State v. Bassett

Decision Date28 April 1964
Citation200 A.2d 473,151 Conn. 547
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Harold BASSETT. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Thomas B. Coughlin, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

John F. McGowan, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before KING, C. J., and MURPHY, SHEA, ALCORN and COMLEY, JJ.

COMLEY, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Harold Bassett, was found guilty by a jury on three counts, which alleged violations of General Statutes § 53-40, the blackmail statute, which is printed in the footnote. 1 From the evidence the jury could find that during October, 1961, the defendant entered certain retail establishments in the Danbury area and maliciously threatened to accuse the proprietors of the crime of violating the Sunday closing laws; General Statutes § 53-300; with the intent to extort money from them.

The defendant contends that he could not be convicted of the crime charged because his acts did not constitute a malicious threat within the meaning of § 53-40. In support of his argument, he quotes language in his brief which purports to be § 1296 of a 1908 revision, and he cites cases to the court in support of his interpretation of that language. There is, of course, no revision of 1908.

The language quoted by the defendant is, however, substantially similar to the language of § 1296 of the 1902 Revision, and the cases discussed by the defendant relate to that section, which is entitled 'Intimidation; boycotting.' Section 1296 was first enacted as part of chapter 92 of the Public Acts of 1878, entitled 'An Act for the Protection of Employees and Employers,' and this provision, which had been substantially retained as § 6358 of the 1918 Revision and § 6208 of the 1930 Revision, was repealed in 1939 by § 1442e of the 1939 Cumulative Supplement. The statute referred to by the defendant was thus wholly distinct in purpose and different in form from the blackmail statute. The blackmail statute was first enacted as chapter 47 of the Public Acts of 1887 in substantially the same form as it exists today in General Statutes § 53-40. The defendant's interpretation of the language of § 1296 of the 1902 Revision, in terms of the cases relating to that statute, has no relationship to the instant case, which involves the charge of blackmail only. So far as those cases discuss and define the word 'threaten,' they are consistent with the state's claim that the defendant's conduct in this case could be so characterized. See State v. McGee, 80 Conn. 614, 616, 69 A. 1059; March v. Bricklayers & Plasterers Union, 79 Conn. 7, 13, 63 A. 291, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 1198.

In the case of each of the three counts on which the defendant was convicted, the evidence showed that he entered a retail establishment and requested a sum of money from the proprietor for membership in an organization which he claimed was located in Milford and was attempting to abolish the 'blue laws.' Each of the three proprietors was shown a letter, dated September 27, 1961, which was on stationery of the Circuit Court for the third circuit in Danbury and was signed by the prosecuting attorney. This letter was addressed to persons not involved in the present case and it warned them that, unless they desisted from selling merchandise on Sunday, they would be prosecuted. The first proprietor refused to pay the $200 demanded by the defendant and claimed that he was not violating any blue law. Thereafter the defendant lodged a complaint against him in the Circuit Court for violating the blue laws. The defendant told the second proprietor that he would file a complaint against him unless he paid $50 to join the Milford organization. On one Sunday, the defendant purchased a small amount of meat at the store, held up the bag in which it had been placed and remarked: 'See what I purchased.' This proprietor paid $25 to the defendant, and no complaint was lodged against him. The defendant told the third proprietor: 'I can keep you open or close you up on a Sunday.' The defendant demanded $50 for membership in the Milford organization and declared: 'You are either with me or against me. If you don't pay $50, you will feel the...

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28 cases
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 1983
    ...inconsequential that to admit it would distract attention which should be concentrated on vital issues of the case. State v. Bassett, 151 Conn. 547, 551, 200 A.2d 473 [1964].' State v. Mahmood, 158 Conn. 536, 540, 265 A.2d 83 [1969]." State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 589-90, 325 A.2d 199, ......
  • State v. Moynahan
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 5 Abril 1973
    ...and inconsequential that to admit it would district attention which should be concentrated on vital issues of the case. State v. Bassett, 151 Conn. 547, 551, 200 A.2d 473.' State v. Mahmood, 158 Conn. 536, 540, 265 A.2d 83, At the close of the direct testimony of Miller and of Vernale the d......
  • State v. Mastropetre
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 1 Agosto 1978
    ...attention from the real issue should be excluded; State v. Mahmood, 158 Conn. 536, 540, 265 A.2d 83 (1969); State v. Bassett, 151 Conn. 547, 551, 200 A.2d 473 (1964); as should evidence which would be of greater prejudicial effect than probative value. See State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, ......
  • State v. Lewisohn
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • 8 Noviembre 1977
    ...would have materially beclouded the issue in the case and for that reason was properly excluded from the evidence. See State v. Bassett, 1964, 151 Conn. 547, 200 A.2d 473, where the alleged selective enforcement of the Sunday closing laws was ruled of such slight and inconsequential relevan......
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