State v. Avery
Decision Date | 28 July 2021 |
Docket Number | Appeal No. 2017AP2288-CR |
Citation | 970 N.W.2d 564 (Table),2022 WI App 7 |
Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steven A. AVERY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
¶1 In 2007, following a jury trial, Steven A. Avery was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide, party to the crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. We affirmed his convictions on appeal. The issues in this new case concern collateral proceedings: whether the circuit court erred in denying Avery's WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2019-20)1 motion and two supplemental motions without a hearing, as well as his motions to vacate and for reconsideration of the first of these motions. We hold that Avery's § 974.06 motions are insufficient on their face to entitle him to a hearing and that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying the motions to vacate and for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶2 We previously summarized the facts of this case in our decision on Avery's direct appeal, see State v. Avery , 2011 WI App 124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216, and we will discuss below those facts relevant to his collateral attack on his conviction. But for context, this case began in early November 2005 with the disappearance of Theresa Halbach, a twenty-five-year-old professional photographer. Volunteer searchers found Halbach's RAV4 on the forty-acre site of Avery's Auto Salvage, a salvage yard business where Avery and other family members lived and worked. It was believed that Halbach had photographed vehicles at this site several days earlier, per Avery's request. According to State witness Bobby Dassey, Halbach was last seen walking towards Avery's trailer.
¶3 After finding the RAV4, police searched the Avery property and, over the course of the next four months, discovered and identified evidence including: burned bone fragments in and around a burn pit, with DNA matching Halbach's; both Avery's and Halbach's blood in the RAV4; the remnants of electronic devices and a camera, the same models as Halbach's, in a burn barrel; Halbach's RAV4 key in Avery's bedroom, with Avery's DNA on it; Avery's DNA on the hood latch of the RAV4 ( ); and a bullet and bullet fragments in Avery's garage, containing Halbach's DNA.
¶4 The case was tried over a five week period in February and March of 2007. The State's theory was that Avery shot Halbach in the head, in his garage, and threw her in the cargo area of the RAV4. He then burned the electronics and camera, cremated Halbach in a burn pit, transferred the remains to a burn barrel, and hid the RAV4 until he could crush it in the Avery car crusher. The defense argued that law enforcement was biased against Avery, who was pursuing a wrongful conviction lawsuit against Manitowoc County and the Sheriff's Department,2 and, as a result, planted evidence implicating Avery. The real killer, the defense argued, took advantage of this "investigative bias" to also plant evidence on the Avery property, once early media publicity made it clear that Avery was a key suspect.
¶5 The jury found Avery guilty of first-degree intentional homicide and felon in possession of a firearm. Avery received a life sentence without the possibility of extended supervision. In 2009, Avery commenced his direct appeal by filing a motion for postconviction relief, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 974.02, requesting a new trial. That motion was denied, Avery appealed, and this court affirmed in the aforementioned decision. See Avery , 337 Wis. 2d 351, ¶3.
¶6 In 2013, Avery filed a pro se WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion (the 2013 motion), requesting a new trial. That motion was denied, and Avery appealed. That appeal was stayed and later dismissed on Avery's motion, shortly after he initiated the postconviction proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. In 2017, Avery filed the first of the six motions that are the subject of this appeal.3 These motions will be analyzed individually, with further discussion of relevant law, but some basic principles apply generally.
¶7 WISCONSIN STAT . § 974.06 provides a mechanism for vacating, setting aside, or correcting a sentence once the time for direct appeal has passed, on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds or where "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." Sec. 974.06(1) ; State v. Romero-Georgana , 2014 WI 83, ¶32, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668. Section 974.06(4),4 however, creates a procedural barrier to review, in that it requires the defendant to raise all grounds for relief in his or her first (postconviction or appellate) motion. State v. Balliette , 2011 WI 79, ¶¶35-36, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. Thus, a defendant is normally barred from raising issues in a § 974.06 motion that were or could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous § 974.06 motion. State v. Escalona-Naranjo , 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). An exception to this rule exists where the defendant can show a "sufficient reason" for not raising the issue in any prior postconviction proceeding. Id. ; § 974.06 ; Romero-Georgana , 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶¶48-50.
