State v. Baber, 45373
| Decision Date | 10 December 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 45373,45373,2 |
| Citation | 297 S.W.2d 439 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Willie BABER, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Daniel T. Tillman, St. Louis, for appellant.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., W. Don Kennedy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
STOCKARD, Commissioner.
On December 4, 1954 the appellant, Willie Baber, shot and killed Edward Brown. A jury found that he was guilty of murder in the second degree and fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for twenty-five years. In his brief to this court appellant has presented twenty-five separate assignments of error.
Appellant contends that it was error to instruct the jury on second degree murder because there was no proof of premeditation. This calls for a statement of the facts.
Brown and appellant were sitting in the front seat and Charlie Haynes was sitting in the back seat of Brown's automobile. Haynes had a bottle of whiskey, and he and Brown had a drink, but appellant declined. Brown and appellant were arguing about the fact that earlier in the week appellant had either failed or refused to buy Brown a beer. There were also some comments made as to whether Brown 'gets around as much' as he wanted to. Appellant got out of the automobile and walked around the car to the left door and he and Brown continued to argue. According to Haynes, appellant struck Brown. He did not see Brown strike appellant and did not hear Brown make any threat. However, according to appellant, deceased called him a vile name and then Haynes told them to 'cut that out' because 'you are all too good a friends for that.' Appellant testified that Brown then leaned over in the seat of the car and he saw the handle of a pistol which he knew deceased was in the habit of carrying with him, and because he feared for his life he shot Brown in the head. Haynes did not see the actual shooting because he had settled back 'to take another drink,' but he did hear appellant say, 'Well, I kill you' after he had hit Brown, and he also saw Brown lean over in the car toward the right door of the car just before he heard the sound of the shot. No weapon of any kind was found on Brown or in the automobile.
Appellant admitted the killing, not claiming that it was accidental. The trial court instructed on murder in the second degree, manslaughter and self-defense. The form of these instructions, except that on self-defense, is not criticized.
Murder in the second degree includes all common-law murder not made murder in the first degree by Section 559.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594. Therefore, generally speaking, murder in the second degree is the killing of a human being wilfully, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, but without deliberation. State v. Murphy, 292 Mo. 275, 237 S.W. 529; State v. Linders, Mo.Sup., 224 S.W.2d 386. Premeditation means thought of beforehand for any length of time, however short. State v. Malone, 333 Mo. 594, 62 S.W.2d 909. The above recitation of the facts clearly establishes that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find every essential element of murder in the second degree, including premeditation.
Shortly after appellant was apprehended he was questioned by the St. Louis police and a statement prepared in question and answer form. The questions and answers which were read to the jury without objection, included the following: The woman with whom appellant had been 'living' was otherwise identified as Georgia Lee Taylor who was called as a witness by the state. After giving her name she was asked: 'And is that Miss, or Mrs. Taylor?' She replied that it was 'Miss.'
In the closing argument to the jury the assistant circuit attorney made the following statement: 'You talk about good character, and I say this with reservation, you talk about good character, a confessed adulterer living in adultery, this is the good character, this is the law abiding citizen parading up and down your street with a weapon in his busom, a concealed loaded gun----.' At this point defense counsel interposed an objection to the reference that appellant was an adulterer for the reason that there was 'no evidence entered that he was.' The objection was overruled.
There is no evidence that appellant was guilty of adultery as that crime is defined and made punishable by Section 563.150 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Not only does the evidence fail to show that either appellant or Georgia Lee Taylor was married, it establishes that contrary. While appellant's statement may have been an admission that he was guilty of some other offense, it was not an admission that he was guilty of the crime charged against him by the assistant circuit attorney. State v. Sekrit, 130 Mo. 401, 32 S.W. 977; State v. Chandler, 132 Mo. 155, 33 S.W. 797, 53 Am.St. Rep. 483; State v. McGehee, 308 Mo. 560, 274 S.W. 70; State v. Hillman, 128 Mo.App. 172, 106 S.W. 603; State v. Holland, 162 Mo.App. 678, 145 S.W. 522.
Appellant put his character in issue by offering evidence as to his reputation for 'peaceful and violence.' Within the limits of the evidence, the assistant circuit attorney in this was entitled to comment on appeallant's relationship with Georgia Lee Taylor, and to comment on appellant's character for the purpose of throwing light on the question of guilt or innocence. But even though appellant's character was in issue and there had been admitted without objection evidence of misconduct on his part, the assistant circuit attorney was not authorized, under the guise of commenting on appellant's character, to charge him with the commission of a specific crime of which there was no evidence in the record, and incidentally the evidence of which, if it had been offered, would not have been 'such as bears analogy and reference to the nature of the charge' on which appellant was being tried. State v. Beckner, 194 Mo. 281, 292, 91 S.W. 892, 894, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 535. See also State v. Archie, 301 Mo. 392, 256 S.W. 803; State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175, 100 A.L.R. 1503; 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th ed., Sec. 231.
In its brief the state contends that the argument to the jury that defendant was a 'confessed adulterer living in adultery' was responsive to the evidence, and that the 'argument was retaliatory,' As previously shown, this argument was not supported by the evidence, and under the circumstances it was not justified as an argument in retaliation to argument of defense counsel. It is not contended, and there is nothing in the record to show that defendant's counsel had made any argument material to this question other than that the state had not brought forth witnesses to refute appellant's evidence of his good character. This argument of defense counsel could not permit the assistant circuit attorney by way of retaliation to charge appellant with the commission of a separate crime when there was no evidence of the commission by appellant of that crime.
Although the comment of the assistant circuit...
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