State v. Bastedo

Decision Date17 October 1961
Docket NumberNo. 50283,50283
Citation253 Iowa 103,111 N.W.2d 255
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Edward E. BASTEDO, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Paul A. Mahr, Sioux City, for appellant.

Evan Hultman, Atty. Gen., John H. Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Edward F. Samore, County Atty. for Woodbury County, Sioux City, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

Pursuant to a hearing on his 'application' for arrest of judgment (Chapter 788, Code 1958, I.C.A.), the trial court found appellant's contentions were without merit, denied the application, and remanded him to the custody of the prison warden. In this appeal the defendant Edward E. Bastedo contends the trial court erred in failing to find under the testimony that his plea of guilty was induced by coercion, fraud, undue influence, and fear, and that the circumstances leading up to the plea compel the conclusion that his plea was entered as a result of undue influence and coercion, was not voluntary, and constituted a denial of due process guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Upon a careful review of the proceedings as set forth in the record, we find no error and must affirm the judgment of the district court.

It appears from the record that the defendant was arrested August 28, 1959, on a charge of rape. He was indicted on that charge November 10, 1959, arraigned on November 13, 1959, and, through his court-appointed attorney, entered a plea of 'Not Guilty'. Subsequent to a change of attorneys (three times), trial was commenced on May 16, 1960. At the close of the state's evidence on May 19, 1960, defendant pleaded guilty to the included offense of assault with intent to commit rape. The plea was accepted by the trial judge, who sentenced the defendant to the men's penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, for a term of fifteen years. No appeal bond was filed, and defendant was then committed. On August 26, 1960, during the same term of court the defendant, acting pro se, filed a request for review entitled 'Application for Arrest of Judgment' in which he asked that the judgment be set aside, for the reason that it was based upon a plea of guilty obtained in violation of his rights under the due process clause of the federal constitution and the state constitution providing any plea of guilty obtained only by force, fear and duress, is a fraud on the court and absolutely void.

The trial court granted defendant a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum, appointed requested counsel for him, and commenced the hearing upon this application October 17, 1960. Upon the completion of the hearing the testimony offered orally and by affidavit was duly considered by the court, and on October 19, 1960, relief was denied. Notice of appeal was duly filed November 15, 1960.

I. Where a right of review is given a person accused of a crime by statute, such a right is substantial and the accused therein may challenge his conviction as having been obtained by duress, coercion, fraud, or undue influence. Sewell v. Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 566, 57 N.W.2d 556, and cases cited therein.

Chapter 788.1, Code 1958, I.C.A., outlines the statutory procedure for a 'motion' in arrest of judgment. Section 788.1 provides: 'A motion in arrest of judgment is an application to the court in which the trial was had, on the part of the defendant, that no judgment be rendered upon a verdict against him, or on a plea of guilty, and shall be granted when upon the whole record no legal judgment can be pronounced.'

Section 788.2 relates to the time of filing the motion and provides: 'The motion may be made at any time before or after judgment, during the same term.' (Emphasis supplied.)

While the defendant entitled his motion an 'application', the entitlement we think was sufficient and the filing clearly was timely, being within the same term. His application to the court entitled him to a hearing and it was promptly afforded him by the learned trial court. As bearing on this right, see State v. Stennett, 220 Iowa 388, 395, 260 N.W. 732; State v. Kirkpatrick, 220 Iowa 974, 976, 263 N.W. 52. While it is stated in State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 515, at page 525, 258 N.W. 886, that a motion for a new trial must be filed before judgment, and while the trial court felt this was actually only a motion for a new trial, we think the review requested was much more and challenged the very jurisdiction of the court to accept his plea of guilty allegedly involuntarily entered. He was entitled to a hearing on that issue. The rule as stated in State v. Bading, 236 Iowa 468, 471, 17 N.W.2d 804, 807, is that 'a motion in arrest of judgment must be granted upon the whole record * * * in the event the court finds no legal judgment can be (or could be) pronounced.' Thus if upon the whole record here it is determined, as defendant contends, that the plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered, but was procured by undue influence, coercion and fraud, no valid judgment or sentence could be pronounced herein. State v. Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 85 N.W.2d 598, and cases cited therein; Euziere v. United States, 10 Cir., 249 F.2d 293 and cases cited therein; 14 Am.Jur., §§ 286-287, pages 960-962.

