State v. Bass

• Decision Date: 08 March 1983
• Citation: 189 N.J.Super. 445,460 A.2d 214
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Alan BASS and Renee Nicely, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 445

189 N.J.Super. 445

460 A.2d 214

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Alan BASS and Renee Nicely, Defendants.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Essex County.

Decided March 8, 1983.

On Further Death Penalty Challenges

March 14, 1983.

E. Carl Broege, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for defendant Renee Nicely (Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Defender, attorney).

Michele Adubato, Nutley, for defendant Alan Bass (David Glazer, Caldwell, attorney).

Hilary L. Brunell, Asst. Prosecutor, for plaintiff (George L. Schneider, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney).

STERN, J.S.C.

Defendants moved to dismiss this indictment, charging a capital offense, by asserting that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 is unconstitutional. They also attack the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) which the State claims to be the aggravating factor justifying imposition of the death penalty in this case. Notice that the State would endeavor to prove that factor was given at the arraignment. See R. 3:13-4. As a result the court granted defendants' request for a bill of particulars in preparation for trial and in anticipation of a challenge to the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c). ¹ However, the court has reserved decision as to whether the sufficiency of the State's proofs or constitutionality of the aggravating factor, as applied, can be determined before trial or even before the penalty phase which follows a guilty plea or verdict. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(1); footnote 5, infra.

At argument on the motions, defendants tacitly agreed that an unconstitutional provision relating to the penalty or aggravating factor involved in this case could undoubtedly be severed, see State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 67, 286 A.2d 55 (1972); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1(h). The State conceded because of procedures unique to the trial of a death penalty case, that defendants have standing to mount a pretrial facial constitutional attack upon the aggravating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c), which was noticed in this case. This opinion concerns only the constitutionality of the aggravating factor. ²

To be successful on this motion, based on federal grounds, defendants must convince this court that the plurality in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), was in error when it said that "In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909, [ (1976),] the Court held that this statutory aggravating circumstance (§ (b)(7)) is not unconstitutional on its face." 446 U.S., at 422, 100 S.Ct., at 1762 (emphasis added). See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S., at 199-204, 96 S.Ct., at 2937-2939 (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens), and concurring opinions.

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) is substantially identical to Ga.Code § 27-2534.1(b)(7) considered in Gregg and Godfrey. The only difference is that our aggravating factor applies only upon convictions for a purposeful or knowing murder (by "any person ... who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value ..." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)), whereas the Georgia factor applies to certain crimes beyond murder.

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) provides as an aggravating factor permitting death that "The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim". In Gregg, supra, the lead opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens noted:

"It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction." 428 U.S., at 201, 96 S.Ct., at 2938.

Four years later, in Godfrey, the issue was whether the Georgia Supreme Court "had adopted such a broad and vague construction of the § (b)(7) aggravating circumstance as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ..." 446 U.S., at 423, 100 S.Ct., at 1762. In holding that the Georgia Supreme Court did not apply a constitutional construction of the aggravating factor, 446 U.S., at 432, 100 S.Ct., at 1766, the plurality made clear that the statute could have been interpreted to permit non-arbitrary application "based on reason rather than caprice or emotion", 446 U.S., at 433, 100 S.Ct., at 1767. In Godfrey, the Georgia Supreme Court did not construe or limit section (b)(7) as it had in prior cases. But Godfrey is more than a disproportionality opinion. The United States Supreme Court addressed more than arbitrariness. The court seemingly approved section (b)(7) as previously construed by the state courts which subsequently failed to review Godfrey by the same standard. ³ Thus, reading Gregg and Godfrey together leads to the conclusion that, properly construed and applied, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c), like section (b)(7) of the Georgia Code, is constitutional. See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).

Godfrey therefore makes clear that the three prong test, previously adopted in Georgia under section (b)(7), is constitutional. The test requires (1) evidence of torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; (2) depravity of mind is the mental state which leads to torture or aggravated battery before the victim is killed, and (3) "torture and aggravated battery must be construed together, imposing a requirement for evidence that the victim was seriously physically abused prior to death." See 446 U.S., at 431, 100 S.Ct., at 1766; "Note, Criminal Procedure: Godfrey v. Georgia and the 'Especially Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel Murder' ", 34 Okla.Law Rev. 337, 341 (1981). So construed, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(4)(c) is facially constitutional. Defendants insist that a "vague" death penalty statute cannot be saved by judicial construction. Compare Zant v. Stephens, supra; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 350, 266 A.2d 579 (1970); State v. De Santis 65 N.J. 462, 473, 323 A.2d 489 (1974). However, the New Jersey Legislature was clearly aware of the issues of concern to the United States Supreme Court when chapter 111 of the Laws of 1982 was adopted. In adopting the very language of Georgia (b)(7), it is beyond argument that the New Jersey Legislature was also adopting the interpretation of that language already accepted by the United States Supreme Court. Cf, GATX Terminals Corp. v. N.J. Dept. Environmental Protection, 86 N.J. 46, 53, 429 A.2d 355 (1981); In Re Lichtenstein's Estate, 52 N.J. 553, 587, 247 A.2d 320 (1968); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Weehawken, 45 N.J. 336, 343, 212 A.2d 364 (1965). It must be so construed in this case.

Defendants also claim that even if Godfrey upheld Georgia (b)(7) on Eighth Amendment grounds, it did not address Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns based on "overbreadth" or "vagueness". ⁴ They contend that the general public is not given adequate "notice" of the aggravating factor. The factor, of course, is not an element of the offense. It applies only upon a verdict or guilty plea to the underlying knowing or purposeful murder. ⁵ Independently, assuming that defendants can assert a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, I find that the aggravating factor provides notice to a reasonably intelligent person and that defendants' vagueness challenge must fail. See, Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); State v. Profaci 56 N.J. 346, 349, 266 A.2d 579 (1970); Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 186 N.J.Super. 449, 453 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1982). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2961, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 984 (1978).

The motion is denied.

On Further Death Penalty Challenges

STERN, J.S.C.

Defendants move to dismiss this indictment, asserting that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 is for various reasons unconstitutional under the State and Federal Constitution. At oral argument defendants conceded that their attack, if successful, required only a determination that the death penalty or penalty proceeding was unconstitutional and that the indictment need not be dismissed. See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 67, 286 A.2d 55 (1972) cert. den. 408 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 2849, 33 L.Ed.2d 766 (1972); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1(h).

This opinion disposes of the facial challenges to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and the death penalty. However, the court intends to supplement, in an oral opinion, the points and reasons outlined herein.

An analysis of the United States Supreme Court opinions treating the death penalty reveals the following:

1. Under federal law the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).

2. The death penalty cannot be mandatorily imposed following conviction for murder. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976) ( Roberts I); Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976).

3. Any mitigating factor must be considered. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. , 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977) (Roberts II); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, supra.

4. Aggravating factors must be specified in the statute. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Jurek v. Texas, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).

5. A court cannot prevent a finding of a lesser included offense where it is factually justified. See Hopper v. Evans, 454 U.S. 1136, [102 S.Ct....