State v. Bates
| Decision Date | 11 August 1953 |
| Citation | 99 A.2d 133,140 Conn. 326 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. BATES. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Thomas F. Wall, Public Defender, Torrington, for the appellant (defendant).
H. Roger Jones, State's Attorney, New Hartford, for the appellee (state).
Before BROWN, C. J., and BALDWIN, INGLIS, O'SULLIVAN and CORNELL, JJ.
The defendant was charged in the Superior Court in Litchfield County with the crime of carnal knowledge of a minor female under the age of sixteen years in violation of § 8562 of the General Statutes. The offense was alleged to have been committed in New Milford on or about April 10, 1951. The defendant pleaded not guilty, was found guilty by the jury and was sentenced by the court. He has appealed to this court, claiming error in the denial of his motion to set aside the verdict, in two rulings upon the admission of evidence, and in the court's charge to the jury. The complaining witness, who was fourteen years of age, testified that the defendant had had sexual intercourse with her as alleged. This the defendant denied. Supplemental evidence through other witnesses was offered on the one side and the other. Under our view of the case, a discussion of one, only, of these evidence rulings, in connection with the charge referring to it, sufficiently disposes of the appeal.
Some time after the defendant had been arrested and released on bond, he was present in the New Milford town building with his attorney in the presence of the complaining witness. Referring to this occasion, in response to a question by the state's attorney on direct examination, the witness testified that she then accused the defendant of what he had done to her. She was then asked: 'Did he make any statement----?' The defendant's attorney objected to the question, stating that he had advised the defendant to remain silent, and claiming that to admit the inquiry would violate the rule laid down in State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 265, 116 A. 336. The state claimed that this rule was inapplicable because the defendant was not in custody, being on bond at the time. The court overruled the defendant's objection. The examination then proceeded as follows:
'Q.--Did Charles Bates make any answer at that time? A.--No, he didn't.
'Q.--When you accused him? Did you make the statement at that time, 'He's the one that had intercourse with me'? A.--Yes.
The theory upon which a third person's statement assented to by a party's silence may be held admissible stems from the ancient maxim that 'silence gives consent.' Obviously, while silence may imply assent to the correctness of a communication, this holds true only under certain conditions. '[T]he inference of assent may safely be made only when no other explanation is equally consistent with silence. * * *' 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.) p. 70. There is a divergence of judicial opinion as to the effect, on admissibility of incriminating statements made in the presence of an accused and not denied by him, of the fact that he was under arrest, or in custody under a criminal charge, at the time the accusation was made. There is abundant authority 'that the mere fact of arrest is sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of the accused's failure to deny accusatory statements then made in his presence and hearing.' 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th Ed.) p. 1101. As the authority quoted further states, this is on the ground 'that it is the common knowledge and belief of men in general that silence while under arrest is most conducive to the welfare of an accused whether he be guilty or innocent; that is to say, that anything he may say not only may, but will, be used against him; and that such restraint upon an accused destroys the basis for an inference of acquiescence by silence or failure to controvert.' Id., 1102; note, 80 A.L.R. 1235, 1262; People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103, 106, 184 N.E. 689.
State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 A. 336, is one of many supporting decisions cited in the first two of the above authorities. In that case, this court stated the rule applicable in this state as follows, 97 Conn. at page 265, 116 A. at page 339, The rule has since been applied in Weller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 58, 192 A. 317, and State v. Yochelman, 107 Conn. 148, 152, 139 A. 632.
In view of the right which the rule accords to an accused when he is 'in custody,' the question for decision is whether...
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State v. Ralls
...for court or prosecutor to comment on the defendant's silence in the face of in-custody accusations or interrogation. State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d 133; State v. Ferrone, 97 Conn. 258, 116 A. 336; see Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 468 n. 37, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The cases which the......
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State v. Deatore
...whether on a basis of constitutional right or not, is not confined to the federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d 133 (Sup.Ct.Err.1953) (silence inadmissible); People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 172 P.2d 18 (Sup.Ct.1946) (silence admissible). In this context, ......
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State v. Ayala
...of release. While released on bail prior to trial, a defendant is still within the constructive custody of the law. State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 330-31, 99 A.2d 133 (1953). The trial court retains jurisdiction over the conditions of release; see General Statutes §§ 54-69 to 54-69b et seq.......
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