State v. Banks

• Decision Date: 23 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 49A02–1303–CR–235.,49A02–1303–CR–235.
• Citation: 2 N.E.3d 71
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. DeAngelo BANKS, Appellee–Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

2 N.E.3d 71

STATE of Indiana, Appellant–Plaintiff,
v.
DeAngelo BANKS, Appellee–Defendant.

No. 49A02–1303–CR–235.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Jan. 23, 2014.

[2 N.E.3d 73]

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kelly A. Miklos, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Matthew D. Anglemeyer, Marion County Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION
BROWN, Judge.

The State appeals the trial court's grant of DeAngelo Banks's motion to suppress his confession of murder. The State raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the court erred in granting Banks's motion to suppress. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2010, Banks arrived at the New Castle Correctional Facility and was placed in the psychiatric ward of the facility. He had been previously diagnosed with schizo affective disorder. On December 7, 2010, Indianapolis Police Detective Michael Mitchell went to the New Castle Facility to question Banks and to follow up on an investigation involving a DNA lead. Detective Mitchell had no previous contact with Banks, was not aware that Banks was in the psychiatric ward or that he was medicated, and had not spoken with any medical personnel concerning him. Rather, Detective Mitchell simply made an appointment to speak with Banks, was greeted by security personnel, and was placed in a room with Banks.

Detective Mitchell asked the correctional officer to place the handcuffs which were behind Banks's back to his front so that he could sign the rights waiver form, but the correctional officer refused. Banks spelled his name for Detective Mitchell, and the following exchange then occurred:

Q. Okay. Before we get started, I'm gonna read you your rights.

A. Alright.

Q. And you have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you as evidence in court. You have the right to talk a [sic] lawyer before any questions are asked or—you may answer any questions. Do you understand that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed before you for any further questioning if you stop answering, okay?

A. Okay.

Q. And if you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer, you have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer. Do you understand that? You don't have to talk to me is what I'm sayin'.

A. Oh, yeah, alright.

Q. You have—and if you do talk to me, you have the right to stop any time.

A. Alright.

Q. Okay?

A. Yeah.

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Q. And that's for you. Do you know Margaret-do you want to talk to me today?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. I know you can't sign the rights waiver ‘cause you're handcuffed but—

A. Yeah, I agree.

Q. —We'll put that—we'll put that in the—

A. I agree.

State's Exhibit 2 at 2–3.

Detective Mitchell then questioned Banks, and Banks indicated that he remembered the picture of Margaret Russell, that he knew her for about an hour, and that he was in Oaktree Apartments in September the year before last. Banks then stated: “I was under an influence of cocaine and—she—she was out prostitutin'. And—I don't know what happened, man, it's like—it's like for some reason, man, I—I seduced her and it ended up to a murder, right?” Id. at 4. Banks stated that he strangled her with his hands and explained how he strangled her. When asked whether he had sex with her, Banks said: “Yea, a dead body, too, right?” Id. Banks stated that he took off her shirt and wiped his semen and her fluids, and that the whole thing took “[p]robably like—fifteen minutes” then said “[n]aw, it was longer than that. Because after she was—spiritually dead—her soul hadn't left her body yet, though, right?” Id. at 5. He also said that he killed “some lady on 17th street ... [and] Ritter” around November of 2009 and that he strangled her and then had sex with her dead body. Id. at 5–6. When asked “is there any particular reason you killed these girls,” Banks answered: “Other than I was under the influence of drugs, man, I—I've been—I've been psychologically tormented, right? I don't know what's—what the problem is, man. I think I might be insane or somethin', right?” Id. at 7. The day after Detective Mitchell spoke with Banks, Dr. Maguire informed another detective who wanted to speak to Banks that “it might be more productive to come after his medication had stabilized, because he had been out of it.” Transcript at 23.

On December 27, 2010, the State charged Banks with the murder of Russell under cause number 49G05–1012–MR–91655 (“Cause No. 55”) and the murder of Debra Harper under cause number 49G05–1012–MR–91656 (“Cause No. 56”). On February 16, 2011, the State alleged that Banks was an habitual offender under each cause number.

On December 1, 2011, Banks filed a motion to suppress a statement he gave to Detective Robert Flack on December 18, 2010, and testimony relating thereto in Cause No. 56.

On March 23, 2012, Banks filed a motion to suppress his statement to Detective Mitchell and testimony related thereto in Cause No. 55, and alleged that

due to the confusing manner in which these rights were stated to him by Detective Mitchell and the defendant's altered and compromised state of mind, produced by a combination of psychotropic medications that he had been administered during his incarceration at the facility, including December 7, 2010, his “waiver” of those [Miranda ] rights was not freely self-determined and the product of rational intelligent and free will, i.e. the statement was not made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly due to the impairment of his mental faculties.

Appellant's Appendix at 51–52.

On December 7, 2012, the court held an evidentiary hearing. Dr. Ellen Keris Maguire, a psychologist working in the psychiatric ward of the New Castle Correctional

[2 N.E.3d 75]

Facility, testified that she saw Banks “weekly at the beginning and then it tapered off.” Transcript at 10. She testified that he had previously been diagnosed with schizo affective disorder, which she described as:

A psychotic disorder that also has some mood systems, so it's kind of a combination of schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder. So there you have delusions, hallucinations, and then at the same time you can have periods where your mood is extremely euphoric and high and you're up for several days and then you can also have a period of depression.

Id. at 11. According to Dr. Maguire, Banks was significantly worse when he arrived in November 2010 than later in his confinement. She noted that the day after Detective Mitchell spoke with Banks, she informed another detective that “it might be more productive to come after his medication had stabilized, because he had been out of it.” Id. at 23. She testified that her opinion would have been the same the day before. She further stated that “closer to March or April [Banks] was consistently stable.” Id. at 24.

Detective Mitchell testified that he introduced himself to Banks, told Banks that he was there to talk about a case, and Banks told him that he knew why he was there. He stated that Banks began talking about the murders, and he stopped Banks from talking and turned on his tape recorder. Banks “seemed to understand” why Detective Mitchell was there before being told and that it was “indicative of the whole conversation that [Banks was] understanding what [he was] talking about.” Id. at 51. When asked “[s]o you didn't have to in anyway [sic] to I'll use the term, use any coercive tactics to get him to talk to you, he wanted to talk to you from the get go,” Detective Mitchell answered, “Absolutely, yeah.” Id. He acknowledged that the correct statement to Banks should have been that if he cannot afford a lawyer one would be appointed to him before any further questioning, and that he did not read the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Advice of Rights Waiver verbatim to Banks. He also testified that Banks's answers during the interview were appropriate to the questions, that Banks did not laugh inappropriately during the questioning and did not do anything that seemed “highly ... inappropriate to the conversation.” Id. at 48. On re-cross examination, in response to the question, “Now December 7 of 2010 that the defendant understood his rights and did in fact want to waive them and talk to you about what occurred” he responded, “Yes, that's correct.” Id. at 54–55.

Banks testified that he was still medicated the day of the evidentiary hearing and that he understood what was happening at the hearing. He testified that he vaguely remembered the day when Detective Mitchell came to talk to him, and when asked whether he recalled Detective Mitchell advising him of his rights, answered: “Not really, no.” Id. at 56. Banks stated that he did not really understand that he had certain rights that he could invoke so as to not give a statement and he “thought [Detective Mitchell] was telling [him] something totally different.” Id. at 57. He said that he did not know that he had the right to talk to a lawyer before he talked to the detective, and that he interpreted the words “further questions” as Detective Mitchell “telling [him] like I would get a lawyer like right now like before he asked me questions.” Id. When asked why he agreed to talk with Detective Mitchell, Banks replied: “I was in restraints. They had me restrained down. It's real vague. I was kind of like in and out of it.” Id. at 58. He also indicated that had he been clearly advised,

[2 N.E.3d 76]

he would not have given up his rights and talked to Detective Mitchell.

At the end of the hearing, the court stated:

Let me outline the problem that I see. Then you folks can tell me your thoughts. We might need to get some more scholarship in here. When a person has processing difficulty, cognizant difficulty, it takes more care rather than less care to make sure the person understands what he or she is doing and the consequences of the acts. When you put that in the context of a rights waiver, we recognize that the...