State v. Baroudi
| Decision Date | 13 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-185,92-185 |
| Citation | 623 A.2d 750,137 N.H. 62 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Adam BAROUDI. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Brian R. Graf, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.
Timothy M. Landry, Asst. Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The defendant, Adam Baroudi, was convicted of possession of marijuana. He appeals the Superior Court's (O'Neil, J.) denial of his motion to suppress the controlled drug, which two police officers discovered while searching a closed knapsack in the trunk of his car. Although Baroudi did not explicitly give the officers permission to search the knapsack, the superior court found that Baroudi authorized the officers to search the trunk and that the scope of this search extended to the knapsack. The sole issue before us is whether the superior court properly employed an objective standard in making its ruling, basing its findings on the totality of the circumstances as reasonably construed by the police officers, or whether the court should have instead grounded its decision on a determination of Baroudi's actual state of mind at the time of the search. For the reasons that follow, we approve the objective standard used by the superior court and affirm.
At trial, the police officers testified to the following relevant facts. They stopped Baroudi's car after witnessing Baroudi engage in what they suspected was a drug transaction. They then requested his permission to search the car's passenger compartment making it clear they wished to search for drugs and informing him he could stop the search at any time. Baroudi consented, and they proceeded, examining among other things the contents of the glove compartment, although they neither sought nor received specific authorization to search this particular area. They found no drugs. The officers then asked Baroudi if they could search his trunk. He assented. Inside the trunk, the officers found a closed knapsack, and again without seeking or receiving specific authorization, they opened the zipped compartments of the knapsack and discovered the marijuana.
Baroudi denies giving permission to search any area of his car or anything in it, but concedes that the trial record supports the superior court's finding that the search proceeded as outlined above. He also concedes that if we approve the objective test used by the superior court, instead of a test based on a determination of his actual intent, his appeal fails. The State, for its part, concedes that the officers' search of Baroudi's knapsack cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny unless it was consensual. The only issue on appeal is therefore whether the superior court applied the proper test in determining that the scope of Baroudi's consent to search the trunk of his car extended to his knapsack. His argument, and our decision, is grounded in part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which states in part that "[e]very subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches." We base our decision upon our own case law, using federal cases only for guidance. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 233, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983).
Although Baroudi treats this case as one of first impression, there is ample support in our case law for the superior court's use of a test based on the objectively reasonable perceptions of police officers seeking a defendant's consent to search an area under the defendant's control. We declared in State v. Pinder that "[t]he question of the scope of consent may be stated as 'how far the defendant intended the consent to extend or how the police reasonably construed his consent.' " State v. Pinder, 126 N.H. 220, 224, 489 A.2d 653, 656 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 625 (1978)). Our use of the disjunctive "or" unequivocally allows a court to base a determination of a defendant's consent on a police officer's objectively reasonable impressions. The treatise relied on in Pinder, moreover, explicitly states that the reasonableness of a search "is to be assessed in terms of the circumstances as they reasonably appear to the police at the time of the search." 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.1(b), at 159 n. 44 (2d ed. 1987) (); cf. State v. Jones, 131 N.H. 726, 728, 560 A.2d 1159, 1160 (1989) (). This treatise concludes that, ordinarily, "a general consent permits the opening of closed but unlocked containers found in the place as to which consent was given[,] ... particularly if the police have indicated they are searching for a small object which might be concealed in such a container." 3 W. LaFave, supra § 8.1(c), at 161.
In addition, our decisions in the confession and custody contexts...
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Gonzalez v. University System of New Hampshire, No. 451217 (CT 1/28/2005)
...understanding of an exculpatory agreement or that a reasonable person would have done so is sufficient. See State v. Baroudi, 137 N.H. 62, 64-65, 623 A.2d 750 (1993). However, this court concludes that the agreement fails the exacting requirement of Barnes that, strictly construed, "the con......
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State v. Steimel
...an objective test focused upon how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation. State v. Baroudi, 137 N.H. 62, 65, 623 A.2d 750 (1993). Here, Booth asked the defendant's permission to speak to him and informed the defendant that he did not have to speak......
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State v. Hammell
...it was objectively reasonable for the officers conducting the search to believe that Mathieu had consented to it. State v. Baroudi , 137 N.H. 62, 66, 623 A.2d 750 (1993). We will disturb the trial court's finding only if it is not supported by the record. See State v. McGann , 124 N.H. 101,......
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State v. Hammell
...it was objectively reasonable for the officers conducting the search to believe that Mathieu had consented to it. State v. Baroudi, 137 N.H. 62, 66, 623 A.2d 750 (1993). We will disturb the trial court's finding only if it is not supported by the record. See State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 1......