State v. Baker

• Decision Date: 03 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 20060218-CA.,20060218-CA.
• Citation: 182 P.3d 935,2008 UT App 115
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Luke Zachary BAKER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

182 P.3d 935

2008 UT App 115

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Luke Zachary BAKER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20060218-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

April 3, 2008.

Aaron P. Dodd, Provo, for Appellant.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Marian Decker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before THORNE, Associtae P.J., DAVIS, and ORME, JJ.

OPINION

DAVIS, Judge:

¶ 1 Appellant Luke Zachary Baker entered a Sery plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. See generally State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). Baker contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because, he asserts, from the moment the officers placed the driver under arrest, Baker, a passenger in the driver's vehicle, was unlawfully detained. We agree, and thus reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND¹

¶ 2 In the early morning hours of September 30, 2004, Baker was riding in the backseat of a car traveling through Pleasant Grove, Utah. Pleasant Grove Police Officer Raymond Robertson noticed the car's license plate was not illuminated. Accordingly, he initiated a traffic stop.

¶ 3 As he approached the vehicle, Officer Robertson noticed a knife in a leather sheath on the thigh of a passenger in the back seat. At approximately 1:21 a.m., Officer Robertson ran a warrants check on the driver and discovered that her license had been "suspended for drugs." Officer Robertson then called for a K-9 unit to check the vehicle for controlled substances. Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary hearing that there was "no other reason" for requesting the K-9 unit. After he finished talking to dispatch, Officer Robertson walked back to the vehicle and proceeded to arrest the driver.

¶ 4 Responding to dispatch, additional officers—Pleasant Grove Police Officer Mike Bartell and Orem City Police Officer Chris Rockwood—arrived on the scene to assist Officer Robertson. By the time Officer Bartell arrived, the driver was already out of the vehicle and under arrest. Officer Robertson informed the other officers of the knife, and Officer Bartell proceeded to seize the knife while Officer Robertson processed the driver.

¶ 5 Officer Bartell then spoke to the backseat passenger whom Officer Robertson had seen with the knife. This passenger volunteered that he had a knife sitting on his thigh. Officer Bartell responded that he "better take the knife until we finish up with the stop." Officer Bartell then asked the passengers if there were any more knives in the car. The passengers, including Baker, then handed Officer Bartell approximately twelve other knives, including a set of throwing knives. Officer Bartell testified at the suppression hearing that none of the passengers said or did anything to make him fear for his safety once the knives were confiscated. Officers Rockwood and Robertson concurred with this assessment. Yet Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary hearing that the passengers were not free to leave until the K-9 unit arrived.

¶ 6 At approximately 1:33 a.m., Officer Robertson placed the driver in the back of his patrol car, and at 1:34 a.m., Orem City Police Officer Art Lopez arrived with a police service dog. At this time, Baker and his three remaining riding companions were still seated in the vehicle with the engine turned off. The dog then sniffed around the car and indicated that it smelled drugs. Accordingly, Officer Rockwood frisked the passengers and found a glass pipe in Baker's pants pocket and another in his shoe. At the suppression hearing, Officer Robertson testified that the reason the officers searched Baker was not because they were afraid for their safety, but was instead because they wanted to check for drugs and contraband. Baker was then placed in handcuffs and taken to the police station. In the process of booking Baker, police officers found a bag containing seventy-one grams of methamphetamine.

¶ 7 Baker was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. Baker moved to suppress the evidence of the glass pipes and methamphetamine. After a hearing, the trial court denied Baker's Motion to Suppress. The trial court ruled that given the lateness of the hour, the number of passengers, the number of knives, and the ongoing arrest of the driver, Baker "was not `detained' for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Using the same set of facts, with the addition of the K-9 unit's detection of drugs, the trial court similarly ruled that "it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably believed that [Baker] and the other passengers were armed and dangerous."² Baker now appeals the denial of his Motion to Suppress.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Baker argues that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress. "On review of both criminal and civil proceedings, we accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, ¶ 22, 135 P.3d 864 (defining a factual finding). "We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for correctness, without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts." Layton City v. Oliver, 2006 UT App 244, ¶ 11, 139 P.3d 281 (citing State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 699).³

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Baker argues that he was unlawfully detained from the moment the driver was arrested and that he was illegally frisked. We analyze each argument separately.

I. The Detention

¶ 10 "When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car [and the passengers are] seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). Thus, both driver and passenger "may challenge the constitutionality of the stop." Id. "[A] seizure occurs if `in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" Id. at 2405 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)); accord State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990). "When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative detention." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 23, 164 P.3d 397 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n. 2 (10th Cir.1994)).

¶ 11 "Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 576. And "officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion." Id. This "articulable suspicion" must be "that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ¶ 15, 107 P.3d 706 ("No person may be detained except upon reasonable suspicion, and the scope of the detention must be limited to addressing the articulated grounds for the stop."). "The articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion are usually grounded in an officer's personal perceptions and inferences" but may also include external information. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct.App.1997). "[W]e `look to the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.'" State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, ¶ 8, 47 P.3d 932 (omission in original) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). "Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do `not add to the delay already lawfully experienced' and do `not represent any further intrusion on [the detainee's] rights.'" Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ¶ 15, 107 P.3d 706 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir.1994) (finding the detention unlawful once the officer had discovered that detainee's car's registration sticker "was valid and had not expired"); Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ¶ 17, 107 P.3d 706 (determining that continued detention of a defendant was unlawful when the officer provided "no specific, articulable facts supporting his unwillingness to accept the date of birth on [the defendant's] license"); State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, ¶¶ 19-20, 76 P.3d 178 (holding that detaining a motorist on suspicion of intoxicated driving after successful performance of field sobriety tests was unlawful, and therefore unreasonable).

¶ 12 Here, the State, citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), argues that the K-9 unit search was part and parcel of the traffic stop and hence Baker was not unlawfully detained. However, the driver was arrested well before the K-9 unit arrived. Placing her in the patrol car, which occurred only a minute before the K-9 unit was on the scene, was, at best, a ministerial act. We see no lawful reason why the passengers were detained while the officers awaited the arrival of the K-9 unit. The constitution, not the speed with which police officers dispatch their duties, determines when an arrest occurs. Cf. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 24 n. 31, 164 P.3d 397.

¶ 13 Moreover, the desire to check the vehicle for controlled substances did not require the presence of the passengers,⁴ yet Officer Robertson admitted that the passengers were not free to...