State v. Baker
| Decision Date | 30 January 1893 |
| Citation | 23 Or. 441,32 P. 161 |
| Parties | STATE v. BAKER et al. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Linn county; Reuben P. Boise, Judge.
Charles Baker and F.S. Phelps were convicted of larceny, and appeal. Reversed.
J.K Weatherford and W.S. McFadden, for appellants.
Geo. E Chamberlain, Atty.Gen., for the State.
The defendants were indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of larceny in stealing one mare, the property of S.N Needham. On the trial the prosecution gave evidence tending to show that the animal described in the indictment was stolen from Needham's pasture, about four miles southeast of Albany, in Linn county, on the night of the 12th of October, 1891; and on the same night another animal was stolen from one Anderson, and a saddle and bridle from Albers, both neighbors of Needham. On the 15th of the same month the defendants were seen at the toll gate on the toll road leading from Lebanon to eastern Oregon, traveling east, with these two animals in their possession, but, having no money with which to pay toll, were compelled to and did return towards the Willamette valley, and two days later the animals were turned into a pasture near or adjacent to the toll road, where they remained until the night of the 30th, when they were taken therefrom without the knowledge of the owner of the pasture, and without the pasturage having been paid. On the same night the animals were taken from the pasture, and on a direct route from there to Salem, there was stolen from one Royce, at Lebanon, a spring hack, a set of harness, and a buggy robe and from one Baltimore, about 12 miles east of Albany, a pair of single lines, a buggy cushion, and two blankets. The defendants were arrested at Salem on the evening of the following day, having in their possession, as the evidence tended to show, the mare described in the indictment; also the Anderson mare, and the property stolen from Albers, Baltimore and Royce. The defendants objected and excepted to the admission of any evidence tending to show that any of the property claimed to have been found in defendants' possession at the time of their arrest, except that described in the indictment, was stolen property, on the ground that such evidence tended to prove other and different crimes from the one alleged in the indictment. The general rule is unquestioned that evidence of a distinct crime unconnected with that laid in the indictment cannot be given in evidence against the prisoner. Such evidence tends to mislead the jury, creates a prejudice against the prisoner, and requires him to answer a charge for the defense of which he is not supposed to have made preparation. And while, as Lord Campbell says, "it would be evidence to prove that the prisoner is a very bad man, and likely to commit such an offense," ( Reg. v. Oddy, 5 Cox Crim.Cas. 210,) under no enlightened system of jurisprudence can a person be convicted of one crime on proof that he has committed another. It is of the utmost importance to a defendant that the facts given in evidence by the prosecution shall consist exclusively of the transaction which forms the subject of the indictment, and which he has come prepared to answer. And yet, while this is the general rule, the exceptions to it are so numerous that it has been said "it is difficult to determine which is the most extensive,--the doctrine or the acknowledgment exceptions." Trogdon v. Com., 31 Grat. 870. In cases where the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence for a conviction, and the evidence offered forms logically one link in the chain of circumstances, tending to show that he who committed the one crime must have committed the other, or is so intermingled and connected with the crime charged as to form one entire transaction, it is admissible, although it may tend to prove distinct felonies. The purpose of such proof, however, should be explained in the charge of the court. Whart.Crim.Ev. § 31; Brown v. Com., 76 Pa.St. 319; Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532; Long v. State, 11 Tex.App. 381; Jones v....
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State v. Long
...Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., § 345. The rule as stated has received the unqualified approval of this court. In State v. Baker, 23 Or. 441, 443, 32 P. 161, 162, this court said: '* * * In cases where the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence for a conviction, and the eviden......
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State v. Baughman
...to establish a defendant's character and propensity to act accordingly. The general rule, as this court stated in State v. Baker , 23 Or. 441, 442-43, 32 P. 161 (1893), was that "no enlightened system of jurisprudence" would permit the admission of such evidence:"The general rule is unquest......
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State v. Williams
...evidence of a defendant's prior crimes to prove that the defendant had acted accordingly in the charged circumstances. State v. Baker, 23 Or. 441, 442–43, 32 P. 161 (1893). In Baker, the court explained that “no enlightened system of justice” would permit the admission of such evidence:“The......
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State v. O'Donnell
... ... with the larceny of a cow and a calf, the property of Rhodes, ... the court erred in admitting testimony tending to show the ... commission of an independent crime. "The general ... rule," says Mr. Justice Bean in State v. Baker, ... 23 Or. 441, 32 P. 161, "is unquestioned that evidence of ... a distinct crime unconnected with that laid in the indictment ... cannot be given in evidence against the prisoner. Such ... evidence tends to mislead the jury, creates a prejudice ... against the ... ...