State v. Badgett

• Decision Date: 23 February 1911
• Citation: State v. Badgett, 87 S.C. 543, 70 S.E. 301 (S.C. 1911)
• Parties: STATE v. BADGETT.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

70 S.E. 301

87 S.C. 543

STATE v. BADGETT.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 23, 1911

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; J W. De Vore, Judge.

Tom Badgett was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

R. B Pasley, Stanyarne Wilson, and H. K. Osborne, for appellant. J. C. Otts, Sol., for the State.

JONES C.J.

Under an indictment for the murder of Brezina Suber, defendant was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 10 years at hard labor in the penitentiary.

The testimony tended to show that late in the evening of November 5, 1909, in Spartanburg county, defendant went to the house of Kate Hunter, with whom her daughter, Hattie Drummond lived, and met the deceased there. Defendant was intoxicated and had a pistol in his hand, passed the deceased at or near the door, and after entering the house, and asking "Who is in here?" began shooting his pistol, frightening Kate Hunter and her daughter, which caused them to flee from the house. Two of the balls from defendant's pistol struck the head of the bed, and one struck the wall of the room. The deceased caught defendant by the pistol arm, and the fourth shot struck and killed her. Defendant testified: "She grabbed my arm and turned it down, and I did not know she was shot until she cried out she was shot." Defendant further testified that he was purposely shooting away from the parties in the house, not intending to shoot any one, and that, if deceased had not grabbed his arm, she would not have been shot.

The defendant's third request to charge was as follows: "That the jury must be further satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was the direct result of the gross negligence of a defendant, in order to find him guilty of manslaughter for such gross negligence. In order for a result to be a direct result, it must have occurred without intervention or act of another party; and if it would not have occurred without such intervention or act of another party, it cannot be said to have been a direct result." To which the court responded as follows: "I charge you that, Mr. foreman and gentlemen, and in connection with it this: In order for a result to be a direct result, it must have occurred without intervention or act of another party, provided that intervention or act of another party was negligence and carelessness in the party that committed the act. I charge you that in connection with this third request here."

Appellant's only exception alleges error in the charge in this: "It is not necessary, in order to exempt the defendant on trial that the intervention or act of another party should be negligence and carelessness of such party, because he was excusable if such responsible intervening act of the other party was due either to her willfulness, or to her best effort to avoid an...