December 31, 1978, Armand Aubert, the defendant's husband, attended a New Year's Eve party at a neighbor's home. At approximately 11:15 p.m., the defendant, Jean Aubert arrived at the party. The defendant carried with her a .38 caliber revolver. She pointed the weapon at her husband and said "Do you want it now?" Mr. Aubert approached the defendant and grabbed the barrel of the gun with one hand and the back of the defendant's hair with the other. Mr. Aubert continued to hold the defendant by the back of the hair while he reached to open a nearby door. The weapon somehow discharged, and a bullet struck Mr. Aubert in the face.
The Strafford County Grand Jury indicted Jean Aubert and she was tried for attempted first-degree murder, RSA 629:1. The jury found her guilty as charged. The defendant seasonably excepted to the sufficiency of the indictment and opening statement, to certain comments made by the court, to the admission of certain evidence, to portions of the court's instruction, and to its failure to charge as requested. The Trial Court (Goode, J.) reserved and transferred all exceptions to this court.
The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in declining to charge the jury concerning the defendant's claim that the shooting was accidental. We agree. A requested charge on a party's theory of defense must be given if such theory is supported by some evidence. Refusal to charge on that defense is reversible error. United States v. Tashman, 478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973); Swain v. State, 583 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.1979); C. Torcia, 4 Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 538 (12th ed.1975). This principle applies to the defense of accident as well as to other defenses. People v. Lester, 406 Mich. 252, 277 N.W.2d 633 (1979); State v. Martin, 35 N.C.App. 108, 240 S.E.2d 486 (1978).
There was evidence produced at trial which, if believed by the jury, would support a finding that the shooting was accidental. It was established at trial that the defendant, a right-hander, carried the pistol in her left hand. A weapons expert testified that this indicated that the defendant did not intend to use the pistol. Further evidence indicated that Mr. Aubert initiated the struggle with the defendant. Expert medical testimony concerning entry and exit wounds left by the bullet supported the theory that the shooting might have been accidental. Based on the evidence presented, defense counsel requested the trial court to charge that if "the gun went off accidentally ... you are instructed to return a verdict of not guilty." Because there was evidence to support this theory of defense, the trial court's refusal to charge the jury about the defense of accident was error.
The defendant next argues that the court's reasonable doubt charge was improper. We agree. The court's definition of reasonable doubt follows:
The first paragraph of the court's instruction is virtually identical to the reasonable doubt definition delineated in the model charge suggested by this court in State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978), and upheld by the federal court in Tsoumas v. State of New Hampshire, 611 F.2d 412 (1st Cir. 1980). However, the trial court attempted to further define the concept of reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly criticized such efforts. See, e.g., State v. Donovan, N.H., 419 A.2d 1102 (decided this date).
In the instant case, the second paragraph of the court's charge overly favored the prosecution. The trial court instructed that "absolute positive certainty can almost never be attained" but that "the state is not required to establish guilt beyond all doubt." While this statement, may not be technically erroneous, very similar language has been criticized for favoring the prosecution. See United States v. Shaffner, 524 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1975). Further, the United States Supreme Court...
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