State v. Bates

• Decision Date: 01 May 1894
• Docket Number: 11,488
• Citation: 15 So. 204,46 La.Ann. 849
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GEORGE BATES AND PETER RAMP

15 So. 204

46 La.Ann. 849

STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GEORGE BATES AND PETER RAMP

No. 11,488

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 1, 1894

Rehearing refused.

APPEAL from the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Moise, J.

M. J Cunningham, Attorney General, and Jno. J. Finney, Assistant District Attorney, for the State.

Paul W Roussel, Attorney for Defendant and Appellant.

OPINION

NICHOLLS, C.J.

Only one question is presented to us in this case. Defendant was convicted in the lower court upon an information for petty larceny and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for six months.

He complains in this as he did in the District Court of the ruling of the judge a quo in allowing, over his objections, the introduction of the testimony of several witnesses, which evidence he claims was to show that he was guilty of another separate and distinct larceny, committed at a different time and place, and of property belonging to a different owner.

His position is set forth in the syllabus of the brief of his counsel as follows:

"On trial of an accused charged with larceny, it is not competent for the State, in order to show the intent with which the act was committed, to prove him guilty of another larceny committed at a different time and place. State vs. Johnson, 38 An. 686, 688; State vs. Palmer, 32 An. 565; Schaser vs. The State, 36 Wis. 429.

"On the trial of an indictment for larceny evidence of DISTINCT thefts committed at other times and places than the one for which defendant is on trial is incompetent. William vs. State (Texas), 6 S.W. 318; English vs State (Texas), 15 S.W. 649.

"Evidence must be confined to the point at issue and the facts proven must he strictly relevant to the particular charge and have no reference to any conduct of the prisoner disconnected with the charge. Hudson vs. The State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 355; People vs. Sharp, 107 N.Y. (Ct. App.) 427."

The general rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offence he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offence alone and that other offences committed by him are wholly excluded; therefore, the introduction of collateral evidence of extraneous crimes to show intent, motive, guilty knowledge, are exceptions to this general rule, and in order that this evidence be admissible at all it must bear directly and materially upon and have some connection with the issue before the jury. People vs. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427; Hudson vs. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 355; English vs. State (Texas), 15 S.W. 649; Commonwealth vs. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, and authorities cited therein.

There is no doubt that for certain purposes and under certain circumstances evidence is admissible of the perpetration by the defendant of a crime other than the one with which he is charged. The general rule, however, is against the introduction of such evidence and the exceptional circumstances, which justify a departure from the rule, should be clear and very convincing. This statement of the proposition shows that each case must, to a great extent, be passed upon in view of its own special facts. The subject is treated of at length in Rice on Evidence, Vol. 3, Chap. 25, Secs. 153 et seq., and specially as to larceny in Chap. 42, Sec. 453.

The author in Sec. 157 says: "It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle that a party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of another;" and in Sec. 153 he says: "The indictment is all that the defendant is expected to come prepared to answer. Therefore, the introduction of another and extraneous crime is calculated to take the defendant by surprise, and to do him manifest injustice by creating a prejudice against his general character. * * * It would lead to conviction upon the particular charge made by proof of other acts in no way connected with it, and to uniting evidence of several offences to produce conviction for a single one."

In the bill of exceptions reserved by the defendant to the action of the court in permitting the testimony of Dominecq, Chaplain and Kennedy to go to the jury, to show the intent of the accused (Bates) at the time of the larceny of the pool balls, charged to have been stolen on the 30th of September, 1893, the testimony of those witnesses is stated by him "to have been substantially as follows:

"That George Bates, in company with one William Daly, alias Chickens, did, on the day previous, enter the place of one J P. Dominecq, and that after their departure five balls were found missing, which balls were subsequently found at Louis Chaplain's, where they had been sold by the said George Bates. That the said five balls, or any of them, were not the ones alleged to have been stolen from the place of M. Schultz on the 30th of September, 1893, for...