State v. Barnes

Decision Date07 March 1997
Docket NumberNo. 17717-0-II,17717-0-II
Citation932 P.2d 669,85 Wn.App. 638
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Bernard Gilbert "Pete" BARNES, Appellant.

Deborah Snyder Kelly, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., David Harold Bruneau, Clallam Co. Prosecuting Attorney, Port Angeles, for Respondent.

Angela Dawn Anderson, Jeffrey Steinborn, Steinborn & Associates, Seattle, for Appellant.

SEINFELD, Chief Judge.

Bernard Barnes appeals his conviction of leading organized crime, contending that the trial court should have applied principles of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel to bar the prosecution. Clallam County had earlier brought a civil forfeiture action against Barnes based upon the same criminal conduct. That action was dismissed with prejudice on Barnes's motion for summary judgment. Barnes's 13 assignments of error also include complaints of prosecutorial vindictiveness, erroneous evidentiary rulings, an inconsistent jury verdict, juror misconduct, and insufficient evidence. He also challenges a provision of his sentence that requires him to pay $500,000 to a County fund. We conclude that policy considerations preclude the application of collateral estoppel

under these facts. Finding no trial court error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

FACTS

During the relevant time period, Barnes lived in a house at 6200 Wye Road in Joyce, Washington, and owned a second residence on Lake Sutherland. He permitted Kim Smith, an acquaintance and an experienced cultivator of marijuana, to live at his Lake Sutherland home.

In 1987, Barnes hired Donald Zimmerman to build a second house on the Wye Road property near his residence. The new home, 6200-B Wye Road, contained a large unfinished basement that was not visible from the exterior. Upon completion of the house, Smith moved in.

About this same time, Barnes hired Jim Bennett to grade the lot and Smith hired Thomas Madle, an electrician, to create a power diversion at the residence. Bennett noticed several things about the house that aroused his suspicions. He saw numerous venting mechanisms in the foundation, dirt accumulations that disappeared without any evidence of landscaping, and complete coverings over the home's windows. Suspicious of illegal activity, Bennett shared his concerns with Zimmerman. Barnes later called Bennett to say that he was glad the matter was brought to his attention.

Zimmerman then told Bennett that he and Barnes had found marijuana plants in the house, that the side of the garage had been cut out with a chain saw in order to create access to the basement from the garage, that the staircase inside the house to the basement had been removed, and that the home had closed circuit TV. Zimmerman warned Bennett that they had his picture from the TV and that "if the law found out about it, they would kill [Bennett]." Zimmerman also said that he and Barnes had evicted Smith.

Shortly thereafter, Jeffrey Wentworth, another of Barnes's acquaintances who also was experienced at cultivating In July 1990, the police executed a search warrant at the Wentworth/Stansbery house. They discovered 255 live marijuana plants in the basement, 15 operational halide lights, several venting fans, two Sonizair Polar Neutralizer units for air purification, electrical transformers for the lights, a 200 amp power diversion, venting ducts through the foundation of the house, timers that turned the lights off and on, Thermax insulation on the basement ceiling, and mylar reflecting film on the walls. In a bedroom, police found an electronic scale and in the living room "buy notices." Outside, officers found a truck that belonged to Barnes and a boat trailer that contained additional marijuana plants and various items of equipment and supplies for cultivation.

                marijuana, moved into the 2600-B Wye Road house with his girl friend, Randi Stansbery.  Douglas Chute, another acquaintance, told authorities that he overheard Barnes and Smith discussing plans to grow marijuana in the 6200-B Wye Road house.  They said "if that worked, they were going to put them underground."   Chute testified at trial that Smith and Barnes had plans for four other similar houses and that individuals like Smith and Wentworth expected to share in the profits with Barnes in exchange for supplying the growing equipment, experience and labor
                

Police also found a repair order for Barnes's truck in Wentworth's name; receipts for building supplies sold to Wentworth from a local store and charged to Barnes's account; records of narcotics usage and income from sales traceable to Wentworth, Stansbery, and Smith; and phone books containing the phone numbers of Barnes, Chute, Madle, and Smith.

The officers used the evidence from this search as the basis to obtain a search warrant for Barnes's Wye Road residence. There, they seized over 13,000 documents relating to Barnes's financial transactions and his business dealings. Included was a lease for the 6200-B Wye Road house in Wentworth's name executed by Loretta Barnes Clallam County filed a civil action against Barnes, his wife, and two other defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Criminal Profiteering Act, RCW 9A.82, by possessing and conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to deliver, committing and conspiring to commit the theft of utilities, manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture marijuana, and leading organized crime. The County sought forfeiture of considerable property that it had seized; damages in the amount of the profits from the illegal activities, RCW 9A.82.100(4)(g); civil penalties of $250,000 from each defendant, RCW 9A.82.100(1)(d); and costs of prosecution, RCW 9A.82.100(4)(e). Finding a lack of evidence to support the allegations, the trial court granted Barnes's motion for summary judgment.

and a deed and promissory note evidencing the home's sale to Wentworth.

