State v. Banks
| Decision Date | 04 December 1984 |
| Citation | 194 Conn. 617,484 A.2d 444 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Thomas BANKS. |
Edward J. Peters, Jr., Portland, for appellant (defendant).
Julia D. Dewey, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and Michael Dearington, Chief Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and DANNEHY, JJ.
The defendant, Thomas Banks, appeals from the judgment rendered upon the jury verdict convicting him of arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112. 1
The accusation of arson in the second degree was made in an amended information which in substance charged that on or about January 23, 1981, the defendant started a fire or caused an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building he owned in Hamden to collect insurance against loss, and his act subjected another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury and another building to a substantial risk of destruction or damage. 2 At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal which the court denied. 3
The defendant has assigned and argued as errors the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and a certain instruction to the jury. We turn first to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury.
In our examination of this record, we have recognized the elementary rule that if there is sufficient evidence, viewing it most favorably to the state, to support the verdict, we must affirm. It is not claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant purposely started a fire and caused an explosion with intent to destroy or damage the building he owned and used as a residence at 33 Dudley Street in Hamden in order to collect the insurance money on the property. 4 We have examined the record carefully, and have considerable doubt that the evidence supports the charge that the defendant's act subjected another person to a substantial risk of personal injury. We need not, however, resolve this issue if there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the act of the defendant subjected another building to a substantial risk of damage or destruction. 5 In our examination we will not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses but will determine " ' "whether the jury could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." ' " (Citations omitted.) State v. Rutan, 194 Conn. 438, 444, 479 A.2d 1209 (1984).
Based on the evidence, the jury could have reasonably found the following facts. The defendant paid $14,000 for the building at 33 Dudley Street in June, 1978. He experienced financial problems with the building almost immediately, taking out two mortgages on the building and financing some improvements through a loan. Gas service at the building was terminated in June, 1980 for nonpayment. On the evening of January 23, 1981, an explosion and fire started by an accelerant destroyed the building.
Nearby persons who interviewed the defendant on the evening of the fire smelled gasoline in his presence. Chemical analysis revealed the presence of gasoline on the defendant's shoes. The defendant filed a proof of loss with his insurance company.
At the trial, a number of photographs of the building were admitted into evidence. Four photographs showed not only the gutted exterior of the building but also the area around the building, including a second house located at 35 Dudley Street, immediately adjacent to the burned building. The two houses are shown in the photographs to have been closely spaced, separated only by their driveways. No direct evidence was presented that the second house was either damaged or subjected to a substantial risk of damage or destruction. The jury thus had to infer such risk in order to find the defendant guilty as charged.
The defendant did not object to the submission of the four photographs and they were admitted as full exhibits for all purposes. See State v. Segar, 96 Conn. 428, 437, 114 A. 389 (1921). The jury had the photographs during deliberations after having been instructed by the trial court: "You will have all the exhibits that were admitted as full exhibits and ... you are to consider [them]." Further, the jury heard testimony that the building had been "engulfed in flames," that flames had shot out from several of the building's windows, and that a "spherical ball of flame" had "formed over" the building. There was also testimony describing the violence of the explosion and the high intensity of the fire. That the fire at 33 Dudley Street was extinguished before it had actually spread to the second house does not mean that a substantial risk did not in fact exist as to the second house. See State v. Young, 87 Wash.2d 129, 133, 550 P.2d 1 (1976). The jury thus had before it evidence from which it properly could have inferred that the fire had created a substantial risk of damage or destruction to the second house. In sum, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the essential elements of the crime charged and to persuade the jury of the existence of each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Haddad, 189 Conn. 383, 387, 456 A.2d 316 (1983); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979).
The remaining claim of error relates to a portion of the trial court's charge. The jury was instructed that if it should find that the defendant had made false statements about himself or his whereabouts at the time of the offense, or had made any declarations subsequent to the alleged criminal act which were influenced by that act, it would have the right to take such misstatements as proof of the defendant's consciousness of his own guilt. The defendant excepted to this instruction. A consciousness of guilt instruction may be given when a party has made material misstatements because such fabrication or falsification implies...
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State v. McClain, SC 19532
...that the instruction is improper because it improperly shifts the burden of proof from the state to the defendant; State v. Banks , 194 Conn. 617, 622, 484 A.2d 444 (1984) ; and inserts the court's imprimatur on the state's version of the events. State v. Johnson , 288 Conn. 236, 285, 951 A......
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State v. Kulmac
...is given such weight as the trier of fact deems it is worth. State v. Rawls, supra, 198 Conn. at 118, 502 A.2d 374; State v. Banks, 194 Conn. 617, 620, 484 A.2d 444 (1984); State v. Ruth, 16 Conn.App. 148, 152, 547 A.2d 548 (1988), cert. denied, 209 Conn. 827, 552 A.2d 434 The standard of r......
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State v. Burge
...was not obligated to indicate the precise purpose for which testimony on his mental acuity was being offered. See State v. Banks, 194 Conn. 617, 620, 484 A.2d 444 (1984); State v. Cuvelier, 175 Conn. 100, 108, 394 A.2d 185 (1978); Sears v. Curtis, 147 Conn. 311, 316-17, 160 A.2d 742 (1960);......