State v. Barry

Decision Date14 January 1964
Docket NumberNo. 51108,51108
Citation255 Iowa 1329,125 N.W.2d 833
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert BARRY, d/b/a Barry Motor Company, Danbury, Iowa, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

James R. Hamilton, Edson & Hamilton, Storm Lake, for appellant.

Evan Hultman, Atty. Gen., George J. Knoke, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. LARSON, Justice.

Defendant Robert Barry, an active partner in Barry Motor Company of Danbury, Iowa, was convicted of violating the provisions of section 321.26, Code of Iowa, 1958, I.C.A., as amended. He relies principally upon two propositions for reversal. Both involve a construction of section 321.26.

Appellant first contends the state failed to sustain its burden to prove defendant guilty of the crime charged, beyond reasonable doubt, and that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. The contention is without merit. From the stipulated evidence it appears, after Robert Barry gave instructions to his employees that a certain 1960 Ford Fairlane 500 automobile then on his used car lot was not to be sold, and he departed on a trip to Puerto Rico, an employee William Barry did on September 13, 1961, sell that automobile to David Blake and permitted Blake to drive the car for over two months with pasteboard plates, although Blake at the time of the sale made no application for registration and certificate of title as required by section 321.26 of the Code.

Section 321.26 as amended by the 59th General Assembly effective July 4, 1961, provides: 'No manufacturer or dealer shall permit the use of such card (pasteboard card described in section 321.25) unless an application for a registration and certificate of title has been made, as herein provided, and receipt issued to the user of the card by such manufacturer or dealer showing the fee paid by the person making the application, the county treasurer, or proper county or state official if purchaser is from a foreign state, to whom fee was mailed or delivered and the date of mailing or delivery of fee.'

The statute, of course, is to be construed strictly and all doubts are resolved in favor of the accused. Appellant's first proposition is that the legislative intent to eliminate guilty knowledge is not clearly apparent. State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 57 N.W.2d 553; State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 1331, 50 N.W.2d 9. We cannot agree.

While the statute uses the words 'No * * * dealer shall permit the use', when read with the balance thereof, we think the legislative meaning is quite clear. It amounts to an absolute prohibition against the issuance of such plates unless the buyer at the same time makes application for a registration and certificate of title. It imposes a duty upon the dealer to see that this requirement is not neglected. It falls within the class of police offenses where the act is prohibited for the welfare of the state. It is in the nature of a prohibition such as is usually found in statutes that forbid a person to permit ice to accumulate before his front door on a city street. As is pointed out in Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Edition, Vol. 1, § 29, page 45, in such instances it is of no consequence whether the offender was cognizant of the violation of the law. The legislature may adopt such a method as the best way of preventing deleterious results to the public. Prompt transfers and authentic ownership records are deemed necessary. This is what the legislature required by enacting this prohibition in the law. See 3 Drake Law Review 1, 3, an article by Professor Hudson.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in prohibitive statutes covering misdemeanors, as this one is, where no provision is made as to the intention, and the word 'knowingly' or other apt words are not employed, to indicate that knowledge is the essential element of the crime, intention is not an element of the crime. This is especially so where the act is forbidden by a statute in aid of the police power of the state. State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 1320, 210 N.W. 137, 49 A.L.R. 1270, and citations.

That section 321.26 forbids the dealer execution and issuance of pasteboard plates obtained from the state, without the buyer...

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4 cases
  • State v. Ramos
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1967
    ...knowledge was not made an element of the crime. State v. Dunn, supra. See State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871, 134 N.W.2d 922; State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1329, 125 N.W.2d 333; State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 57 N.W.2d 553. In other cases we have required proof of intent or guilty knowledge even thou......
  • Iowa City v. Nolan
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1976
    ...and frequently does, impose a vicarious 'criminal' liability for the acts of another. We recognized such liability in State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1329, 125 N.W.2d 833, affirming the conviction of a partner in a car sales agency whose employee, without defendant's knowledge, permitted a custome......
  • Sanborn v. Maryland Cas. Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1964
    ... ...         I. Our rules of procedure do not state whether an action for declaratory relief or judgment should be in the law or equity forum of the district court but our rule is now well established ... ...
  • Sullivan v. Iowa Departmental Hearing Bd. of Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Dept., 2-67417
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 1982
    ...rather than "violate." Furthermore, a person's knowledge of the law is generally presumed, Iowa Code § 701.6; State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1329, 1333, 125 N.W.2d 833, 835 (1964); State v. Sonderleiter, 251 Iowa 106, 109, 99 N.W.2d 393, 395 (1959), particularly when the activity challenged is re......

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