The State then filed a criminal information charging Barnes with leading organized crime. It included the crimes listed in the civil complaint as predicate acts establishing the required pattern of criminal profiteering. Barnes moved for dismissal, arguing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the criminal prosecution. The court denied his motion, finding that the decision in the civil case was not a final judgment on the merits and that the application of the doctrine created an injustice.

The jury retired to begin its deliberations on a Friday. After a day of deliberating, the jury sent the court a note that stated:

We cannot reach a unanimous agreement on any of the 8 predicate acts with no hope of resolution (at least 3 dissenting votes on each one). Do we have to be unanimous on a verdict of not guilty in order to find Barnes not guilty on each predicate?

The trial court rejected Barnes's proposed instruction and instead told the jury to reread the instructions and continue deliberating.

On Monday afternoon the jury sent the following note to the court:

We reviewed the instructions--thoroughly, per your request and understand them clearly. We have reviewed all of the evidence numerous times in great detail and remain unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Same vote as we had Friday with no way to resolve it. What do we do apart from doing "violence" to the dessenters [sic] judgments?

The trial judge declared a mistrial based on the jury's declared inability to reach a verdict.

Following a second trial, the jury found Barnes guilty of leading organized crime. It found that he led Smith, Wentworth, and Stansbery, and that he had committed the following three predicate acts: conspiracy to commit theft from the power company; conspiracy to manufacture marijuana; and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.

The trial court sentenced Barnes to serve a mid-range sentence of 60 months. It also ordered him to make full restitution to the power company for the stolen electrical power and to pay $500,000, gained as a result of his illegal activities, to the Clallam County Racketeering Fund.

LEADING ORGANIZED CRIME

To convict a defendant of leading organized crime, the State must prove that the defendant "[i]ntentionally organiz[ed], manag[ed], direct[ed], supervis[ed], or financ[ed] any three or more persons with the intent to engage in a pattern of criminal profiteering activity." RCW 9A.82.060(1)(a). The statute defines pattern of criminal profiteering activity as

engaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering.... In order to constitute a pattern, the three acts must have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims, or methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the same enterprise, and must not be isolated events.

RCW 9A.82.010(15). Enumerated criminal profiteering acts include delivery or manufacture of controlled substances or possession with intent to deliver or manufacture controlled substances and theft. RCW 9A.82.010(14)(e), (n).

I DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Barnes claims that the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions prevent a criminal prosecution for the same acts prosecuted under a civil action. But in a recent case, the United States Supreme Court held that generally civil forfeiture is remedial, not punitive, for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Thus, the State did not violate Barnes's federal constitutional rights by pursuing the criminal action after the dismissal of the civil action. United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, ---- - -----, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2148-49, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). We have interpreted the state constitution similarly. Tellevik v. 6717 100th Street S.W., 83 Wash.App. 366, 370-71, 921 P.2d 1088 (1996). Thus, this claim lacks merit.

II COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Barnes argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the criminal action on the basis...

To continue reading

Request your trial
104 cases
  • State v. Carlson, No. 30419-8-II (WA 5/10/2006)
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 10 de maio de 2006
    ...to show a formal agreement; a conspiracy may be proven by the acts, declarations, and conduct of the conspirators. State v. Barnes, 85 Wn. App. 638, 664, 932 P.2d 669, review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1021 (1997). And circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove a conspiracy. Barnes, 85 Wn. A......
  • State v. Israel
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 9 de setembro de 2002
    ...Smith, 65 Wash. App. 468, 471, 828 P.2d 654 (1992), and the conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Barnes, 85 Wash.App. 638, 664, 932 P.2d 669 (1997); State v. Brown, 45 Wash.App. 571, 579, 726 P.2d 60 (1986). Further, once a conspiracy has been established, "evidence......
  • State v. Oeung
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 27 de setembro de 2016
    ..."sufficient to permit a logical and reasonable deduction that a conspiracy existed" and that Oeung was involved in the conspiracy. Barnes, 85 Wn.App. at 664-65. Thus, given Remegio's testimony and the evidence regarding Oeung's relationship with her alleged co-conspirators, the State made a......
  • State v. Whitaker
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 17 de abril de 2006
    ...working together understandingly with a single design for the accomplishment of a common purpose, will suffice. State v. Barnes, 85 Wash.App. 638, 664, 932 P.2d 669 (1997). ¶ 58 Whitaker moved in limine to exclude coconspirator hearsay. He argued that the State would be unable to establish ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT