State v. Barnes, No. 24578.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
• Writing for the Court: SILAK, Justice.
• Citation: 987 P.2d 290,133 Idaho 378
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Carolyn BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 24578.
• Decision Date: 24 August 1999

987 P.2d 290
133 Idaho 378

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Carolyn BARNES, Defendant-Appellant

No. 24578.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Pocatello, May 1999 Term.

August 24, 1999.

987 P.2d 291

Tammie D. Whyte, Idaho Falls, for appellant

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

SILAK, Justice.

This is an appeal from the district court's appellate decision affirming the magistrate's judgment convicting appellant Carolyn Barnes (Barnes) of misdemeanor D.U.I. That judgment was entered upon Barnes' conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to challenge the magistrate's denial of her motion to dismiss, which was based on the fact that Barnes was operating a snowmobile when she was issued the citation. We affirm the magistrate's judgment of conviction.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts which are as follows:

1. That on/or about February 16, 1997, the defendant, Carolyn Barnes, was issued a citation for a violation of I.C. § 18-8004, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, by Officer Gerry Wykoff, of the Fremont County Sheriff's Office.

2. The incident occurred in Fremont County, Idaho, near Island Park Lodge.

3. That on/or about February 16, 1997, Officer Wykoff responded to the Island Park Lodge in reference to fighting that had been going on earlier in the evening.

4. Officer Wykoff then observed Carolyn Barnes talking to Jim Funkhouser, Island Park Lodge Owner.

5. Mr. Funkhouser asked Officer Wykoff if he would take the defendant, Carolyn Barnes, to her home because she was in no condition to drive.

6. Officer Wykoff indicated to Mr. Funkhouser that he would take the defendant to her home.

7. Although the defendant does not recall being addressed at this time by the Officer, the Officer maintains that she refused a ride and got on her snowmobile and drove down Big Springs Road.

8. Big Springs Road is a public roadway, which is plowed and maintained by Fremont County.

9. Officer Wykoff then followed the defendant, Carolyn Barnes, for approximately 6/10 of one mile.

10. The defendant then stopped and got off her snowmobile.

11. Officer Wykoff asked her where she was going.

12. The defendant indicated that she was going to park her snowmobile at John Madson's house, approximately 3/10 of one mile from where she was stopped and the Officer indicated that it was "right there" and pointed in the direction of the entrance to the driveway.

13. Officer Wykoff also stated that he would give the snowmobile key to John Madson.

14. The defendant then got back on her snowmobile to return to John Madson's driveway and missed the entrance. She

987 P.2d 292

then drove back to Island Park Lodge, a distance of approximately 6/10 of one mile.

15. Officer Wykoff followed the defendant to Island Park Lodge where she was stopped and waiting for him.

16. After a discussion, the Defendant refused to leave her snowmobile at that location and she was arrested for D.U.I.

17. The defendant was booked into the Fremont County Jail on February 16, 1997.

18. No field sobriety tests were performed on the defendant by the Officer.

19. Officer Ralph Davis administered an Intoxilyzer test to the defendant.

20. The results of the Intoxilyzer test of the defendant reflected a BAC of .15/.17.

B. Procedural Background

On March 28, 1997, Barnes filed a motion to dismiss the D.U.I. charge on the basis that the charge was improperly brought under I.C. § 18-8004. Barnes argued that she could not be charged with violating the misdemeanor D.U.I. statute because operating a snowmobile while intoxicated is an infraction under a different statute, I.C. § 67-7110. A hearing on the motion was held before a magistrate on April 18, 1997, after which the court denied the motion.

On June 13, 1997, Barnes moved to suppress the BAC results, although the record does not reflect any ruling by the magistrate on this motion.

On August 27, 1997, the parties entered into the Stipulation of Facts and Conditional Guilty Plea, whereby Barnes pled guilty to the D.U.I. charge, but reserved the right to appeal the magistrate's adverse rulings. Barnes then appealed to the district court.

After oral argument, the district court entered its Decision and Order Affirming Magistrate in February 1998. Barnes thereafter appealed to this Court. On March 24, 1998, Barnes was sentenced by the magistrate to a driver's license suspension of 180 days, a $500 fine, and 90 days in jail (80 suspended, 8 at the discretion of the court and 2 to be served), and a two year probation. The magistrate granted Barnes' request for a stay of execution of the sentence pending this appeal.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether a snowmobile is a motor vehicle for purposes of the application of I.C. § 18-8004.

2. Whether it was proper for the State to charge Barnes under I.C. § 18-8004, for a misdemeanor violation, even though I.C. § 67-7110 makes it an infraction to operate a snowmobile under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

3. Whether the BAC test results should have been suppressed.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When this Court reviews a case appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's decision, it makes an independent appellate review of the magistrate's decision, after giving due regard to the district court's ruling. See Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d 603, 605 (1996); Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993). The Court will uphold the magistrate's findings of fact on appeal from a district court's appellate review if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Schevers, 129 Idaho at 575, 930 P.2d at 605; Ausman, 124 Idaho at 841, 864 P.2d at 1128. However, the construction and interpretation of a statute present questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997); Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hosp., 130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 (1997). Statutes relating to the same subject matter, although in apparent conflict, are to be construed in harmony, if reasonably possible. See Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 736, 874 P.2d 545, 547 (1994); State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 540, 861 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct.App.1993).

987 P.2d 293

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. A Snowmobile Is A Motor Vehicle Pursuant To I.C. § 18-8004.

Barnes first argues that a snowmobile should not be considered a "motor vehicle" for purposes of applying I.C. § 18-8004 because snowmobiles are treated differently than motor vehicles in several ways. By way of example, Barnes states that an operator of a snowmobile is not required to have a driver's license to operate the machine, unless the snowmobile is being operated on a public roadway or highway; that there is no age requirement for operating a snowmobile; and that liability insurance is not required in order to operate a snowmobile. We find Barnes' argument to be without merit.

At the time of Barnes' arrest in February 1997, Idaho Code section 18-8004(1)(a) provided:

It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.10, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.

I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis added).

Idaho Code section 49-123(2)(g) defines "motor vehicle" as follows:

Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated upon

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