State v. Bannon Energy Corp.
Decision Date | 23 March 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 98-315, No. 98-314, No. 98-317., No. 98-316 |
Parties | The STATE of Wyoming, Department of Revenue, Appellant (Petitioner), v. BANNON ENERGY CORPORATION; and Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Appellees (Respondents). The State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Bannon Energy Corporation; and Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Appellees (Respondents). The State of Wyoming, Department Of Revenue, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Bannon Energy Corporation; and Wyoming State Board of Equalization, Appellees (Respondents). The State of Wyoming, Department of Revenue, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Bannon Energy Corporation, Appellee (Respondent). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing the Department of Revenue: Vicci M. Colgan, Chief Deputy Attorney General; and Charles T. Solomon, Assistant Attorney General.
Representing Bannon Energy Corporation: Brent R. Kunz and Ian D. Shaw of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing the State Board of Equalization: Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and Harry D. Ivey, Assistant Attorney General.
Before THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ., and ELIZABETH A. KAIL, D.J. (RET.)
The Department of Revenue petitioned the district courts for a review of an order issued by the State Board of Equalization which reversed the Department of Revenue's assessment of interest and penalties against Bannon Energy Corporation, a purchaser who owed a sales tax deficiency. The district courts certified the cases to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).
We affirm the State Board of Equalization's order.
The Department of Revenue presents this issue:
A. Did the State Board of Equalization erroneously conclude that the sales tax statutes prohibit the Department of Revenue from assessing interest and penalty against purchasers who do not timely pay sales taxes[?]
Bannon Energy is a corporation engaged in oil and gas exploration and production in Wyoming. The Department of Audit conducted a sales and use tax audit of Bannon Energy for the period July 1, 1992, through December 31, 1994. It found that Bannon Energy had underpaid sales taxes in the amount of $327,874.55 on items it had purchased. The Department of Revenue assessed Bannon Energy a tax deficiency in that amount plus interest in the amount of $115,501.63 and a ten percent penalty of $32,-787.46. Bannon Energy appealed from the assessment of the interest and penalty to the State Board of Equalization, but it did not appeal from the assessment of unpaid taxes.
The State Board of Equalization decided the appeal without holding a hearing, relying solely upon the statutes and the written arguments presented by Bannon Energy and the Department of Revenue. The State Board of Equalization found in favor of Bannon Energy and reversed the assessed interest and penalty. It concluded: "[T]he sales tax statutes do not permit the [Department of Revenue] to assess interest and penalty against purchasers owing a sales tax deficiency." The Department of Revenue appealed to the district courts, and those courts certified the cases to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).
When we review cases that have been certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to the court of the first instance. Union Telephone Company, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Commission, 907 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Wyo.1995). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) governs judicial review of administrative decisions. W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo.1998).
The issue presented in this case requires us to interpret several Wyoming statutes which pertained to the imposition and collection of sales taxes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Newton v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 922 P.2d 863, 864 (Wyo.1996); Trefren v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1993). We affirm an agency's conclusions of law when they are in accordance with the law. Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo.1996). When an agency has not invoked and properly applied the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's errors. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 855 (Wyo.1998); Gneiting v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo.1995).
The only question before us is whether the Department of Revenue could assess and collect interest and penalties from purchasers who failed to timely pay sales taxes. The Department of Revenue contends that the State Board of Equalization incorrectly interpreted various Wyoming statutes when it concluded that the department was without power to impose interest and penalties against purchasers. Specifically, the Department of Revenue claims that, although the statutes prescribed interest and penalties for vendors only, we should construe them as authorizing it to impose interest and penalties against purchasers as well.
Our rules of statutory interpretation are well established. We first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers' Compensation, 957 P.2d 843, 845 (Wyo.1998). This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo.1993); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo.1991). A "statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc.,813 P.2d at 220. A "statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d at 219-20.
If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. Lyles, 957 P.2d at 846; Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo.1996).
We begin by making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia.
State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). If we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d at 1044.
Before its amendment in 1997 and its repeal in 1998, § 39-6-407 stated in pertinent part:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-407 (Michie 1994) (amended 1997 & repealed 1998). Before its amendment in 1997 and its repeal in 1998, § 39-6-409 provided in relevant part:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-409 (Michie 1994) (amended 1997 & repealed 1998).
The Department of Revenue points out, and we agree, that § 39-6-407(d) clearly obligated the purchaser to pay sales tax to either the vendor or the Department of Revenue. See State Board of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corporation, 737 P.2d 350, 353 (Wyo.1987)
. The Department of Revenue concedes that the interest and penalty provisions set out in § 39-6-409 referred to only vendors, but it goes on to argue that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-6-410(a) (Michie 1994) (amended 1996 & repealed 1998)2 unambiguously authorized interest and penalties for purchasers. The Department of Revenue contends that, because § 39-6-410(a) applied...
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