State v. Ballard

Decision Date24 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-900,80-900
Citation423 N.E.2d 115,66 Ohio St.2d 473,20 O.O.3d 397
Parties, 20 O.O.3d 397, 23 A.L.R.4th 241 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BALLARD, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Prior to accepting a guilty plea from a criminal defendant, the trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory process of witnesses. (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, followed.)

2. Failure to use the exact language contained in Crim.R. 11(C), in informing a criminal defendant of his constitutional right to a trial and the constitutional rights related to such trial, including the right to trial by jury, is not grounds for vacating a plea as long as the record shows that the trial court explained these rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant (State v. Caudill, 48 Ohio St.2d 342, 358 N.E.2d 601, modified.)

Appellant, Arnold Ballard, was indicted for one count of aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01) and one count of aggravated robbery (R.C. 2911.01). On June 15, 1979, appellant, represented by counsel, appeared in open court and expressed a desire to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of murder (R.C. 2903.02).

Prior to accepting appellant's guilty plea, the trial court personally addressed the defendant, as required by Crim.R. 11(C), to determine whether the defendant was fully informed of his rights and understood the consequences of his guilty plea.

The trial court, after being satisfied that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, accepted the guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction. The count of aggravated robbery was nolled.

After sentencing, appellant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Appellant argued that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing because he was not informed of his right to trial by jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was substantial compliance with the command of Crim.R. 11(C).

This cause is now before the court pursuant to allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Mark A. Stanton, Columbus, for appellee.

Marshman, Snyder & Corrigan, Anthony A. Cox and Terrance O'Donnell, Cleveland, for appellant.

HOLMES, Justice.

This cause presents a recurring question of what is required of a trial judge when accepting a guilty plea or a plea of no contest from a criminal defendant. Here, the appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea because of the trial court's alleged failure to inform him that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to a trial by jury. Appellant, in effect, argues that the trial court did not comply in this regard with the mandate of either Crim.R. 11(C) or Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.

Crim.R. 11 provides, in pertinent part:

"(C) Pleas of guilty and no contest in felony cases.

"(1) Where in a felony case the defendant is unrepresented by counsel the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant, after being readvised that he has the right to be represented by retained counsel, or pursuant to Rule 44 by appointed counsel, waives this right.

"(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:

"(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation.

"(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence.

"(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself." 1

The first time this court had an opportunity to speak to Crim.R. 11(C) was State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 342, 358 N.E.2d 601. In Caudill, this court said that trial courts must "adhere scrupulously" to the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). 2

However, the Caudill rule of scrupulous adherence was short-lived. In State v. Stewart (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163, the trial court had neglected to specifically inform the defendant, who was pleading guilty to murder, that he was not eligible for probation. This court held that such omission did not constitute prejudicial error, and that there was substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11. In essence, the holding in State v. Stewart is that where the record discloses that the trial court personally addressed the defendant during his plea hearing and informed him of his constitutional rights as contained in Crim.R. 11, the omission of not informing the defendant of one of the non-constitutional rights, such as probation, would not per se constitute prejudicial error, or plain error. 3

This court, in State v. Stewart, in order to show that the defendant was not prejudiced by the omission, pointed out in the opinion that the record reflects certain things that took place at the plea hearing which would have reasonably advised the defendant of the consequences of his plea, and that he was facing imminent sentence. This court set forth as part of the colloquy between the trial court and the defendant the fact that the defendant knew the maximum penalty that was involved, and that the court may immediately sentence the defendant. Further, this court pointed out that the defendant had signed a "Petition" for entering a plea, which paper, among other things, declared that the defendant had not been promised probation if he pled guilty.

Based upon the above facts, and a finding that the trial court did inform the defendant of his constitutional rights, which were duly waived, and the other various consequences of his plea, this court, at page 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163, held that "(t)he trial court substantially complied with the requirements in Crim.R. 11, and the failure to personally advise appellant that in entering a plea of guilty to murder he would not be eligible for probation does not rise to the status of prejudicial error."

Stewart was followed by State v. Strawther (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 298, 283 N.E.2d 900, where the trial court neglected to inform the defendant that he had the right to compulsory process, but the defendant signed a written plea of guilty in which he waived his right to compulsory process. Also, in State v. Billups (1978), 57 Ohio St.2d 31, 385 N.E.2d 1308, this court upheld the validity of a plea where the defendant, having been present in the courtroom when the judge conducted a colloquy informing another defendant of his rights, executed a written document which encompassed the rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2).

The state, relying on State v. Stewart, supra, argues that the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C). However, here, we are not faced solely with the question of compliance with the nonconstitutional rights of a defendant in Crim.R. 11(C), as was this court in State v. Stewart. Appellant alleges that he was not informed of his constitutional right to trial by jury; therefore, we must resolve this matter in light of Boykin v. Alabama, supra. This resolution involves a two-step analysis. First, what does Boykin require of a trial court. Second, in what manner must a trial court satisfy the requirements.

In Boykin, the defendant pled guilty to five counts of robbery. The record did not reveal that the trial court conducted any discussion with the defendant to determine that he had an understanding of what a guilty plea connotes and that he was aware of its consequences. The court held, 395 U.S. at page 242, 89 S.Ct. at page 1711, that it was plain error to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that "(i)t was intelligent and voluntary." The court, 395 U.S. at page 243, 89 S.Ct. at page 1712, stated:

"Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record." 4

Here, the trial court did not specifically inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to a jury trial, a "Boykin right." Thus, this court must determine whether such an omission results in a per se involuntary and unintelligent guilty plea, mandating that the plea be vacated and the defendant allowed to plead anew.

There is a split of authority as to whether the complete omission of a Boykin constitutional right alone is cause to nullify a guilty plea. The answer to this question rests upon how Boykin is interpreted. Some courts read Boykin as requiring guilty pleas to be no more than voluntarily and knowingly entered, and hold that failure to mention, in any manner, a Boykin right does not necessarily result in an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea. See, e. g., Roddy v. Black (C.A. 6, 1975), 516 F.2d 1380, certiorari denied 423 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 226, 46 L.Ed.2d 147; Wilkins v....

To continue reading

Request your trial
1243 cases
  • State v. Lawson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • 7 Octubre 2021
    ...his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory process of witnesses." State v. Ballard , 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus, following Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242-243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (196......
  • State v. Fitzpatrick
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • 7 Julio 2004
    ...right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory process of witnesses." State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 20 O.O.3d 397, 423 N.E.2d 115, paragraph one of the syllabus, following Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed......
  • State v. Anthony
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 11 Junio 2015
    ...... {¶ 7} The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11 is to insure that certain information is conveyed to the defendant that would allow him or her to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision regarding whether to plead guilty. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479–480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). In determining whether the trial court has satisfied its duties under Crim.R. 11 in taking a plea, reviewing courts have distinguished constitutional and nonconstitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d ......
  • State v. Lawson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • 7 Octubre 2021
    ...U.S. 238, 242-243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); see also Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). {¶ 78} In this case, the trial court complied with Ballard and Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) by informing that his guilty plea waived his rights to confront the state's witnesses, to compel the attendance of witnes......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT