State v. Barksdale

• Decision Date: 14 December 1964
• Docket Number: No. 47227,47227
• Citation: 247 La. 198,170 So.2d 374
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce BARKSDALE.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 374

170 So.2d 374

247 La. 198

STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce BARKSDALE.

No. 47227.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Dec. 14, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1965.

Robert F. Collins, Nils R. Douglas, Lolis E. Elie, New Orleans, for appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

SUMMERS, Justice.

The appellant Bruce Barksdale, a 27 year old Negro, was charged by the grand jury of Orleans Parish for the October 3, 1962, aggravated rape of a white female. He was tried, found guilty and sentenced to death. On this appeal he relies upon seven bills of exceptions for reversal of the conviction and sentence.

The indictment is drawn in the short form authorized by Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:235. That article permits the crime to be charged in these words: 'A.B. committed aggravated rape upon C.D.'

The crime of aggravated rape is defined by Article 42 of Louisiana Criminal Code (LSA-R.S. 14:42) as follows:

'Aggravated rape is a rape committed where the sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of the female because it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:

'(1) Where the female resists the act to the utmost, but her resistance is overcome by force.

'(2) Where she is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution.

'(3) Where she is under the age of twelve years. Lack of knowledge of the female's age shall not be a defense.

'Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by death.'

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 3

At the outset appellant requested that the district attorney furnish a bill of particulars. This was answered by the State as follows:

'1) Q. Under which subsection of L.S.A.-R.S. 14:42 is defendant charged?

'A. Subsections 1 and 2.

'2) Q. What is the weapon with which defendant is alleged to have committed aggravated rape?

'A. State is not required to answer.

'3) Q. Where was the alleged aggravated rape perpetrated?

'A. 1023 Chartres Street, upstairs apartment.

'4) Q. What time of day was the alleged rape done?

'A. Approximately 9:30 a.m.

'5) Q. How many times was the alleged victim ravished?

'A. State is not required to answer.

'6) Q. What was the force or threat used in committing the alleged aggravated rape?

'A. State is not required to answer.

'7) Q. Was the victim of the alleged rape merely threatened or was the weapon physically used against the alleged victim?

'A. State is not required to answer.

'8) Q. If the weapon was physically used against the victim was she knocked unconscious?

'A. State is not required to answer.

'9) Q. What injuries aside from the alleged rape did the victim sustain as a result of this aggravated assault?

'A. State is not required to answer.'

Except as to the information specifically furnished, the trial judge refused to require the State to further particularize. To this ruling appellant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 1.

Appellant also filed several motions to quash the indictment. He combines the argument on the bill of particulars with the argument on the motions to quash.

The motions to quash set forth that the indictment violates Article, I, Section 10 of the State Constitution, LSA and the sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution, for it is insufficient to properly inform the accused of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. These motions to quash were denied by the trial judge and Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was timely reserved.

The contention, in essence, is that the short form indictment is invalid especially when it is not supplemented by all of the information requested in the bill of particulars for the accused is not properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Although the district attorney may be required to furnish a bill of particulars to a person accused under the short form indictment (Art. 235, Code of Crim.Proc.), he need not be compelled to give the evidence with which the State will prove its case. State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So.2d 530 (1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 834, 80 S.Ct. 85, 4 L.Ed.2d 75 (1959); State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954); State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359 (1948). And the granting or refusal of a bill of particulars addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Labat, 226 La. 201, 75 So.2d 333 (1954), aff'd 350 U.S. 91, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955), rehearing denied 350 U.S. 955, 76 S.Ct. 340, 100 L.Ed. 831 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 879, 78 S.Ct. 144, 2 L.Ed.2d 109 (1957).

The indictment sets forth that the crime was committed in the parish of Orleans. It contains the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the accused and the victim as required by Article 235 of the Code and declares that the offense is 'contrary to the form of Statute of the State of Louisiana in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the same.'

The State's reply to the bill of particulars, containing the sections of LSA-R.S. 14:42 under which the State was proceeding and the place and approximate time of the crime, is sufficient. It supplies the accused with adequate information to prepare his defense and has all the information to which appellant was entitled under the law. The other information requested, concerning the weapon used, the number of times the victim was ravished, the force or threats used, whether the victim was merely threatened or whether the weapon was actually used and the injuries received by the victim, was obviously an attempt to obtain knowledge of the evidence relied upon by the State to prove its case, which the law does not require the State to disclose. The refusal of the judge to require the State to further particularize was proper.

The State and Federal constitutional provisions relied upon in the motions to quash require that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This means that an indictment must be drawn in words of sufficient particularity to permit the accused a fair and reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense, Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); that is, the accusation should sufficiently inform the accused in order that he may defend himself properly, and it should give enough information to permit the trial judge to intelligently regulate the trial, and should be sufficient to form a record from which it can be clearly determined whether a subsequent proceeding is barred by the former adjudication. State v. Scheler, 243 La. 443, 144 So.2d 389 (1962); 32 Tul.L.Rev. 47, 52 (1957).

Realizing the need for a form of criminal pleading that would be simpler, and at the same time guarantee the accused his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the Louisiana Legislature in adopting a modern code of criminal procedure in 1928 authorized short form indictments to be used for certain well-defined crimes, such as murder, rape, theft, burglary robbery, etc. Art. 235, Code Crim.Proc.; 6 La.L.Rev. 78 (1944). This short form of indictment authorized by Article 235 has been uniformly upheld by this court as meeting the constitutional test that the accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. See State v. Eyer, 237 La. 45, 110 So.2d 521 (1959) (murder); State v. Michel, supra (aggravated rape); State v. Scheler, supra (negligent homicide); State v. Wright, 215 La. 529, 41 So.2d 76 (1949) (simple burglary); State v. Howard, 243 La. 971, 149 So.2d 409 (1963) (armed robbery); State v. Durbin, 235 La. 989, 106 So.2d 443 (1958) (simple robbery); State v. Roshto, 222 La. 185, 62 So.2d 268 (1952) (theft of animal: heifer). In State v. Clark, 242 La. 914, 140 So.2d 1 (1962), we approved the short form of indictment against a contention that it failed to set forth that the accused 'willfully, intentionally and feloniously' committed aggravated rape.

The meaning of the words 'aggravated rape' are so certain and have such a well-defined meaning that all persons charged in an indictment with that crime could have no doubt concerning the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Moreover, the parish where the crime was committed, the date of the crime and the names of the accused and the victim are given in order that there can be no doubt in the mind of the accused of the facts and circumstances of the crime with which he is charged. Thus, the constitutional requirements and the statutory requirements of Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure LSA-R.S. 15:227 requiring that the indictment state every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense are satisfied.

There is no merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 3.

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 10

Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was taken to the denial of the Motion to Set Aside the Jury Commission, General Jury Venire, Grand Jury Venire, Grand Jury and Petit Jury Venire. This motion alleged violations of rights guaranteed by the sixth and 14th amendments to the Federal Constitution by the discriminatory administration of the jury system and the exclusion of all but a token number of Negroes.

Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was taken to the denial of a Motion to Set Aside the Petit Jury. This motion is substantially the same as the one involved in Bill of Exceptions No. 4.

The theory of appellant's case as far as these two bills are concerned is that there is a lack of an impartial administration of the jury system in Orleans Parish. This is accomplished, it is contended, by exclusion of Negroes and the simultaneous inclusion of a token number of Negroes on the venires and on the grand and petit juries.

It is conceded that the issues presented by these bills are questions...