¶8 Where, as here, a defendant appeals the circuit court's denial of a WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion without an evidentiary hearing, then the question before us is narrow: whether remand for a hearing is warranted because the circuit court erred in denying the motion on its face. See Balliette , 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶38. Pursuant to § 974.06(3)(c), the court shall "[g]rant a prompt hearing" unless "the motion and the files and records of the action conclusively show that the [defendant] is entitled to no relief." Our supreme court has also determined, however, that a baseline level of specificity applies to all postconviction motions, including those under § 974.06. See Balliette , 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶42-43, 58-59. Thus, in order for the reviewing court to meaningfully assess the claim, the defendant must allege "sufficient material facts—e.g. , who, what, where, when, why, and how—that, if true, would entitle [the defendant] to the relief he [or she] seeks." State v. (John) Allen , 2004 WI 106, ¶¶2, 23, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433 ; Romero-Georgana , 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶37. This requirement promotes finality once the defendant has been convicted and sentenced, "minimize[s] time-consuming postconviction hearings unless there is a clearly articulated justification for them," and recognizes that "the pleading and proof burdens ... have shifted to the defendant in most situations after conviction." Balliette , 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶53, 58. Accordingly, in the context of a § 974.06 motion, the defendant must describe, with specificity, his or her "sufficient reason" for failing to raise the claim in any earlier proceeding—that is, the defendant must show why his or her claim is not procedurally barred under § 974.06(4).5 See Romero-Georgana , 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶37.
¶9 We will further discuss some of the contours of this "sufficient reason" exception below, but one point bears mentioning here: ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel can be, and often is, cited as the reason for the defendant's not bringing some claim on direct appeal. The specificity requirement, however, applies just as much in this context. The defendant cannot merely present legal conclusions, summarily arguing that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring the claims he or she now views as meritorious. Id. , ¶¶36, 42. Instead, to be entitled to a hearing, the defendant must raise sufficient material facts demonstrating prior counsel's ineffectiveness—that is, that counsel was constitutionally deficient and that such performance was prejudicial to the defendant. Id. , ¶¶37-39, 56; see Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Importantly, to show deficiency in this context, the defendant must allege sufficient facts showing that his or her new claim is "clearly stronger" than the claims postconviction counsel in fact brought. Romero-Georgana , 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶¶45-46.
¶10 Whether the circuit court erred in not ordering a hearing involves two potential inquiries, with separate standards of review. The circuit court must hold a hearing where the motion is sufficient on its face, unless the record as a whole otherwise conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief. Balliette , 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶18, 50 ; State v. Howell , 2007 WI 75, ¶¶75-77 & n.51, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48. Whether a WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion meets this standard—including whether there is a "sufficient reason" for overcoming the procedural bar of Escalona-Naranjo —is a question of law that we review de novo. Romero-Georgana , 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶30. If, on the other hand, the motion does not raise sufficient facts, "or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief," then the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing. Balliette , 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶18 (quoting John Allen , 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9 ). In such case, we review for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Romero-Georgana , 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶30.
¶11 In August 2016, Avery, now represented by counsel, brought a motion for postconviction scientific testing. In November 2016, the circuit court granted the motion, permitting Avery to conduct independent testing of nine trial exhibits: seven samples of bloodstain cuttings, swabs, or blood flakes taken from Halbach's RAV4; Halbach's RAV4 key; and a 1996 sample of Avery's blood.
¶12 Based largely on the results of this testing and other investigations, Avery filed a WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion in June 2017 (the June 2017 motion), requesting a new trial. His motion raises a number of claims6 falling into three categories for purposes of overcoming the Escalona-Naranjo...
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