State v. Banghart-Portillo
| Docket Number | S-1-SC-37389 |
| Decision Date | 19 September 2022 |
| Citation | 519 P.3d 58 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Christina M. BANGHART-PORTILLO, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, David Henderson, Appellate Defender, Kimberly M. Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Defendant-Petitioner
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Emily C. Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiff-Respondent
{1} Defendant Christina Banghart-Portillo pleaded guilty to tampering with evidence, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-5 (2003), and conspiracy to commit tampering with evidence, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979) (Count 1 and Count 2, respectively), each of which was a fourth-degree felony offense, under a written plea agreement. Because Defendant had a prior felony conviction, each sentence was enhanced at her initial sentencing by one year under New Mexico's habitual offender statute, NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-17(A) (2003). Defendant also admitted her identity in a second prior felony at the time of her sentencing, yet the district court imposed no additional enhancement at that time. The district court imposed consecutive sentences on Defendant for a total of five years of incarceration with three years suspended, leaving her with an initial sentence of two years of incarceration followed by three years of probation. Defendant violated the terms of her probation over halfway through her three-year probationary period, prompting the district court to apply a second habitual offender enhancement, which added a total of three years to the sentence for each count pursuant to Section 31-18-17(B).
{2} The central issue before this Court is whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of finality for Count 1 such that the district court no longer had jurisdiction when it applied the habitual offender enhancement to that Count. Defendant argues on appeal that the district court's enhancement of the Count 1 sentence resulted in a double jeopardy violation because the court had lost jurisdiction by the time of the enhancement. The Court of Appeals held that the district court retained jurisdiction to apply a habitual offender enhancement to Count 1. State v. Banghart-Portillo , A-1-CA-36917, mem. op. ¶ 3, 2018 WL 6011168 (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2018) (nonprecedential). We originally granted, then quashed, Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. We later granted Defendant's motion for rehearing on two narrow issues:
{3} We agree that the district court retained jurisdiction to enhance Defendant's sentence for Count 1, but we reach that conclusion guided by the issues on which we granted rehearing. We further clarify that a defendant must be reasonably informed when a sentence of probation is imposed on multiple counts in the aggregate such that a habitual offender enhancement will apply to all counts throughout the entire probationary period.
{4} According to the charging documents in Defendant's case, Officer Steven Minner pulled over Defendant and Anthony Banghart because their vehicle had a broken taillight. Officer Minner arrested Defendant, and a fellow officer arrested Mr. Banghart because both had outstanding warrants. After the two were booked, another officer observed Mr. Banghart remove an object from his clothing near his abdomen area and pass it to Defendant. Defendant then attempted to swallow the object but was unable to and "coughed it up." Defendant gave the object back to Mr. Banghart, and he put it back in his clothing. The observing officer relayed this information to Officer Minner. The two officers then searched Mr. Banghart and discovered two pieces of plastic that contained heroin.
Defendant indicated that she understood.
{6} Approximately one month later, the State filed a supplemental criminal information, alleging that Defendant had committed two prior felonies. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the court that Defendant would admit her identity in both prior felonies. Defense counsel further explained that the State had agreed to seek enhancement for only one prior felony and to hold the other in abeyance. The district court reminded Defendant that she did not need to admit to the two prior felony convictions and that the State had the burden of proving its allegations in the supplemental information. Defendant and the district court then had the following exchange:
{7} The district court sentenced Defendant to eighteen months in prison for Count 1 and eighteen months in prison for Count 2 and added a one-year habitual offender enhancement to each, for a total of five years of incarceration. The district court suspended three years of Defendant's incarceration relating to Counts 1 and 2 and instead imposed three years of probation to begin after her release from her two-year prison sentence relating to her habitual offender enhancements.1 Finally, the district court provided that Defendant would serve a mandatory parole term of one year following her incarceration to run concurrent with her term of probation.
{8} Defendant began her probationary period after being released from prison. Defendant violated probation multiple times, prompting the State to file a petition to revoke Defendant's probation on three occasions. The district court revoked then reinstated Defendant's probation on the first two occasions. The district court then revoked Defendant's probation following the State's third petition, just over halfway into Defendant's probation term, and enhanced her sentences for Counts 1 and 2 by three years each, pursuant to Section 31-18-17(B).
{9} Defendant filed pleadings opposing the district court's habitual offender enhancements for both counts. Defendant argued, among other things, that the written plea agreement imposed a maximum term of three years of incarceration and that she completed her sentence as to Count 1 after serving over half of her three-year probationary period, such that the district court lost jurisdiction to enhance it. This argument was based on Defendant's assertion that the first eighteen months of her probation corresponded to Count 1, and the second eighteen months of her probation corresponded to Count 2. The district court rejected Defendant's arguments, finding that her three-year probationary period was unitary and, as a result, that she was still on probation for and subject to enhancement on both Count 1 and Count 2 throughout the entire three-year term.
{10} Defendant appealed to our Court of Appeals, which held that the district court retained jurisdiction to enhance Defendant's sentence on both counts. Banghart-Portillo , A-1-CA-36917, mem. op. ¶¶ 1, 3. It reasoned that "it did not appear that Defendant's judgment and sentence was structured for time served on probation to correspond with any particular conviction." Id. ¶ 3. As such, Defendant "had no reasonable expectation of finality as to [C]ount [1] or any limitation on the enhancement prior to the completion of her entire probationary period." Id. (citing Yazzie , 2018-NMCA-001, ¶ 14, 410 P.3d 220 ). Defendant then timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari under Rule 12-502 NMRA. We granted, then quashed certiorari. We subsequently granted Defendant's motion for rehearing to determine whether Yazzie is controlling in this matter and to consider the impact Mares has on our analysis.
{11} "[W]hether a trial court has jurisdiction in a particular case is a question of law that we review de novo." Smith v. City of Santa Fe , 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. "We generally apply a de novo standard of review to the constitutional question of whether there has been a double jeopardy violation." State v. Cummings , 2018-NMCA-055, ¶ 6, 425 P.3d 745. Additionally, to the extent that this Court is required to interpret a plea agreement, the terms of the plea agreement are also reviewed de novo....
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