II. Appellant first contends the trial court erred in failing to find from the conflicting testimony that there was coercion and that the plea of guilty was induced thereby. Upon a review of this nature we determine only whether there is substantial evidence supporting the findings of the trial court. If the court accepts and considers the competent and material testimony introduced and, after weighing the same, finds it is either sufficient or insufficient to sustain the burden of proof necessarily devolved upon applicant, that determination is usually binding upon us. Sewell v. Lainson, supra.

Here we note a direct contradiction as to who requested the conferences between the defendant and the county attorney or his assistant, and as to what was actually said at those conferences. Defendant contends he was first approached by the county attorney and asked to plead guilty a few days prior to the appointment of Mr. Goldblatt and the commencement of the trial. He said he agreed under certain conditions not then acceptable. On the other hand, the county attorney testified defendant requested that conference and offered to plead guilty to the rape charge if the county attorney would recommend a ten-year sentence, return his camera and certain pictures seized by the officers and held as evidence in the matter, and allow him an unsupervised visit with his wife. When the county attorney advised would recommend a fifteen-year sentence and refused to return lewd pictures or permit a visit not under the usual rules of the sheriff's office, no plea was entered.

At later conferences between the defendant and his counsel Goldblatt, and between Goldblatt, the county attorney and the trial court, there was a dispute as to what was said by the respective parties. By affidavit admitted by stipulation, the county attorney, Edward F. Samore, stated 'that neither I nor my assistant nor any member of the County Attorney's staff, nor his counsel in any way made any remarks or acted in any manner calculated or gave any appearance or indication of any effort or desire to pressure the defendant in the very least * * *'; that '* * * he was advised by me in the presence of his counsel that the other charges would have to be disposed of in the normal channels of criminal procedure pursuant to the Laws of the State of Iowa'; that in response to defendant's question as to whether there was any inclination on the part of the State to prosecute under the Habitual Criminal statute or file any other charges, 'he was advised by me in the presence of his counsel that there was none.' Affidavits of his former counsel, Mr. Goldblatt, largely corroborated those declarations of the county attorney. The trial court stated it 'has never had occasion to question the veracity of either of these attorneys', and we do not question that quality in the presiding judge.

We are satisfied there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that as a matter of fact no threats, promises, or undue influence calculated to induce defendant to plead guilty to the offense of rape or the included offense of assault with intent to commit rape, were made by the county attorney or his assistants. Thus it must be concluded that no statements were made which were reasonably calculated to influence the defendant to a point of coercion in entering a plea of guilty herein.

III. Counsel argues, however, that the circumstances and sequence of facts strongly indicate the actions of the county attorney were calculated to and did, as a matter of fact, influence and coerce the defendant into entering the plea of guilty, and that the showing was sufficient to require that the judgment and sentence be set aside. A careful examination of those circumstances and events does not reasonably require such a conclusion. While it is true a plea of guilty to a charge contained in an indictment or information must be entered freely, voluntarily, and without any semblance of coercion, and that under the United States Supreme Court decisions, as well as our own, a plea of guilty interposed as a result thereof is not...

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  • State v. Sisco
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 24 July 1969
    ...and without fear or persuasion, the court may without abusing its discretion refuse to permit its withdrawal. State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 111, 112, 111 N.W.2d 255, 260; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 505, pages 497, 498; Anno. 66 A.L.R. 638.' See also Machibroda v. United States, 3......
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    • 16 October 1974
    ...711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d at 549--550, and citations; Code § 777.15; State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 106--107, 111 N.W.2d 255 (1961); People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313, 314--315 (1968); Recommendations of the National Advisory Commiss......
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    ...However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume public officials have done their duty. State v. Bastedo, 253 Iowa 103, 110, 111 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1961); State v. Critelli, 237 Iowa 1271, 1281, 24 N.W.2d 113, 118 (1946). This means a grand jury is presumed to be legally consti......
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