State v. Barrett

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WALKER, J.
• Citation: State v. Barrett, 132 N.C. 1005, 43 S.E. 832 (N.C. 1903)
• Decision Date: 31 March 1903
• Parties: STATE v. BARRETT.

43 S.E. 832

132 N.C. 1005

STATE v. BARRETT.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 31, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court, Moore County; Robinson, Judge.

Walter Barrett was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed.

Where the court charged that if, when the fatal shot was fired defendant reasonably believed that deceased was about to assail him with a gun, or that he was in imminent danger of his life, the jury should acquit, and in another part of the charge stated that, before the prisoner could be acquitted on the ground of self-defense, it was incumbent on him to show that it was "necessary" that he should shoot deceased, to protect his life or save himself from serious bodily harm, such instructions were so conflicting as to constitute prejudicial error.

H. F Seawell, for appellant.

Wm. B Jones and The Attorney General, for the State.

WALKER J.

The prisoner was indicted in the court below for the murder of Essex Williams, and was convicted of murder in the first degree. Several exceptions were taken by him to the rulings of the court during the trial and to the charge, but we deem it necessary to consider only one of them at length; and, in order to show the grounds of this exception and the reason for our decision, it will be sufficient to state that there was evidence introduced on the part of the state tending to show a case of murder in the first degree, and on the part of the defendant there was evidence tending either to reduce the grade of the homicide to manslaughter, or to show that the defendant killed the deceased in self-defense.

At the request of the defendant the court charged the jury as follows: "(1) If the jury shall find from the evidence that after the fight in Mary Jane Williams' room the prisoner and his wife went into their room, and while in there they heard, or thought they heard, the deceased and his wife go out at the window, and then the prisoner started through the room to the back room for their effects preparatory to removing from the premises, and, when the prisoners were in the room of the deceased, the deceased suddenly made an assault on the prisoner Walter Barrett with a gun, and the prisoner reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of his life, he had the right to shoot to save himself; and, if he shot and killed the deceased under these circumstances, he would be guilty of no crime, and the jury should say, for their verdict, 'Not guilty.' (2) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the prisoner Walter Barrett, after he had been ejected from the room, saw the wife of the deceased hand a gun to the deceased, and the prisoner reasonably believed that the deceased was going to assault him with the gun, the prisoner had the right to arm himself with a pistol for his own protection." After giving these instructions, among others requested by the prisoner, but not material to be mentioned, the court, in its general charge, instructed the jury that "the prisoner having admitted that he shot the deceased, if the state had satisfied them from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the shots fired by the prisoner caused the death of the deceased, the law presumes malice from the mere use of a deadly weapon, and denominates the offense murder in the second degree, and casts the burden on the prisoner of satisfying the jury by the stronger proof of such facts and circumstances as will disprove the presumption of malice, and reduce the grade of the offense from murder in the second degree to manslaughter, which is the unlawful and felonious killing, without malice, either express or implied, or to show by the greater proof such facts and circumstances as will justify the killing on the plea of self-defense; that is, that it was necessary for the prisoner to shoot, in order to protect his life or save himself from serious bodily harm." To these instructions the prisoner excepted, and we are of the opinion that in one respect his exception is well taken.

It will be observed that, in the two instructions given by the court at the prisoner's request, the jury were told that it was quite sufficient to acquit the prisoner if they should find that at the time of the homicide, or when the fatal shot was fired, he reasonably believed or apprehended that the deceased was about to assail him with a gun, or that he was in imminent danger of his life; and yet, when the court gave that part of its charge relating to self-defense, the jury were instructed that, before the prisoner could claim an acquittal upon the ground that he did kill the deceased in self-defense, it was incumbent upon him to show that it was necessary that he should shoot the deceased, in order to protect his life or to save himself from serious bodily harm.

In some of the early cases expressions may be found which would seem to indicate that a case of self-defense is not made out unless the defendant can satisfy the jury that he killed the deceased from necessity, but we think the most humane doctrine, and the one which commends itself to us as being more in accordance with the enlightened principles of the law, is to be found in the more recent decisions of this court. It is better to hold, as we believe, that the defendant's conduct must be judged by the facts and circumstances as they appeared to him at the time he committed the act; and it should be ascertained by the jury under the evidence, and proper instructions of the court, whether he had a reasonable apprehension that he was about to lose his life or to receive enormous bodily harm. The reasonableness of his apprehension must always be for the jury, and not the defendant, to pass upon, but the jury must form their conclusion from the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time he committed the alleged criminal act. If his adversary does anything which is calculated to excite in his mind, while in the exercise of ordinary firmness, a reasonable apprehension that he is about to assail him and to take his life or to inflict great bodily harm, it would seem that the law should permit him to act in obedience to the natural impulse of self-preservation, and to defend himself against what he supposes to be a threatened attack, even though it may turn out afterwards that he was mistaken, provided, always, as we have said, the jury find that his apprehension was a reasonable one, and that he acted with ordinary firmness. We think that the foregoing principle has been clearly stated and adopted by this court in several cases. In State v. Scott, 26 N.C. 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148, this court says: "In consultation, it seemed to us at one time that the case might have been left to the jury favorably to the prisoner on the principle of Lovett's Case, Cro. Car. 538 (1 Hale, P. C. 474), which is, if the prisoner had reasonable grounds for believing that the deceased intended to kill him, and under that belief slew him, it would be excusable, or, at most, manslaughter, though in truth the...