State v. Balint, 15936
| Decision Date | 27 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 15936,15936 |
| Citation | 426 N.W.2d 316 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Brian P. BALINT, Defendant and Appellant. . Considered on Briefs |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
R. Shawn Tornow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee; Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.
Drake A. Titze of Minnehaha County Public Defender's Office, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.
Appellant Brian P. Balint was charged with intentional damage to property (first degree) under SDCL 22-34-1, a Class 4 felony, and was sentenced to one year in the penitentiary, all of which was suspended with the exception of 90 days to be served in the Minnehaha County Jail. The incident stemmed from the breaking of a large (roughly seven by eleven feet) window on a vacant building. A jury convicted Balint and on this appeal, he asserts two errors by the trial court creating these issues:
1) Is intentional damage to property a specific intent crime (trial court held "no"); and
2) Is voluntary intoxication available as a defense in intentional damage to property cases (trial court held "no").
The second issue is dependent on the answer to the first. We affirm, holding that intentional damage to property is a general intent crime, to which the defense of voluntary intoxication is inapplicable.
On June 11, 1987, Balint was observed acting in an unusual manner on the sidewalks of Sioux Falls. Eyewitnesses indicate that he was behaving as if drunk or drugged. He punched a newspaper stand, a sign, and shook his fist at a window. He also flexed his muscles in the window. He shoved at the window repeatedly, and the window burst. Police were called by the witnesses, and Balint, found panhandling, was arrested. Balint had no difficulty speaking to the officer, but smelled of alcohol. He denied any knowledge of breaking the window. At trial, Balint testified he woke up in jail without memory of why he was there. A witness for the State testified that Balint acted like he "had something to drink or [was] on some type of drug or possibly someone that might have escaped from McKennan Hospital." McKennan Hospital has a psychiatric care unit. Suffice it to say, his conduct was bizarre. Testimony of Balint, a drifter, revealed a long history of alcohol abuse, stints in detoxification centers, and panhandling.
Balint was convicted under the following statute:
SDCL 22-34-1. Intentional damage to property--Degree of offense according to value. Any person who intentionally injures, damages, or destroys public property without the lawful consent of the appropriate governing body having jurisdiction thereof, or private property in which other persons have an interest, other than by arson under chapter 22-33, without the consent of the other persons is punishable according to the following schedule.... Where the damage to property is more than two hundred dollars, the person is guilty of intentional damage to property in the first degree, which is a Class 4 felony.
Evidence established that the window value exceeded $200, and Balint had no consent from the owner.
SDCL 22-1-2(1)(b) defines "intent" and its variants as follows:
SDCL 22-1-2. Definition of terms....
* * *
* * *
(b) The words "intent, intentionally" and all derivatives thereof, import a specific design to cause a certain result or, when the material part of a charge is the violation of a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, a specific design to engage in conduct of that nature[.]
Balint argues that these statutes inherently mean intentional damage to property is a "specific intent" crime and the State must prove, as an element of that crime, that a defendant had the purpose of creating the harm that resulted from his action (i.e., the State must prove the purpose of the shoves, as demonstrated by the bizarre conduct, was to break the window). If the crime requires that "specific intent" be proven, Balint contends he was entitled to an instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication, as the evidence indicated diminished capacity to form the requisite intent.
"Voluntary intoxication" is defined in SDCL 22-1-2(49) 1 as "intoxication caused by substances that an actor knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which is to cause intoxication[.]" The defense of voluntary intoxication is defined in SDCL 22-5-5, of which the following is relevant here:
SDCL 22-5-5. Voluntary intoxication--Crimes involving motive or intent.... [W]henever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act.
State v. Waller, 338 N.W.2d 288 (S.D.1983), contains a passing reference to "specific intent" regarding intentional damage to property: "Defendant asserts, however, that although the evidence may support the jury's finding of specific intent to damage the door, it does not support a finding of specific intent to damage the car." Waller id. at 292 (). This Court did not discuss the "intent" aspect, but merely opined that the evidence supported the conviction. Waller, id. An implication follows that this crime requires specific intent. However, we are not hinging our decision on such an implication because the present issue does not appear to have been raised in Waller.
The specific/general intent dichotomy was extensively analyzed in State v. Huber, 356 N.W.2d 468 (S.D.1984):
Specific intent with regard to mental state means what is the "particular" intent, i.e., is the crime restricted to those who act purposely or does it include those who act only recklessly, etc.? The phrase "specific intent" has an entirely different connotation when used with reference to such doctrines as "diminished capacity" and "voluntary intoxication." "Some crimes require a specified intention in addition to the intentional doing of the actus reus itself,--an intent specifically required for guilt of the particular offense...." Perkins, [Criminal Law, at 762 (2d ed. 1969).] LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law Sec. 28, at 202 (1972), states this is the most common usage of "specific intent." The term "designate[s] a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." LaFave & Scott, supra. Crimes such as...
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