State v. Austin

Citation87 S.W.3d 447
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. Richard Hale AUSTIN.
Decision Date16 September 2002
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

Frank J. Glankler, Jr. and Robert L. Hutton, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Richard Hale Austin.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Amy L. Tarkington, Deputy Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which PANEL: FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

The appeal in this capital case arises from the resentencing of Richard Hale Austin, who originally was convicted and sentenced to death in 1977 as an accessory before the fact in the premeditated murder of Julian Watkins. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. Austin, 618 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S.Ct. 980, 71 L.Ed.2d 116 (1981). In 1997 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted habeas corpus relief as to Austin's sentence, holding that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase of the original trial. See Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1079, 118 S.Ct. 1526, 140 L.Ed.2d 677 and 523 U.S. 1088, 118 S.Ct. 1547, 140 L.Ed.2d 695 (1998). Following a resentencing hearing, the jury again imposed a sentence of death, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (1997), we designated the following issues for oral argument:1 1) whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding certain mitigating evidence; 2) whether the trial court committed reversible error in admitting victim impact evidence; and 3) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate, and all other issues mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the remainder of the issues raised by Austin, we conclude that they do not warrant relief. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in all respects.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In early 1977 Watkins was an undercover agent investigating illegal gambling at the Golden Cue, Austin's pool hall in Memphis. Based on Watkins' work, indictments were returned against Austin, his wife, and several of his employees and associates, including Terry Lee Casteel. Watkins was to be the principal witness against them. At the resentencing hearing, Casteel testified for the State that Austin was upset about the gambling charges and blamed Watkins.2 Austin told Casteel, "I need to do something about it.

I need to take care of him." Austin eventually hired Jack Charles Blankenship, an escaped convict, to murder Watkins. On the evening of May 22, 1977, Casteel and Blankenship drove to Watkins' house, but Watkins was not at home. Blankenship spent the night in a trailer owned by Austin's wife. The next morning Casteel drove Blankenship to Watkins' automobile body repair shop. Blankenship lured Watkins outside and then fatally shot him in the head, neck, and chest. Casteel and Blankenship returned to the trailer, where Austin paid Blankenship $980 for the murder.3

Marilyn Lee Pryor, who worked at the Golden Cue, testified that in early May 1977 Austin commented that Watkins was an "S 0 B, and that he should have his brains shot out." Pryor saw a man fitting Blankenship's description leave the Golden Cue with Austin and Casteel the night before Watkins' murder. The next morning, as Austin and Casteel were leaving the Golden Cue, Austin told Pryor that "they had to take care of some business." When Pryor later told Austin that she had given the police a statement in connection with the murder investigation, he told her that she was a "stupid, cold bitch and that [she] should have been killed, too."

In addition to proof regarding the circumstances of the murder, the State introduced victim impact evidence. Carolyn Watkins Cupp, Watkins' widow, testified that the victim had been a loving, kind, generous, hard-working man who had been active in his community. Steve Watkins, the youngest of the victim's three sons, testified that he was eight years old at the time of the murder. He described his father as everything to him and as good as anyone can be. Both witnesses testified that Watkins' death had left an emptiness in the family.

The defense tried to create lingering doubt as to Austin's involvement in the murder. The defense theory was that Casteel had hired Blankenship. Levi Haywood, an inmate who had been in jail with Casteel in 1977, testified that Casteel told him that Austin was not involved in Watkins' murder. Troy Bullock, a friend of Austin, testified that several days before Watkins' murder Casteel picked up a piece of paper with Blankenship's telephone number on it and stated, "I will take care of this.... I'm taking care of [Austin's] business."

The defense called Blankenship, the actual killer, to testify on Austin's behalf.4 After supporting Austin's innocence for twenty-two years, Blankenship suddenly and surprisingly repudiated his prior statements. Blankenship stated that he had lied in the past and would now tell the truth because he had made his peace with God. Blankenship then testified in detail about the circumstances of the killing and how Austin had recruited and paid him to murder Watkins.

The defense next introduced testimony from employees of the Department of Correction that Austin, who at the time of resentencing was almost sixty years old was a model prisoner and a man of good character. Austin had only one minor disciplinary write-up in his twenty-two years cn death row and had achieved the highest classification level possible based on good behavior. He was a teacher's aide and tutored other inmates for the GED examination. Two retired guards told how Austin had saved their lives during a prison riot in 1985.

Members of Austin's family testified that Austin was the fourth of eight children and was a good pool player. At the time of resentencing, he suffered from diabetes. Despite his long years in prison, Austin remained in close contact with family members who visited him often. His stepdaughter described Austin as kind, generous, and honest.

The last witness for the defense was Dr. Mark Cunningham, a clinical and forensic psychologist, who had evaluated Austin. Dr. Cunningham opined that there was a very high likelihood that Austin would continue to have a good adjustment to incarceration and a low to very low likelihood that he would commit acts of serious violence. Dr. Cunningham also stated that Austin's presence would tend to reduce overall violence in the prison system.

Based on this proof, the jury found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the following aggravating circumstance: "The defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration." Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2404(i)(4) (Supp.1977).5 In addition, the jury found that the State had proven that the aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.6 As a result, the jury sentenced Austin to death.

EXCLUSION OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE

Austin challenges the trial court's exclusion of certain mitigating evidence during the resentencing hearing. Specifically, Austin contends that the trial court erroneously excluded the following evidence: 1) a vice squad report requesting indictments based on Watkins' undercover gambling investigation; 2) testimony of Terry Casteel that Austin had reported his automobile stolen while Casteel was using it; 3) testimony of Reverend Joe Ingle about Austin's actions during a 1985 prison riot:; and 4) a 1995 deposition of Jack Charles Blankenship.

The admissibility of evidence at the resentencing hearing in this case is governed primarily by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2404(c) (Supp.1977) [now section 39-13-204(c) (Supp.2001],7 which provides:

In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i) below; and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. However, this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the state of Tennessee.

Under this statute, any evidence relevant to the circumstances of the murder, the aggravating circumstances of the murder, or the mitigating circumstances, which has probative value in the determination of punishment, is admissible. State v. Teague, 897 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tenn.1995). Because the exclusion of mitigating evidence potentially undermines the reliability of the sentencing determination, we review any error in failing to admit such evidence under a constitutional harmless error standard. See State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 739 (Tenn.1998).

Vice Squad Report

During the testimony of Floyd Cupp, the defense sought to introduce a vice squad report, dated March 31, 1977, requesting indictments on several people based on Watkins' undercover gambling investigation. Cupp was a...

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